The Democrats regain control of the two chambers of Congress after the election on 3 November 2026, according to an American press agency. Donald Trump’s setback revives a question already raised after the defeat of Kamala Harris in 2024: how do Gaza and Iran influence the American elections? The investigations shed light on two distinct mechanisms: the political breakdown around support for Israel and the economic cost attributed to the war against Iran.
The winning powers announced on November 4 are not an official certification. They establish a balance of power, without alone explaining why each elector voted. To understand the role of the Middle East, the results of candidate positions, opinion surveys and participation must be reconciled.
Harris in 2024: Gaza divides into Trump’s refusal
Kamala Harris had taken over a weak candidate from the Biden administration’s support of Israel. It called for a ceasefire and the release of hostages, but rejected the arms embargo demanded by pro-Palestinian activists. This disagreement concerned a concrete instrument of American politics, beyond statements of compassion.
On 19 September 2024, the Uncommitted movement refused to support him. In particular, he denounced his position on unconditional arms deliveries. But he also called for preventing Trump’s return and recommended against a vote for a third candidate. His refusal to support Harris was therefore not a rally for the Republican.
Six days later, Emgage Action chose instead to support Harris, despite his disagreements over Gaza. The Muslim political mobilization organization favoured Trump’s defeat. These divergent strategies prohibit speaking of a single Arab or Muslim vote. They show above all the need to bring together a divided coalition on military support for Israel.
In Michigan, arithmetic does not demonstrate causality
The official results of 2024 gave Trump 2,816,636 votes in Michigan, compared to 2,736,533 in Harris. The difference is 80 103 votes. Jill Stein, environmental candidate, gathered 44,607. Even by assigning all these voices to Harris, an unrealistic hypothesis, they would not be enough to reverse the result in this state.
This calculation limits a precise explanation: that of a defeat caused only by Stein ballots. It does not measure Gaza-related abstentions, voters passed to Trump or the effects on volunteerism. Nor can it be said that these movements would have been sufficient to change the national outcome.
A commune that votes more Republican does not automatically reveal the motivations of each inhabitant. Adding local developments and assigning them to a community or war would confuse the observed result with its explanation.
U.S. elections remain choices at several challenges
Prior to the 2024 presidential election, 81 per cent of registered voters interviewed by the Pew Research Center considered the economy very important for their vote. Above all, 69% placed at least five subjects in this category. The hierarchy varied among the camps: immigration to Trump’s supporters, health and Supreme Court to Harris’s.
The study published by Pew in June 2025 sheds further light. It brings the respondents’ responses closer to the files attesting to their participation. Of Trump’s voters in 2020, 89% had voted again in 2024. This proportion was 85% of Biden’s. Trump also had an advantage among new voters and voters returning to the polls.
These data establish a difference in mobilization. They do not attribute to Gaza all the absences in the Democratic electorate. Verified participation and declared choice document behaviour; they do not designate a single cause.
In 2026, Iran entered the vote by cost of living
The war against Iran introduces another dimension. In the annual Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey, only 2% of adults make it their first electoral issue. However, 86% believe that it has affected the cost of living in the United States. Inflation and daily spending are the top priority concerns, at 37%.
The survey was conducted from 10 to 21 July 2026 among 2,156 adults. It measures an American judgment on the effects of war, not an economic breakdown of inflation. It does not allow Iran to be allocated every price increase. Tariffs are also among the policies associated with the deterioration of purchasing power.
However, the possible electoral mechanism becomes clearer: a conflict may not appear at the top of foreign policy responses. Voters can judge it through their expenses and the competence they lend to the president.
A weak president, more motivated democratic supporters
The Pew survey conducted from 28 September to 4 October 2026 confirms the central place of the economy. It is considered very important for the vote of 84% of registered voters. Among the supporters of a democratic candidate in the House, 63% say they are extremely motivated to vote, compared with 46% among Republican supporters.
The same survey, conducted among 5,062 adults including 3,917 registered voters, measures 30% approval for Trump. A 44% share of those registered consider their vote in Congress as a vote against them. These answers precede the vote: they shed light on its context, without constituting an inquiry into the motivations of the voters on 3 November.
The comparison with 2024 thus draws a change of political responsibility. Harris had to defend the record of the administration to which she belonged. Two years later, Trump responded to his own decisions. The contestation of wars can therefore target different camps depending on who governs.
Michigan changes message, no rule of evidence
The senatorial victory of Abdul El-Sayed against Mike Rogers, announced by a news agency on November 4, gives a concrete mark. The democrat is defending an arms embargo against Israel. He won in the state won by Trump in 2024. Its success shows that such a position does not necessarily prevent a general victory.
He does not prove that this position alone explains his election. To measure the respective weight of Gaza and Iran, it will be necessary to cross-check the final local results with post-election surveys. Participation, change of candidate and reasons for voting will have to be distinguished, particularly among voters returning to the polls after 2024.
Sources and benchmarks
- Libnanews, Abdul El-Sayed elected: breakup on Israel, 4 November 2026.
- Associated Press via WTTW, Democratic House and Senate Control, November 4, 2026.
- ABC News, Statement of the Uncommitted Movement, 19 September 2024.
- Associated Press, support for Emgage Action in Harris, September 25, 2024.
- Federal Election Commission, official presidential results of 5 November 2024.
- Pew Research Center, the stakes of the 2024 vote, September 9, 2024.
- Pew Research Center, Analysis of Verified Voters, June 26, 2025.
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Foreign Policy and Midterms, October 1, 2026; 10-21 July.
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs, annual survey methodology 2026: 2,156 adults, margin of error of 2.2 points.
- Pew Research Center, mobilisation before midterms, 8 October 2026; investigation from 28 September to 4 October.
- Cover: full official portrait of Kamala Harris, Lawrence Jackson / White House, March 2021, public domain.
- Cover: integral photograph of the Capitol, Architect of the Capitol, 1997, public domain. Classic graphic editing Libnanews; archival photographs.
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