An investigation published on Tuesday, September 8, claims that Benjamin Netanyahu had been personally warned, about ten days before the October 7, 2023 attack, of a major operation prepared by Hamas. The alert reportedly came from the President of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The Israeli Prime Minister’s office categorically denies this version. These revelations provoke a new offensive by the opposition, less than two months from the Israeli elections on 27 October.
Netanyahu reportedly received a direct warning before 7 October
Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly received a particularly sensitive warning in the last days of September 2023. According to an investigation published on Tuesday, September 8, the President of the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, personally warned the Israeli Prime Minister that a major Hamas operation was in preparation.
The conversation would have taken place about a week and a half before October 7, 2023. On that day, Hamas fighters and other Palestinian groups crossed the Gaza Strip border and attacked several localities, military positions and rallies in Israel.
The information attributed to the Emirati leader would therefore not have been limited to a general assessment of the security situation. Mohammed bin Zayed is said to have referred to the intentions of Hamas and its leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar. The warning would have concerned the preparation of a large-scale operation.
According to the investigation, the telephone conversation lasted about 45 minutes. Benjamin Netanyahu would have reacted calmly. He would have thought that Hamas was focusing its intentions on the West Bank and assured its interlocutor that Israel was prepared for the different scenarios.
The crucial point is what would have followed. The Israeli Prime Minister reportedly did not pass this warning on to the main officials of the security apparatus. This statement, if confirmed, would add a major element to the debate on political and military responsibilities that preceded October 7.
Information that would have come back from Yahya Sinwar
The investigation also reconstitutes the supposed information journey to the Emirati President. Yahya Sinwar, then Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, reportedly warned a former Palestinian official that his movement was preparing a particularly important operation.
Sinwar allegedly presented this action as an event likely to cause an « earthquake ». The former Palestinian official reportedly then conveyed this information to an Emirati adviser. It would eventually have gone back to Mohammed ben Zayed.
The President of the United Arab Emirates decided to contact Benjamin Netanyahu directly. This transmission chain remains at the heart of the revelations published on Tuesday. However, it must be established independently, while several people involved in this sequence have not publicly expressed themselves.
Yahya Sinwar was killed by Israeli forces in October 2024 in the Gaza Strip. He can therefore no longer be questioned about the exact nature of the information he allegedly transmitted before the attack.
The issue now exceeds the existence of additional information among the many signals observed before 7 October. The question relates to a possible alert addressed directly to the head of the Israeli Government by an Arab leader with whom Israel maintained close diplomatic relations.
Netanyahu’s office opposes a categorical denial
Benjamin Netanyahu fully challenges this version of events. His office called the information « absolute lie. » He claims that the Prime Minister did not speak with Mohammed ben Zayed during the period mentioned and therefore did not receive any warning from him.
This denial creates a direct factual contradiction. It is not just about the interpretation or severity of the warning. The Prime Minister’s office denies the existence of the conversation itself.
This distinction is essential. In the state, therefore, it is not possible to state as an established fact that « Netanyahu knew » that an attack like the one on 7 October would occur. The investigation states that he was warned of a major operation prepared by Hamas. Netanyahu denies receiving this alert.
The revelation, however, comes in a context where the responsibility of political and security leaders before 7 October remains one of the main subjects of confrontation in Israel. Since the attack, the debates have focused on the information available, their interpretation and the prevailing belief before October 2023 that Hamas sought to avoid a major war.
Eisenkot accuses Netanyahu of ignoring warnings
The publication of the investigation immediately provoked a reaction from Gadi Eisenkot, former Chief of Staff of the Israeli army and now one of Benjamin Netanyahu’s main electoral opponents.
Eisenkot accuses the Prime Minister of having received numerous warnings before 7 October and not having taken them into account. He judges Netanyahu unfit to perform his duties and blames him for trying to escape his responsibility in the failures that preceded the attack.
The former military leader also aims at explaining the early hours of 7 October 2023. In particular, he criticizes the argument that the Prime Minister would not have been awakened early enough when the first signs of the offensive appeared.
The new controversy thus moves the debate towards the days immediately preceding the attack. If the Emirati appeal were established, the question would no longer be just what information the Israeli services had, but what the Prime Minister had personally learned and what he had decided to do with it.
Naftali Bennett challenges Prime Minister’s personal responsibility
Naftali Bennett, a former Prime Minister and also a candidate for election, took an even more direct position. He claims that Benjamin Netanyahu bears a personal responsibility for the failure that led to October 7.
Bennett blames his former rival for not mobilizing the security apparatus in the face of warnings and for not preparing the country for a major attack. He demands his immediate departure.
These accusations take on a particular electoral dimension. Israelis must vote on 27 October 2026. Benjamin Netanyahu thus faces this new controversy during a campaign where his government’s security record and 7-October responsibilities occupy a central place.
This revelation could be politically costly if it were to be sustained in the campaign. Benjamin Netanyahu has long made his experience and ability to guarantee Israel’s security one of his main arguments to the electorate. The assumption that a specific warning could have reached him directly before October 7 is therefore at the heart of this credibility. It also offers Gadi Eisenkot, former Chief of Staff, and Naftali Bennett an angle of attack that can weigh with voters for whom responsibilities for the security failure of 2023 remain crucial. A few weeks before the election, the question is no longer only historical or institutional: it can now directly influence electoral competition.
For his opponents, the investigation called into question the Prime Minister’s political defence. For Netanyahu, it is based on an event that would never have happened. The establishment of the existence of the conversation with Mohammed ben Zayed thus becomes a decisive element.
A strategic relationship between Israel and the Emirates
The identity of the leader who would have conveyed the warning gives additional importance to the case. The United Arab Emirates normalized its relations with Israel in 2020 in the framework of the Abraham agreements, concluded with the support of the United States during Donald Trump’s first term.
Benjamin Netanyahu regularly presented this rapprochement with Abu Dhabi as one of the major successes of his regional policy. Relations between the two countries subsequently developed rapidly in several areas.
A personal warning from Mohammed bin Zayed would therefore have been given an unusual political weight. He reportedly came not from a hostile foreign service or from an indirect source unknown to the Israeli authorities, but from the head of an Arab State that became Israel’s partner.
On Tuesday, the Emirati Presidency did not provide detailed public confirmation to resolve the contradiction between the investigation and the denial of the Netanyahu office.
The debate on the Israeli strategy for Hamas relaunched
These revelations also place the Netanyahu government’s policy towards Hamas before October 2023 at the forefront. For several years, Israel had favoured a form of conflict management based on the idea that the Islamist movement sought above all to preserve its power in the Gaza Strip.
In this context, funds from Qatar had been able to enter the enclave with the agreement of Israel. This policy was based in part on the assumption that Hamas concerned about its political and economic survival could be contained without widespread military confrontation.
The attack of 7 October 2023 caused this design to break out. According to an assessment based on official Israeli figures, 1,221 people were killed during the attack. Some 251 persons were also taken hostage in the Gaza Strip, some of whom had already died at the time of their abduction.
Israel launched a massive military offensive in the Gaza Strip in response. Much of the Palestinian territory has been destroyed. The Gaza Ministry of Health now reports more than 73,000 deaths since the beginning of the war. Its statistics are used by United Nations agencies, although the Israeli authorities regularly challenge certain reviews and their presentation.
Almost three years after October 7, the issue of pre-attack warnings remains politically explosive. The publication of September 8 adds a specific accusation: that of a personal warning that would have reached the Prime Minister’s office before the Hamas offensive.
Benjamin Netanyahu’s denial now places at the centre of the case a verifiable point: whether a conversation with Mohammed bin Zayed actually took place in the last days of September 2023, what it contained and whether Israeli security officials had been informed of it.
