Dossiers

The framework agreement signed between Lebanon, Israel and the United States may encounter several institutional locks. Article 52 of the Constitution raises the question of passage through Parliament. Article 65 imposes two thirds on the Council of Ministers on fundamental matters. In the House, the quorum is 65 deputies and the vote on a law is public. The debate was also political: Taif imposed the dissolution of the militias, but its part on the liberation of the South served to legitimize the resistance against Israel.

The Lebanon-Israel agreement provides a diplomatic framework, but leaves Beirut without decisive guarantees. Total withdrawal, timing, cessation of strikes, reconstruction and return of displaced persons remain conditioned. The Lebanese army finds itself at the centre of a heavy, disputed and risky device, under American guarantee deemed insufficient by part of the South.

The Lebanon-Israel framework agreement signed in Washington states that it wants to restore Lebanese sovereignty and organize a progressive Israeli redeployment. But an essential point remains outside the text: the de-confliction cell linked to Iran. This parallel structure reminds us that Hezbollah and its regional sponsor remain at the heart of the security equation. The official framework seeks to exclude Iran from the Lebanese file, while the actual management of the ceasefire still seems to have to take into account its influence.

The framework agreement signed in Washington between Lebanon, Israel and the United States reveals a major absence: Europeans, especially France, have no formal role in the guarantee mechanism. This architecture gives Washington a central position in mediation, verification and mobilization of aid. But it exposes Beirut to strong political criticism, as American guarantees remain widely perceived in Lebanon as close to Israeli security priorities.

The text of the Lebanon-Israel framework agreement sets out an ambitious but fragile political and security architecture. It affirms the will of both countries to end the conflict, places the Lebanese army at the centre of territorial control and conditions the Israeli redeployment to the verified disarmament of non-State armed groups. Its strengths lie in the recognition of Lebanese sovereignty and the opening of a direct process. Its weaknesses are due to the lack of a clear timetable and the delicate role imposed on the Lebanese army.

Benjamin Netanyahu's statement on Israel's continued presence in the security zone changes the scope of the framework agreement signed in Washington. Israel accepts a partial withdrawal, but retains a military presence in southern Lebanon. Lebanon, which required a total withdrawal, accepted a transition without a definitive timetable. The Lebanese army is at the centre of a delicate arrangement between the restoration of sovereignty and the risk of being accused of indirectly securing Israeli troops.

Lebanon wants to sell a golden visa for $500,000 in a country where banks hold money, the state improvises and the South is still burning. The idea promises administrative prestige, but above all looks like a VIP invitation to test the strength of a house already cracked from everywhere.

Hamas appears to be the great absence of discussions between Iran, the United States and actors in regional de-escalation. This absence questions the nature of the attack of 7 October 2023.

The war in southern Lebanon is not only measured by the number of strikes, destruction or technological superiority of Israel. Israel can win tactical battles while failing strategically. Hezbollah, despite its losses, chose attrition: to survive, maintain a human cost and prevent Israel from imposing a lasting order. The battle of Ali Tahir and Israeli polls on Iran show that the story of an Israeli victory is deeply contested.

The Lebanese case is no longer only dealt with in the Washington Canal between Lebanon, Israel and the United States. It now depends on the Iran-USA negotiations, where the ceasefire in South Lebanon has become a regional clause. This evolution penalizes several Lebanese errors: withdrawal of the army from sensitive positions, breaking the official channel with Iran and processing the disarmament of Hezbollah as a pre-emptive promise rather than as a negotiating map.

The Swiss agreements resulting from the first round of talks between Iran and the United States established Lebanon as the first test of compromise. The Iranian document MINAB 168 highlights five points: Lebanon's conflict management mechanism, Ormuz direct line, Article 13 technical groups, Iran-Qatar agreement on frozen assets and US oil exemption. The actual scope will depend on the application texts and the field.

The role of Youssef Rajji in the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel has become a central political subject. Without official announcement, the Foreign Minister seems to be less present in the decisive channels, in favour of the presidency, the army, Nabih Berri and American mediation. The Iranian ambassador's episode, which the presidency wanted to limit to a reprimand according to political rumours, weakened its method and reinforced the informal channels linked to Hezbollah.

The United Arab Emirates appears to be one of the indirect losers of the conflict with Iran. Their model was based on three pillars: Dubai's role as a re-export platform to Iran under sanctions, the strength of Abu Dhabi's oil revenues and the image of a secure financial refuge in the heart of the Gulf. The war has weakened these three advantages at the same time, while revealing the limits of the American security umbrella and the political cost of normalization with Israel.

Iran is emerging from the conflict with the United States and Israel, but its victory remains fragile. By turning the Strait of Ormuz into a deterrent, Tehran has gained a major strategic advantage. But if it seeks to win this passage or to impose lasting restrictions, it risks provoking a hostile coalition, speeding up alternative roads and turning peace into a new regional crisis.