A non-stop air link between Lebanon and the United States can find a market. There is still no evidence that it can sustain several frequencies, let alone several American destinations. The difference is essential: a large population of Lebanese origin, a favourable Washington decision and a plane capable of crossing the Atlantic are not an operating account. The project deserves better than diplomatic enthusiasm. It is necessary to determine how many passengers it can catch, at what price, with which device and what ability to withstand the weak months or an interruption.
The analysis leads to a conditional but precise response: starting with a targeted service, with limited frequency and supported by correspondence can have an economic logic. Buying capacity to display a historical return, without commercial contracts or backup devices, would be a much more fragile bet. Profitability does not lie in the number of Lebanese living in America. It is used in the recipe actually kept for each seat occupied, related to all costs and the risk of immobilization.
This file separates the public facts verified on November 8, 2026 from the sensitivity calculations. The model figures are neither Middle East Airlines’ accounts, nor its future fares, nor a confidential estimate of its costs. They are used to show what a line promoter should be able to demonstrate before committing capital. Without detailed business data, asserting that the line will necessarily be profitable would be as unwise as decreeing that it can never be.
An open legal door, not an authorized line
American change is real. Presidential Decision 2026-25, dated 30 September, published in the Federal Register on 5 October 2026, repeals four previous decisions governing air restrictions with Lebanon. It asks the Secretary of Transport to implement this development and to remove incompatible provisions. This text therefore changes the political and legal framework. It does not set a commercial opening date, frequency, carrier or U.S. airport of destination.
The U.S. Department of Transport distinguishes two authorizations for a foreign carrier: the economic authority under its services and the safety authority under the Federal Aviation Administration. The requirements of other competent authorities are added. The business case includes ownership, management, financial situation, operating programme and home country authorizations. General political permission does not exempt a company from demonstrating that it meets these conditions.
It is also necessary to separate three often confused objects: State surveillance of aviation safety, airport compliance and security procedures. The FAA’s IASA programme examines the ability of the national authority to exercise oversight in accordance with international standards. It does not calculate the profitability of a road. In particular, security controls are covered by the TSA. None of these examinations is replaced by an aircraft order or a ministerial declaration.
The obstacle has immediate financial consequences. As long as the mandatory steps are not taken, an over-ambitious business date exposes itself to refunds, lost launch costs and poor fleet allocation. A rented or funded device starts to cost before the first American recipe arrives. The regulatory timetable must therefore precede the promise of capacity, and not be treated as a formality which the public announcement would then require to accelerate.
Certification is a project cost, not a detail
A report published on 16 October of a technical mission of the International Civil Aviation Organization referred to invalid airport certification and operational deficiencies. Fayez Rasamny, Minister of Public Works and Transport, replied that the corrections were being made and that the war delayed them. These findings relate to a mission in July, the conclusions of which were transmitted in September; they do not automatically describe the exact condition of each equipment as of November 8.
The documentation consulted does not permit the certification here of the completion of all the procedures necessary for an American service. This limit does not mean that the airport would have stopped operating or that each existing flight would be illegal. It means that a new project must produce its own authorizations. The promoter should publish the steps taken, the decision-making authorities and the remaining conditions, rather than a succession of indicative dates.
The economy of the file must include these expenses: training, control, procedures, equipment, audit and maintenance of additional resources. Some improvements benefit the entire airport. Alloting them in full to a single line would be excessive; leaving them completely out of the calculation would be just as much. The correct method distinguishes between joint modernisation investments and the additional expenditure actually caused by the proposed service, and then indicates who finances them.
This distribution is also a governance issue. If the state pays for infrastructure, the company cannot present its sole business result as the return on the entire project. Conversely, a public investment that improves the operations of several companies on a sustainable basis has a wider utility. The assessment requires two accounts: that of the carrier and that of the community. Adding them without precaution makes it possible to justify any loss by tourist benefits impossible to verify.
The market already exists, but it goes through other airports
The link between the two countries is not economically non-existent because it does not have a non-stop flight. Travelers are already buying connecting routes. The future operator would first seek to move part of this clientele, and only then generate additional travel. Presenting all its future passengers as a net creation of tourism would artificially inflate its impact.
The word « direct » itself deserves clarification. In common use, it refers to a non-stop journey. In air marketing, a flight with the same number may sometimes include a stop. The most economically distinctive product for Beirut would be the stopover: a single boarding and no change of aircraft. A formula with a technical stop would lose part of this advantage while retaining many long-haul costs.
European and regional hubs combine travellers from multiple cities. Their cost is not based solely on the Lebanese market. A non-stop service must, on the contrary, gather a sufficient mass of passengers on the same departure. It saves time for some clients, but loses the flexibility offered by several correspondence schedules. The gain therefore depends on the door-to-door journey, not just the hours spent in the sky.
For a resident of the New York city, Beirut–New York can cancel a stopover. For a resident of another American region, the passage through New York can simply move this stopover from Europe to the United States. It will then be necessary to integrate immigration, the possible recovery of baggage, their re-registration and the time of correspondence. Transatlantic port of call is not necessarily the best route for the entire US territory.
Diaspora cannot be turned into banknotes
The United States Census Bureau counted 685,672 persons in the Lebanese category, alone or in combination with other identifications, in its detailed results of the 2020 census. It is an official demographic indicator, not a measure of Lebanese passport holders or persons travelling to Beirut each year. The figure describes a population according to a given methodology and date. It must not become, by slippage, a demand forecast for 2027.
A person of Lebanese origin may no longer have a close family in Lebanon, rarely travel, prefer another destination or be unable to finance a trip. Another can come several times a year. Children, long-established generations and newly arrived binationals do not have the same behaviours. The market also includes travellers without Lebanese descent: spouses, professional visitors, researchers or tourists. Counting them requires a mobility survey, not a multiplier applied to a community.
The unit of measurement shall be correctly defined. A round trip produces two air trips in a directional counting. The same traveller who returns twice in the year produces four segments. Count arrivals and departures then compare them to a number of natural persons artificially double the apparent market. This confusion is enough to make a capacity appear modest, which in fact represents a significant part of the available travel.
We must finally know the geographical dispersion. A large community throughout the United States does not prove that it is near the selected airport. The carrier must measure the pool actually accessible by road, connecting cities, travel periods and the propensity to pay to avoid a stopover. Until these data are presented, the diaspora remains an argument for prospecting. It is not a bank guarantee.
What three flights per week represent
Let’s take a hypothetical 250-seat device, not like a configuration announced by the MEA. Three round trips per week for 52 weeks represent 156 rotations, representing 312 single flights and 78,000 seats offered in both directions. At 80% filling, this gives 62,400 passenger segments. While all trips are balanced round trips, the equivalent of 31,200 round trips is obtained, not 62,400 separate visitors.
At four weekly rotations, capacity rises to 104,000 annual seats and, at the same filling, to 83,200 segments. The equivalent reaches 41,600 return trips. A program of seven rotations per week, calculated over the same 52 weeks, offers 182,000 seats and carries 145,600 segments at 80%, equivalent to 72,800 return trips. The increase from three to seven frequencies therefore requires more than double the demand received.
These calculations are mechanical; They do not prove that demand exists. To complete the first formula, the operator must conquer a larger addressable market than its only 31,200 return trips. If its market share was 25 per cent, an addressable set of 124,800 annual returns would be required. At 40 per cent, 78,000 would be required. These two rates are assumptions of sensitivity, not promised or observed shares.
It is also necessary to clarify what this addressable market covers. Not all travellers between Lebanon and the United States can be picked up by departure to New York three days a week. Some will choose a competitor due to price, airport origin or loyalty program. A study that uses the entire national market at the denominator, but requires a homogeneous catch from a single airport, underestimates its commercial effort.
New York, Detroit or another city: choose a pond, not a symbol
New York has an international visibility that makes the destination politically attractive. This visibility is not a sufficient investment criterion. The choice must involve specific markets, airport costs, matching possibilities and expected revenues. A less prestigious city can offer a more concentrated clientele; a large platform can give access to more travelers, but with higher loads and competition.
Detroit is often associated with American Arab communities. This does not automatically allow all their requests to be assigned to Lebanon. Countries of origin, family ties and travel habits are different. A serious study must isolate the routes actually linked to Beirut. The cultural proximity of a basin does not replace observed sales, nor does a large local population guarantee sufficient prices in the low season.
The American partner can weigh as much as the city. A correspondence agreement gives access to other markets, but the ticket price must be shared. The Lebanese carrier does not keep all the recipe for a trip with an American domestic segment. A forecast based on the rate paid by the customer, without removing the partner’s share, overestimates transatlantic revenue. Baggage, irregularities and rerouting commitments must be contracted.
The right choice could therefore differ depending on the operator. A company with a strong partner at an airport does not have the same calculation as a company primarily selling point-to-point trips. Before appointing a winner between New York, Washington or Detroit, you have to compare real business proposals. The name of a city does not contain the cost of the niche, the cost of handling baggage, or the value of a distribution agreement.
The range of action already requires a selection
Geography limits options. An orthodromic calculation, the shortest distance on the Earth’s surface, gives about 9,020 kilometres between Beirut and New York-JFK, 8,720 kilometres to Boston, 9,380 kilometres to Washington-Dulles, 9,520 kilometres to Detroit and 9,800 kilometres to Chicago. Los Angeles is approaching 12,000 kilometers. These rounded distances are geographic calculations, not flight plans, nor promises of travel time.
Airbus announces for the A321XLR a range of up to 4,700 nautical miles, or about 8,705 kilometers. Even Boston is therefore around this catalogue limit; New York is over her. Using the only argument of the long-range monopoly to promise a simple and cheap solution to America would be misleading. Geographical comparison is a first filter, not a performance study.
A plane does not always fly on the shortest route. Winds, avoided airspace, fuel reserves, weather at clearances, and carried load change the result. The journey to the west and the return do not necessarily have the same constraints. A technical possibility in a particular configuration does not demonstrate the ability to transport a profitable business load year round. This question must be decided by a performance study specific to the intended device.
The large carrier brings more distance and capacity. It also increases the number of seats to be sold and the financial exposure of each departure. The choice therefore does not simply oppose an expensive old aircraft to a new economic aircraft. It is necessary to compare the total cost of a rotation, the recipe allowed by the cabin, the freight actually boardable and the alternatives of using the aircraft. A consumption gain does not automatically compensate for insufficient demand.
The price displayed is not the company’s recipe
Profitability is measured with a net revenue comparable to costs. The amount paid by the passenger includes returned taxes and charges, sometimes several carriers, as well as ancillary services. A $1,400 return sale does not necessarily mean that $1,400 remains with the Beirut–US operator. Commissions, distribution and sharing arrangements further reduce the amount available depending on the set-up.
The premium cabin can improve balance, but it consumes space. The contribution of these seats should be compared with that of the alternative configuration. One expensive selling place is not enough if many others remain empty. Free upgrades and highly discounted tickets should not be valued as sales at the public rate. A serious forecast uses the revenues actually received by class, period and channel.
Family travel presents a different arbitration. For four people, a moderate difference per ticket becomes an important budget. The time saving of the stopover retains a value, but its tariff premium has a limit. A company that would justify its price only by the comfort of the diaspora could discover that attachment to the country does not remove the comparison of offers. Free baggage and change conditions also count.
The professional application must also be documented. Institutional meetings and the movement of leaders are not automatically sufficient in annual terms. There is a need for business contracts, purchasing habits and a frequency compatible with short stays. A three-day service per week may be suitable for long holidays, but it may cause a business client to lose a day’s work. The average price therefore depends directly on the quality of the schedule.
A transparent model for testing promises
To make the debate verifiable, let us consider a hypothetical rotation with 250 seats in each direction, a full cost of $300,000 and a net freight contribution of $20,000. These amounts are accrual parameters, not an estimate of MEA expenses. The full cost must include operation, aircraft, maintenance, distribution, assigned overhead and provision for disturbance. Freight is counted after its specific charges, to avoid mixing turnover and contribution.
At 80% average filling on both flights, 400 passenger segments are sold. There are 280,000 dollars left to cover after the freight. The net income required is therefore $700 per segment, equivalent to $1,400 in return. This amount is not a price to recommend to the public: taxes and other levies may be added. The model explains a threshold, it does not announce a commercial price.
With three rotations per week, this scenario represents $46.8 million in annual costs. Passengers would bring $43.68 million and freight $3.12 million. The result would be exactly zero depending on the positions selected. An accounting balance does not necessarily pay enough for the capital involved, especially if the start-up costs or exceptional risks have been underestimated. The investor must ask for a margin of security above that point.
The formula can be reproduced: the freight contribution is removed from the cost of rotation, then divided by the number of seats on both flights multiplied by the filling rate. It makes it possible to test a commercial proposal without pretending to know private data. If a proponent announces lower costs, they must explain their scope. If it announces higher revenues, it must produce customer segments or commitments that make them plausible.
Sensitivities that change the result
With the same cost and freight assumptions, 70% filling requires $800 net per segment to achieve balance. At 80%, $700 is required; at 90%, about $622. The filling thus improves the threshold, but only if the additional tickets are not sold at a price that destroys the average recipe. A full aircraft of $500 net per segment would not cover the cost of this scenario.
At a constant net income of $700, a rotation cost of $250,000 would reduce equilibrium filling to about 65.7 per cent. The increase to $350,000 would result in the increase of 94.3 per cent. None of these three costs is presented as an estimate. Their comparison shows why a small variation in fuel, insurance or fleet usage can turn an acceptable line into an almost unbalanced operation.
A degraded business scenario combines 70% fill and $650 net per segment. It generates $227,500 in passenger revenues, then $247,500 with the assumed freight. The loss is $52,500 per rotation, or $8.19 million out of 156 rotations. On the other hand, 85 per cent of fill and $800 net give $360,000 with freight, representing a surplus of $60,000 per rotation and $9.36 million per year, before items that may be excluded from the model.
These differences are not a range of expected benefits. These are two illustrative combinations designed to reveal the fragility of a single average reasoning. An investment study should assign documented probabilities to the scenarios, test their correlations and explain the financing of the unfavourable case. If it presents only the favourable scenario, it describes a commercial objective, not demonstrated viability.
Summer does not automatically pay all year
Seasonality can ruin an attractive average. In a purely illustrative exercise, 16 weeks at 90% filling, 20-80% and 16-60% give an annual average of approximately 76.9%, at constant capacity. The carrier cannot present its full summer aircraft as the year level. It must show the recipe and costs of each month, then consider whether the peak result actually compensates for the hollows.
The difficulty comes from the fact that filling and price can decrease together. To sell in low season, the company lowers its prices; At the same time, it suffers fewer passengers and less revenue per passenger. The annual model should use the sum of monthly revenues, not multiply a good average of filling by a good high season rate. This mixture of periods produces a fictitious profitability.
Reducing frequencies in low months can limit variable losses. But the financing of the aircraft, certain insurances and the staff do not disappear at the same rate. We need a credible alternative use of the fleet. A device temporarily removed from New York and used on another profitable line is better than a locked-in aircraft. There is still a need for rights, slots and demand for this other destination.
Seasonal exploitation can thus be a rational model, not a shameful failure. It must simply be announced and assessed as such. If the political objective requires annual continuity which the market does not finance, the cost of this requirement must appear. The carrier should not hide an unpaid public service mission behind optimistic commercial accounts, nor should it seek after the fact that the State covers a loss that has become foreseeable.
The balance of the two senses deserves its own calculation
Global filling sometimes masks a directional imbalance. On a hypothetical round trip of 250 seats per flight, a 95 per cent full departure and a 65 per cent return give 80 per cent on average. But the financial result depends on the revenues of each direction. If return places are cheaper, multiply the 400 segments occupied by the most requested departure price overestimates the rotation. Add passengers and revenues separately and then maintain a weighted average.
School schedules and length of stay may increase these differences. A wave of departures to Beirut did not necessarily produce its wave of returns the following week. The program must be built on dated flows and residence constraints, not on assumed symmetry. The dynamic price can alleviate the imbalance, but it does not instantly create travelers available on the right dates.
The performance measure should therefore present four elements for each rotation: seats sold to the United States, seats sold to Beirut, net revenue from each direction and corresponding cargo contribution. A single fill indicator does not allow to know where to improve the supply. This ventilation also avoids the possibility that a growth of traffic in the least remunerative sense will be celebrated as an automatic improvement in profitability.
Freight should not be used as a magic variable
The bunkers provide a complementary recipe, but their useful capacity is not equal to the theoretical volume available. Passenger baggage, fuel requirements and mass limits may reduce on-board cargo. A family clientele carrying a lot of luggage can compete with freight precisely during the period of high demand. The model must therefore reason in selling capacity, not in cubic meters announced by the manufacturer.
There is also a need to distinguish between trade and air tonnage. Imports or exports of several million dollars can borrow the sea, intermediate platforms or circuits that do not match the new line. Total bilateral trade is not a potential cargo turnover. Urgent products, seasonality, customs constraints, contractual volumes and net tariffs that are actually negotiable should be known.
The balance of the two senses counts. Strong demand in one direction does not guarantee the same income on return. The carrier must incorporate equipment repositioning, handling costs, controls and payment deadlines. A goods left at dockside to comply with a load limitation can cause a commercial loss beyond its mere tariff. Realistic contracts are therefore worth more than a list of allegedly interested sectors.
In our fiscal year, eliminating the $20,000 freight contribution increases the necessary passenger revenue, to 80 per cent, from $700 to $750 per segment. The difference is equal to $100 net per round trip. This calculation gives the measure of risk: freight can help a line, but an unsecured amount must not artificially close the gap between a passenger revenue too small and an operating cost too high.
A small fleet pays a lot for disruptions
An intercontinental service immobilizes an aircraft and crews for a long time. The reasoning should cover the full cycle, with stopover, rest, maintenance and operational margin. Add only flying hours underestimate the resource mobilized. If the same device runs a tight program, an initial delay can spread to several departures. A good financial use is not to remove any reserve until the first incident.
The opportunity cost is decisive. The aircraft engaged to the United States cannot simultaneously reinforce another line. Even a road with a positive result can be a bad investment if an alternative use generates a better contribution with less risk. It is necessary to compare the profitability of the capital and fleet, not only to check that revenues cover fuel and ground assistance.
The limited frequency reduces the volume for sale, but exacerbates the problem of rerouting. If a departure is cancelled, waiting for the next flight of the same operator can take several days. We need agreements with other companies and a capacity to buy competing seats, sometimes at the last moment. The hotel, meals, refunds and assistance are not accounting accidents to be erased from the balance sheet: they belong to the normal cost of a service exposed to disturbance.
The European bulletin on Lebanese airspace remained active during the consultation on 8 November, valid until 16 November 2026. Its existence is not a universal ban on every flight. However, it recalls that regional risk is part of the exploitation file. An economic plan must be able to absorb the effects of deterioration on insurance, itineraries, demand and availability of crews, without claiming the date of a crisis.
Competitive companies will not remain stationary
A new non-stop link may generate a tariff response. Operators who already transport passengers between the two countries can offer promotions, improve connections or mobilise their loyalty programs. The new entrant must therefore test its recipe in the face of a commercial reaction, not compare its project to competing prices fixed at the time of the study.
Cost sharing in a network makes this competition asymmetric. A company can accept a small contribution on some Lebanese passengers because the flights concerned carry many other customers. A point to point road does not necessarily benefit from the same diversification. This does not condemn the stopover, whose saving of time remains an advantage. This simply limits the ability to impose a tariff premium that is too high throughout the year.
Launch sales can themselves be misleading. An accumulated application, advertising campaign or promotional tickets complete the first weeks without demonstrating commercial loyalty. Reservations after novelty, refunds, revenues per channel and the cost of acquiring a customer must be observed. The number of seats sold should be reconciled with the amount retained, not treated as a sufficient result.
The sectoral context confirms this discipline. In its June 7, 2026 forecast, IATA estimated the global net margin at 2%, with an expected average fill of 84%. It projected $23 billion in profits, compared to $41 billion in its previous estimate. These averages do not give the threshold for a Lebanese line. However, they show that a sector carrying many passengers can remain financially very vulnerable.
A national utility does not allow a blank cheque
Lebanon can benefit from better access to the U.S. market: time saved, easier visits, business opportunities and image connectivity. But the collective interest is not measured by the total number of passengers on board. Some would have travelled in spite of the stopover. Additional tourism expenditure must be distinguished from expenditure simply displaced from one route to another, and from income received by imported services.
An impact assessment must also reduce public costs and possible transfers to the carrier. Guarantees, exemptions, specific work or commercial support have value. Present them as free because they do not appear on the company’s bill moves the charge without removing it. The country needs connectivity, but it has limited public resources. Each commitment must therefore be compared to alternative uses.
If initial support is envisaged, it should be capped, time-limited and accompanied by verifiable indicators. Financing for a launch expenditure does not have the same justification as permanent loss compensation. The State must be able to adopt a system that does not meet its objectives. A line that has become untouchable because it embodies political success can absorb resources long after its economic justification has disappeared.
Competition and transparency remain necessary. A collectively financed airport improvement must benefit the transport system according to clear rules. The public must know who bears the risk, who receives the advantage and who decides to continue the operation. The pride of seeing a Lebanese plane in the United States is understandable. It does not authorize taxpayers or users to finance a model whose accounts would remain inaccessible.
Documents to be required prior to take-off
The first piece is an origin-destination study over several years, with a monthly breakdown by American city. It must distinguish local passengers, connections, residents, family visits and business trips, without automatically converting ancestry into travel. Reservation data must be corrected for their coverage limits. A reporting investigation may complement the analysis, but an intention to travel at unknown prices does not amount to a ticket purchased.
The second piece is a net recipe study. It must indicate the contribution by class, the post levy rates, the agreements with distributors and partners, and the expected reaction of competitors. The third is a full operating estimate, including aircraft, maintenance, crews, charges, insurance, launch costs and disruptions. The assumptions must be compatible with each other, particularly on baggage, cargo and payload.
The fourth piece is a resistance plan: loss of demand, increased costs, temporary interruption, reduced frequency and re-use of devices. It must quantify the need for cash, not just the annual result. A company may lack liquidity before the good weeks compensate the bad. The fifth exhibit is evidence of authorizations and operational capability, with a timetable that distinguishes between decisions taken and actions still underway.
These conditions lead to a concrete course of action. Testing a single service, backed by sales data and a strong partner, is defensible. Multiplying the destinations from the outset or imposing a daily frequency is not without additional evidence. The project must be able to be reduced or reoriented if revenue does not follow. Its success will not be measured by the ceremony of the first flight, but by its ability to pay the funds committed for a long time without converting each difficulty into a request for public support.
Comments