Mediation without a tripartite meeting
The relaxation that has emerged in recent days between Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and the political environment of Hezbollah has not arisen from a substantive agreement. It is the result of a de-escalation work led by Nabih Berri between the Great Serail and Haret Hreik. Before Salam’s last visit to Nabatiyah, the tone was hardened. The Head of Government and Hezbollah exchanged critical messages without always naming themselves directly. The answers passed through speeches, the media and allusions sufficiently clear to be understood by both sides. The risk was no longer that of political disagreement over weapons, state authority or how to deal with the Israeli occupation. An extension of this confrontation could turn the dispute into a rupture between the government and a major political and social component of the South.
Berri chose a discreet method. He did not hold a tripartite meeting with Salam and Hezbollah. On the contrary, the available evidence indicates that he worked through separate channels, political contacts and messages transmitted from one camp to another. The first objective was limited but concrete: to stop verbal escalation before Salam’s visit to Nabatiyah. The priority was therefore not to resolve the strategic disagreement. It consisted of preventing the official displacement of the Prime Minister to the South from becoming a demonstration of rejection, a political boycott or a new sequence of public confrontation. This distinction is important: mediation focused on the conditions of political coexistence, not on doctrinal reconciliation.
Nabatiyeh, life-size de-escalation test
Salam’s visit to Nabatiyeh was particularly sensitive because it was at the heart of the question of the state’s presence in the South. This was his third visit to the city since his arrival as President of the Council. The first, after gaining parliamentary confidence, was devoted to the demands of the inhabitants. The second dealt with the reconstruction process. The third has taken on a more political dimension: to show that the State intends to remain present in a region devastated by war, destruction, displacement and the persistence of Israeli operations. In this context, welcoming the Prime Minister himself became a political message.
Berri’s preparatory work appears in the composition of this reception. MP Hani Kobeissi, member of the Berri bloc, was present. Finance Minister Yassine Jaber also participated in the sequence. More significantly, several presidents of municipalities considered close to Hezbollah in villages in Nabatiyah district took part in the reception. It would be excessive to interpret their presence as a rallying in Salam’s politics. It shows, however, that displacement has not been treated as a provocation to combat. Berri had thus obtained most of what he was looking for: making possible an official visit to a region where the Prime Minister could have been exposed to a politically very costly challenge.
Salam responds by separating dialogue from disagreement
Nawaf Salam took advantage of this atmosphere to modify the register as well. He claimed that he was not in a situation of hostility to a particular camp and insisted that the dialogue was not broken. He also recalled that some commitments had already been agreed upon and should now be implemented. His message to the inhabitants concerned the presence of the State: they should not consider themselves abandoned. This formulation allowed him to maintain the government line without transforming Hezbollah or its environment into an inner opponent. The head of government did not withdraw the issues of disagreement, but he refused to present them as a total political war.
This shade responds directly to Berri’s strategy. The Speaker of the Chamber seeks to dissociate two levels: disagreement over strategic choices and the daily functioning of the State. The first remains deep. Positions on direct negotiations with Israel, the framework for discussions, Hezbollah’s weapons and the conditions for an Israeli withdrawal remain remote. The second level concerns reconstruction, services, the return of displaced persons, the functioning of administrations and the role of the army. Berri considers that a paralysis in these cases would cost the people of the South the price of a national political conflict, while they already bear the consequences of the war.
The passage through Amal’s television was not insignificant
The sequence continued after Nabatiyah. Salam appeared on the Amal movement chain. The choice of this forum was particularly important in the context of de-escalation. It provided the Prime Minister with direct access to part of the Shiite public and allowed him to explain the government’s position on Israeli withdrawal, the return of the State and the functioning of institutions in the South. Berri thus provided Salam with a political space where he could present his policy without going through confrontation with Hezbollah. This gesture did not erase the differences, but it helped bring the Prime Minister out of the image of an external or environmentally hostile official in the South.
Hizbullah’s response came quickly by Hassan Fadllallah. The MP said his party was in favour of strengthening the role of the State in the South and taking over its responsibilities. However, it was an essential political condition: the priority should be the Israeli departure, the cessation of attacks and the end of the destruction and levelling of villages. He requested that the statements be followed by actions. The answer therefore remained critical, but it was part of a debate on priorities and responsibilities. It did not return to the personal confrontation record that preceded mediation. It is precisely on this ground that Berri achieved a result: not to bring doctrines together, but to change the way in which conflict is expressed.
Why Berri refuses a war against the government
The role of the Speaker of the Chamber cannot be understood solely as one-off mediation. His institutional position and alliance with Hezbollah placed him at the crossroads of several constraints. On the one hand, it shares with its ally major reservations about several government choices, including the framework for negotiations with Israel. On the other hand, he considers that a fall of the government or a frontal confrontation with Nawaf Salam would open a crisis that no one would control. His parliamentary bloc also gave confidence to the government. This vote is a stronger indicator than the rumours of breaking up: Berri wants to retain the possibility of criticizing, correcting and blocking certain choices without overthrowing the executive.
This line also led to curbing the hypothesis of a mobilisation against the government. The information available indicates that he helped convince Hezbollah not to push its opposition until an attempt to eviction Salam, either by the street or in Parliament. The calculation is context-related. Lebanon continues to face an Israeli presence in the South, strikes, the destruction of villages, the displacement of inhabitants and a still fragile reconstruction. Adding a major government crisis could create a political and institutional vacuum. Above all, a confrontation taking on a denominational colour would risk turning a disagreement on the national strategy into a Sunni-Shiite conflict, a scenario that Berri seeks to avoid.
Cooperate without rallying: the logic of Ain el-Tineh
The relationship between Berri and Salam must therefore be read as functional cooperation, not as political convergence. The signs of relaxation do not mean that the Speaker has abandoned his positions. He remained opposed to the negotiating framework he considered problematic and to direct negotiations with Israel. The dynamic between Ain al-Tinh and the Great Serail is based on another logic: institutions must continue to function even when their officials do not share the same strategy. For Berri, the government must provide services, finance needs, participate in reconstruction and support the people of the South. For Salam, the support or at least the non-obstruction of the Speaker of the House is essential to obtain the laws and parliamentary arbitrations necessary for government action.
This interdependence explains why everyone has an interest in de-escalation. Salam is leading a government that cannot function sustainably in an open conflict with the Speaker of the House and the main Shiite political forces. Berri, on the other hand, cannot demand more state support in the South while helping to weaken the executive responsible for sending administrations, financing services and negotiating reconstruction aid. The two men therefore do not need to become allies. They need to prevent their disagreement from destroying the instruments each needs. This logic produces what is more like a conflict resolution than a political agreement.
Reconstruction as a compromise ground
Berri chose reconstruction and services as the gateway to de-escalation because these files allow for an immediate common interest. The South needs roads, electricity, water, public services, compensation and financing to enable people to return. On these issues, the question is not who is right in the arms debate. It is necessary to determine which administration acts, which budgets are released and what guarantees allow families to return. By pushing Salam to go to Nabatiyah and facilitating his reception, Berri also sought to make the government directly accountable for its commitments to the region.
This strategy has another dimension. The more the state is present in the South, the more the debate about its authority ceases to be abstract. An institution does not gain legitimacy only through declarations of sovereignty. She wins it when she repairs a road, puts a school back in service, provides a hospital, compensates a family or secures a village. Berri can therefore simultaneously defend two ideas which seem contradictory: to refuse certain orientations of Salam and to demand that his government be more present in the Shia-majority areas. Reconstruction then becomes an instrument of internal de-escalation, but also a test of credibility for the state.
The breaking point remains the sequence: Israeli withdrawal or disarmament first?
However, mediation does not resolve the main disagreement. Hezbollah maintains that the exit from the crisis must begin with the Israeli withdrawal and the end of the attacks. Naim Kassem summarized this position by refusing the idea that his party should give something in order to get Israel’s departure. In this reading, Lebanon is the assaulted party and Israeli commitments must be carried out before resistance is required for an additional concession. The Government, for its part, has to deal with international pressure to extend the exclusive authority of the State and with the negotiating mechanisms linking the withdrawal stages to Lebanese measures. The difference is therefore less about the declared goal – the return of the State and Israeli withdrawal – than about the order in which the steps must be taken.
It is precisely this issue that Berri cannot resolve through personal mediation. It can reduce verbal attacks, organize communication channels and prevent a boycott. It alone cannot resolve the contradiction between a Hezbollah that refuses to disarm under occupation and an international process that seeks to make withdrawal conditional on the reduction of its military capabilities. As long as this contradiction persists, relaxation will remain fragile. It may allow the government to work and Hezbollah to engage indirectly with it, but it does not remove the possibility of a new crisis when negotiations enter into a more binding phase.
A useful but precarious balance
The result obtained by Berri must therefore be accurately measured. There is no strategic agreement between Salam and Hezbollah. There was no tripartite reconciliation meeting. Differences in negotiations, weapons and priorities remain intact. What has changed is the level of confrontation. A visit that could have provoked a hostile demonstration was conducted with the participation of officials from Amal and municipalities close to Hezbollah. Salam responded by saying that the dialogue remained open. Hezbollah formulated its conditions without turning the sequence into a rupture. Then the contacts between Ain al-Tineh and the Great Serail resumed in a more functional climate.
The success of this method now depends on concrete results. If the government moves ahead on reconstruction, services and support to the inhabitants, Berri will have arguments to maintain institutional cooperation. If negotiations with Israel produce measurable withdrawals, Salam will be able to argue that the state path brings results. On the other hand, if the strikes continue, if the villages remain destroyed and if the political process seems to demand Lebanese concessions without compensation, Hezbollah will regain the ground for confrontation with the government. Berri’s mediation only delayed the conflict. For now, it has achieved something more modest but real: to prevent a strategic disagreement from becoming a political break between the State and a part of the country.
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