Dossiers

The vote on the media bill by joint parliamentary committees goes far beyond the professional press. Depending on its final wording, the text may affect citizens who publish on Facebook, X, Instagram or TikTok. The main risk lies in too wide a scope, vague concepts such as false news or infringement of institutions, and a regulatory authority that can become a tool for political control.

The vote on the media bill by joint parliamentary committees goes far beyond the professional press. Depending on its final wording, the text may affect citizens who publish on Facebook, X, Instagram or TikTok. The main risk lies in too wide a scope, vague concepts such as false news or infringement of institutions, and a regulatory authority that can become a tool for political control.

The project to revive the Hedjaz railway, carried by Turkey with Saudi Arabia, goes far beyond the economic framework. By connecting Turkey with the Gulf through Syria and Jordan, Ankara is seeking to become again a central player in regional traffic. This corridor competes with projects linking the Emirates and Saudi Arabia to the Israeli port of Haifa. It also worries Israel, already concerned about Turkish influence in Syria, and puts Riyadh in the face of a contradiction: to cooperate with Ankara while not trusting its report to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The project to revive the Hedjaz railway, carried by Turkey with Saudi Arabia, goes far beyond the economic framework. By connecting Turkey with the Gulf through Syria and Jordan, Ankara is seeking to become again a central player in regional traffic. This corridor competes with projects linking the Emirates and Saudi Arabia to the Israeli port of Haifa. It also worries Israel, already concerned about Turkish influence in Syria, and puts Riyadh in the face of a contradiction: to cooperate with Ankara while not trusting its report to the Muslim Brotherhood.

No, the spectre of civil war is not back in Lebanon.This is a beautiful lure that the Lebanese have understood what the trap of a civil war costs. No, Israel's irresistible temptation to incrust in the South did not end.Yes, in its negotiation with America, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to enunciate only the south of the [...]

The framework agreement signed between Lebanon, Israel and the United States may encounter several institutional locks. Article 52 of the Constitution raises the question of passage through Parliament. Article 65 imposes two thirds on the Council of Ministers on fundamental matters. In the House, the quorum is 65 deputies and the vote on a law is public. The debate was also political: Taif imposed the dissolution of the militias, but its part on the liberation of the South served to legitimize the resistance against Israel.

The Lebanon-Israel agreement provides a diplomatic framework, but leaves Beirut without decisive guarantees. Total withdrawal, timing, cessation of strikes, reconstruction and return of displaced persons remain conditioned. The Lebanese army finds itself at the centre of a heavy, disputed and risky device, under American guarantee deemed insufficient by part of the South.

The Lebanon-Israel framework agreement signed in Washington states that it wants to restore Lebanese sovereignty and organize a progressive Israeli redeployment. But an essential point remains outside the text: the de-confliction cell linked to Iran. This parallel structure reminds us that Hezbollah and its regional sponsor remain at the heart of the security equation. The official framework seeks to exclude Iran from the Lebanese file, while the actual management of the ceasefire still seems to have to take into account its influence.

The framework agreement signed in Washington between Lebanon, Israel and the United States reveals a major absence: Europeans, especially France, have no formal role in the guarantee mechanism. This architecture gives Washington a central position in mediation, verification and mobilization of aid. But it exposes Beirut to strong political criticism, as American guarantees remain widely perceived in Lebanon as close to Israeli security priorities.

The text of the Lebanon-Israel framework agreement sets out an ambitious but fragile political and security architecture. It affirms the will of both countries to end the conflict, places the Lebanese army at the centre of territorial control and conditions the Israeli redeployment to the verified disarmament of non-State armed groups. Its strengths lie in the recognition of Lebanese sovereignty and the opening of a direct process. Its weaknesses are due to the lack of a clear timetable and the delicate role imposed on the Lebanese army.

Benjamin Netanyahu's statement on Israel's continued presence in the security zone changes the scope of the framework agreement signed in Washington. Israel accepts a partial withdrawal, but retains a military presence in southern Lebanon. Lebanon, which required a total withdrawal, accepted a transition without a definitive timetable. The Lebanese army is at the centre of a delicate arrangement between the restoration of sovereignty and the risk of being accused of indirectly securing Israeli troops.

Lebanon wants to sell a golden visa for $500,000 in a country where banks hold money, the state improvises and the South is still burning. The idea promises administrative prestige, but above all looks like a VIP invitation to test the strength of a house already cracked from everywhere.

Hamas appears to be the great absence of discussions between Iran, the United States and actors in regional de-escalation. This absence questions the nature of the attack of 7 October 2023.

The war in southern Lebanon is not only measured by the number of strikes, destruction or technological superiority of Israel. Israel can win tactical battles while failing strategically. Hezbollah, despite its losses, chose attrition: to survive, maintain a human cost and prevent Israel from imposing a lasting order. The battle of Ali Tahir and Israeli polls on Iran show that the story of an Israeli victory is deeply contested.