Dossiers

From Lebanon, the Israeli escalation in South Lebanon directly questions the strength of the agreement in preparation between the United States and Iran. Strikes, incursions and the continuation of Israeli forces are taking place as Washington seeks to conclude quickly with Tehran. Benjamin Netanyahu, subjected to electoral pressure and an Israeli opinion in favour of a hard line, risks developing his privileged relationship with Donald Trump.

The resumption of exports to Saudi Arabia opens a probationary period for Lebanon. Riyadh is not just reopening a market: it tests Beirut's ability to control its borders, fight the Captagon, stabilize its institutions and restore credible sovereignty. The relationship with Riyadh can become the key to an Arab return from Lebanon, but only if the state transforms this economic signal into lasting political evidence.

The Syrian displaced in Lebanon are at the heart of a crisis enlarged by the war of 2026. In addition to the old tensions over municipalities, schools, care and employment, the massive displacement of Lebanese families from the South is now added. The return to Syria is progressing, but it remains limited by security, documents, housing and the economy. Without a clear bilateral framework between Beirut and Damascus, the crisis may continue.

The United States-Iran regional agreement is the product of multi-channel diplomacy. Qatar has reopened a door in Tehran, Pakistan has carried the political announcement and Switzerland must offer the signature framework. This indirect method helped to circumvent the lack of trust between Washington and Tehran, reopen Ormuz and push back the most difficult cases. However, Lebanon remains the potential point of rupture.

The American guarantees promised in the agreement between Washington and Tehran will be judged in Lebanon on their ability to contain Israel. Tehran claims that the Lebanese front must be included in the regional ceasefire, while Benjamin Netanyahu refuses to lose his freedom of action against Hezbollah. For Beirut, American credibility will depend on concrete actions: stopping strikes, Israeli withdrawal, the role of the Finul and the safe return of the people of the South.

Israel claims to want to preserve its freedom of action in Lebanon against Hezbollah, but the Iran-USA agreement changes the calculation. Washington wants to protect regional de-escalation, Tehran claims that Lebanon is included in the ceasefire and Beirut calls for a full withdrawal. Between targeted strikes, partial withdrawal, buffer zone and international surveillance, the Israeli strategy must now deal with a new constraint: not to defeat the regional agreement.

Lebanon concentrates on the contradictions of the Iran-USA agreement. Tehran wants to include the Lebanese front in the de-escalation. Israel refuses to lose its freedom of action against Hezbollah. Washington seeks to preserve its deal with Iran without breaking with its Israeli ally. Beirut claims its sovereignty, but does not control the land alone. The ceasefire will therefore be judged in the South, in the villages, on the return roads and around the disputed Israeli positions.

The deal with Iran does not end regional tensions. It suspends hostilities, reopens Ormuz and refers key issues to further negotiations. The United States can claim de-escalation, but it also appears to be constrained by the political, energy and military cost of the war. In the Gulf, the American umbrella is questioned. In Lebanon, Iran's claimed inclusion of the Lebanese front strengthens Hezbollah and complicates the line of Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam.

Despite the possible agreement between Washington and Tehran, Israel refuses to withdraw from Lebanon and intends to maintain its freedom of action against Hezbollah. This position weakens the US-Iran deal, as Tehran links de-escalation to the fate of the Lebanese front. Without Israeli withdrawal, the ceasefire may remain incomplete.

Tensions between Israel, Turkey and several Arab countries are getting stronger around the discourses on "Great Israel". Saudi Arabia, which remains opposed to Hezbollah's weapons, however, seems to reassess its approach in the light of Iranian resilience and Israeli escalation. Turkey sees the strikes in Lebanon and Syria as a direct threat. The concept of the "new Middle East", already invoked in 2006, has been reflected in regional discussions.

On 9 June 1861, the Beyoğlu Protocol established the Mount Lebanon Moutassarifiya after the 1860 massacres. This Ottoman autonomy, guaranteed by the European powers, stabilizes the Mountain but institutionalises Community representation, foreshadowing the religious balances of modern Lebanon and its lasting political compromises until today still visible.

Ben Gvir reportedly proposed arresting women and youth from Hizbullah-related families, according to the Israeli press. This declaration revives the charge of collective punishment, questions international humanitarian law and places Israel's allies in the face of a major political and legal red line at the heart of the conflict.

The Israeli technique in Lebanon resembles the frog in a pot: temperature rises in degrees, village after village, strikes after strike, evacuation order after evacuation order. Meanwhile, Lebanon is being asked to negotiate as if a ceasefire could be unilateral. This editorial defends the obvious: no serious discussion can begin without complete, complete, reciprocal and verifiable cessation of military operations.

In this case, René Naba analyses Yemen as a decisive player in the Gaza war. Despite blockade, bombardment and poverty, the Houthists imposed a new regional equation, disrupted the Red Sea and challenged Western, Israeli and petromonarchic military arrangements around the global strategic routes of international maritime trade.