The energy component of the agreement with Iran goes far beyond the nuclear issue. It affects the Darmuz Strait, Iranian oil exports, maritime insurance, American sanctions, fuel prices and the balance of vulnerable countries such as Lebanon. Following the signing of the interim memorandum between Washington and Tehran, the markets immediately reacted to the prospect of a gradual reopening of the most sensitive sea route in the Gulf. The barrel has declined, indicating that the operators anticipate a partial return of Iranian supply and a relaxation on oil transport. But this decline is not worth a settlement. The agreement opens a window of sixty days. It does not guarantee the complete lifting of sanctions, the sustainable normalization of the Strait or the elimination of the risk of regional sabotage.
Hormuz, the corridor that shakes markets
The Darmuz Strait is not only a geographical map. It is one of the most strategic crossing points in the world economy. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, oil flows through the Strait reached about 20 million barrels per day in 2024, or almost 20% of global consumption of petroleum liquids. The EIA ranks among the world’s largest energy bottlenecks, with the Strait of Malacca.
This concentration explains the nervousness of the markets. An incident in the Darmuz Strait does not only affect Iran or the Gulf monarchies. It can disrupt Asian refineries, London insurers, Greek shipowners, European banks, refined product carriers and fuel consumers in Beirut, Paris or Manila. Geography imposes dependence. Alternative roads exist, but they remain limited, costly or insufficient to absorb a major crisis.
The American-Iranian memorandum therefore has a direct energy impact. Reuters reports that the text provides for the restoration of the safe passage of commercial ships by Iran, the gradual end of the US naval blockade and the return of maritime traffic to the Gulf. The same document opens a 60-day negotiation period to transform this memorandum of understanding into a final agreement.
Market reaction was rapid. The Brent fell around $77.96 a barrel and WTI around $74.96 after the agreement was signed, according to Reuters. This decline reflects less certainty than relief. Traders aren’t celebrating peace yet. They re-evaluate a risk premium that had swollen with the war, the partial closure of the strait and the threat of wider confrontation.
The possible return of Iranian oil
The second major issue concerns Iranian oil. The memorandum provides for exemptions or licences to resume sales of crude oil and petroleum products. Reuters had already reported, before the signature, that an American official indicated that Iran could sell oil immediately after the agreement. The interim text also refers to the gradual lifting of sanctions and access to certain financial channels.
For Iran, the stake is vital. Oil remains a central source of foreign exchange. American sanctions have long forced Tehran to sell under duress, with discounts, opaque circuits, intermediaries and increased dependence on some Asian buyers. The return of more normal channels would increase revenues, reduce transaction costs and restore part of Iran’s commercial credibility.
For markets, the question is not just whether Iran can sell. She asked how quickly, with what assurances, what flags, what banks and what American guarantees. A legally authorized barrel does not circulate automatically. We need contracts, letters of credit, available tankers, reassured insurers and buyers convinced that Washington will not come back abruptly on its exemptions.
This uncertainty explains the caution of analysts. Reuters indicates that some market participants anticipate gradual normalisation, not an immediate shock of supply. Goldman Sachs, quoted by the Agency, believes that exports could normalize by the end of July and production by October, if the political process is sustained.
The timetable is therefore decisive. A rapid fall in prices can occur on expectations. A sustainable decline requires real volumes. Refineries must receive crude oil. Tankers have to cross. Insurers must cover. Banks have to pay. The agreement creates the possibility of this chain. It does not yet guarantee its full functioning.
Penalties, insurance and banks: invisible mechanics
The general public looks at the price of the barrel. Professionals also look at sanctions, insurance and payments. For years, American architecture against Iran has not only targeted oil sales. It targets ships, banks, front companies, brokers, foreign refineries, ports, insurers and logistics companies. The U.S. Treasury Department maintains a dedicated page on Iranian sanctions, with recent alerts on the risks associated with Iranian demands for Hormuz passage and oil trade with certain refineries.
This architecture has a powerful effect: it turns any transaction with Iran into a risk of compliance. Even when the rules relax, companies expect written guarantees. A European bank may refuse payment if it fears a secondary sanction. An insurer may refuse to cover a tanker. A shipowner may require a high premium. A buyer can wait until clear licenses are published before signing.
That is why the lifting of sanctions is not limited to a political sentence. It requires implementing texts, licences, Treasury instructions, coordination with European and Asian partners and then communication to markets. American sanctions have become a global administrative system. Sometimes loosening them takes as long as imposing them.
The memorandum promises a dynamic of lifting. It does not instantly remove all constraints. Opposition to the US Congress, Israeli objections, Iranian conservative reservations and the risk of a military incident can slow down or cancel this mechanism. The sixty-day period will therefore be both legal and diplomatic. Economic actors will look at the texts, not just statements.
A relaxing price, but not an acquired security
The reduction in the barrel after the agreement should not be confused with full stabilization. Energy prices depend on several factors: availability, stocks, global demand, OPEC+ decisions, refinery capacity, exchange rates, monetary policy and risk perception. The agreement with Iran acts on a major factor, but it does not control all the others.
U.S. stocks show the accumulated tension. Reuters reported that total U.S. crude stocks, including trade and strategic reserves, had dropped to 758.5 million barrels, their lowest level since March 1985, after ten consecutive weeks of decline. This reflects the disruptions of the Iranian war and the increasing demand for American supplies.
This data limits euphoria. If stocks are low, the market remains vulnerable. A reopening of Hormuz can lower the risk premium. But an incident can bring her up immediately. The difference between sustainable relaxation and a simple rebound will depend on the continuity of flows, the rebuilding of stocks and the ability of producers to supply without creating new tensions.
The International Energy Agency had already pointed out in its May 2026 report that the disruptions of maritime trade by Hormuz had weighed on land stocks and refining flows. It predicted a significant drop in refining flows in the second quarter of 2026 due to damage, export restrictions and reduced availability of raw materials.
The return to normal will therefore not be instantaneous. Infrastructure must work. The ports must resume. Refineries need to adjust their supplies. The flow of refined products must be reconstituted. The oil market reacts quickly to announcements, but it slowly stabilizes on volumes.
American Political Risk
The agreement with Iran will also be tested in Washington. Donald Trump can present the memorandum as a success: a drop in oil, a reopening of Hormuz, a halt to the war, and continued pressure on Iranian nuclear power. But Republican and pro-Israeli critics can denounce a text that is too favourable to Tehran. They can point to oil exemptions, Iranian funds, prospects for lifting sanctions and the absence of immediate dismantling of the nuclear programme.
This opposition can have an immediate economic effect. If companies consider that the agreement will be contested, blocked or reversible, they will remain cautious. The memory of the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement remains present in all legal directions. Major groups know that a change of line in Washington can turn a licit contract into a major risk.
Trump also maintains military pressure. According to the information reported after the signing, the US President insisted that the bombings could resume if Iran failed to comply with its commitments. This dual logic, agreement and threat, reassures part of its electorate, but it also maintains uncertainty.
Markets can live with a threat. They live less well with unpredictability. If exemptions are clear and durable, flows will resume. If they appear conditional on each report or incident, prices will remain volatile. Iranian oil could then come back suddenly, without producing the expected relaxation.
Iran between economic victory and nuclear constraints
For Tehran, the energy side is a political victory. The return of oil to markets allows the Iranian government to assert that it has resisted military pressure and obtained recognition of its economic rights. Access to frozen funds, the resumption of sales and the partial end of maritime blockades provide the government with an inner breath.
But this breath has a price. Iran must restore maritime security, commit not to develop nuclear weapons and accept supervision over the fate of enriched materials. The memorandum refers to on-site dilution under IAEA supervision as a minimum basis for stored materials.
The compromise is fragile. Hardest Iranian officials can denounce an excessive nuclear concession. Opponents of the agreement in the United States may denounce an excessive concession on sanctions. Israel can seek to demonstrate that Iran retains a dangerous capability. Each camp therefore has reasons to contest the text.
Energy is becoming a stabilizing instrument here. By quickly giving Iran economic benefits, Washington seeks to create a material interest to respect the agreement. By allowing a drop in oil, Trump is also seeking an American domestic profit. Diplomacy is coupled with a market calculation. The lower the prices, the more politically the agreement becomes defensible.
Effects on vulnerable countries, including Lebanon
Lebanon is not a major global consumer. But it is highly exposed to energy prices. It imports most of its fuels. Its power grid remains fragile. Private generators, road transport, industry, agriculture, hospitals and households are directly affected by variations in oil and diesel. A sustained fall in prices can therefore offer real relief.
This relief remains indirect. Lebanon does not automatically benefit from a global decline if its currency, public finances, import mechanisms and distribution channels remain fragile. The final price also depends on taxes, margins, transport costs, currency availability and the operation of importers. Relaxation on the barrel can reduce pressure. It does not repair the Lebanese electricity sector.
For Lebanese companies, energy cuts can improve production costs. Plants that rely on diesel to compensate for cuts can regain some margin. Carriers can absorb fewer loads. Households can pay less for certain travel or services. But these effects will only be significant if the fall lasts and is actually passed on to local prices.
The risk is therefore to overestimate the agreement. Hormuz can reopen. Iranian oil can come back. Prices may fall. But Lebanon will remain vulnerable as long as it does not reform its electricity, restore banking confidence, secure its imports and stabilize its institutions. The deal can lighten the bill. It cannot replace a national energy policy.
A global economy still suspended from Gulf security
The energy record shows the power of interdependence. A decision made in Washington and Tehran changes the price of fuel in Beirut. A naval incident in the Gulf may affect Asian imports. A US Treasury license can determine whether a bank agrees to finance an Iranian shipment. A strike in Lebanon may threaten the credibility of an agreement on Hormuz.
This interdependence gives the memorandum an importance that goes beyond its political content. It is not just a question of calming a war. The aim is to restore a global economic chain: navigation, insurance, financing, refining and distribution. If this chain goes back, the agreement will produce visible effects. If it remains blocked by mistrust, relaxation will remain partial.
The next few weeks will therefore be decisive. It will be necessary to check whether the ships actually pass, whether insurance premiums are falling, whether buyers are taking back Iranian crude, whether US licences are clear enough, whether sanctions are loosening and whether prices remain downward. It will also be necessary to monitor those actors who can sabotage the process: opponents of the agreement in Washington, Israeli officials hostile to any concessions to Iran, distrustful Iranian factions and regional groups likely to revive an escalation.
Hormuz remains the barometer. If the strait works, the agreement will have immediate economic value. If the passage remains uncertain, the market will retain a risk premium. For fragile countries, the challenge is concrete: fuels, electricity, transport, inflation, purchasing power. The agreement with Iran will therefore be measured not only in diplomatic communiqués, but in ports, refineries, gas stations and energy bills.
