The six Syrian ministers’ visit to Beirut carefully left aside the most explosive issues between the two countries. Behind the discussions on investment, trucks, rail and energy, Damascus maintains another list of applications. It concerns Syrian detainees in Lebanon and former officers of the previous regime who are said to be in Lebanese territory. According to information gathered in the circles involved in the contacts between the two capitals, the Syrian authorities are said to be mainly irritated by what they consider to be Beirut’s slow handling of these two cases.
The choice would have been deliberate: the economic delegation coming to Beirut did not have the task of opening these files. Their treatment would be reserved for the Syrian foreign policy team. This separation allows Damascus to develop economic cooperation with Lebanon without publicly conditioning every step towards the immediate settlement of security disputes.
But it does not mean that these disputes have disappeared.
The detainees ‘ file is already under bilateral supervision. That of the former officers is much more opaque. The available information goes so far as to refer to specific information transmitted to the Lebanese authorities on certain wanted men, their places of presence and their movements. They also refer to information provided by Western intelligence services.
These claims are based on unnamed sources and therefore cannot be presented as judicial findings. However, they allow us to understand why Damascus considers that Beirut now has enough elements to act.
A second phase of surrender of convicts is delayed
The first reason for Syrian discontent concerns the implementation of a security agreement between the two countries on the transfer of convicted persons.
A first step has already created a precedent. The information published in recent months indicates the transfer in July 2026 of68 syrian detaineesfrom Rumieh prison to Syria. These men had been convicted by Lebanese justice and their surrender was part of a bilateral agreement.
This figure is important because it shows that the dossier is no longer at the stage of policy discussions.
A mechanism has been established and a first operation has taken place.
This is precisely what explains the present impatience of Damascus. According to available information, the Syrian authorities accuse Lebanon of delaying the second phase of the operation without sufficient justification.
The question, therefore, is not only about the individual fate of prisoners. It affects the credibility of a commitment already begun to be implemented.
For the Syrian authorities, the logic would be simple: if the two governments signed an agreement and if a first set of detainees could be handed over, why is the second stage not moving at the same pace?
On the Lebanese side, the situation is necessarily more complex. The persons concerned were convicted within the framework of the Lebanese judicial system. Any remission must therefore comply with the legal conditions laid down and cannot be reduced to the transmission of a list between two administrations.
The documents available do not allow to determine precisely how many people would be affected by this second phase or the exact administrative or judicial reasons for its delay. It would therefore be risky to attribute the blockage to a single institution.
On the other hand, Syrian discontent is presented as real behind the scenes.
The precedent of the 68 inmates changed the nature of the file
The July transfer also changed the political perception of the issue.
For a long time, the file of Syrians detained in Lebanon was dealt with in a much broader set of prison issues, the consequences of the war in Syria, terrorism, security and the massive presence of Syrian nationals on Lebanese territory.
The bilateral agreement introduced a different logic: to distinguish those convicted who could be transferred and to organize their surrender to the Syrian State in an official framework.
This evolution allows both countries to avoid a comprehensive and politically impossible solution to all prison cases. It allows to advance category by category.
But it also creates an obligation to follow up.
A first dramatic discount, followed by a long waiting period, may be interpreted by Damascus as a political slowdown rather than a simple administrative difficulty.
It is in this context that the Syrian ministerial visit takes on a particular dimension. Economic leaders came to talk about cooperation without introducing this issue into their official meetings. Damascus thus seems to want to prevent the detainees’ file from immediately blocking trade and infrastructure projects.
However, this method cannot work indefinitely if security files remain frozen.
Where are the former officers of the previous regime?
The second case is even more sensitive.
The new Syrian authorities are seeking to identify former officers and officials linked to the previous regime who reportedly found refuge in Lebanon after the change of power in Damascus.
The information gathered indicates that the Syrian authorities have provided their Lebanese counterparts with detailed information on some of these individuals.
It would not be just names.
The information provided would also cover:places of presence, theirtravel modesand, for some, on their alleged activities or projects from lebanese territory.
This statement must be handled with caution. There is no complete judicial record to publicly establish responsibility for the persons concerned with the information available. Therefore, it is not possible to turn a person reported by Damascus into a convicted fugitive or an established conspiracy.
But the accuracy of the information mentioned explains Syrian impatience.
Damascus would consider that Lebanon can no longer rely solely on lack of information to explain its concern.
Western services also reportedly provided information
One of the most sensitive elements concerns the origin of the information.
According to the same sources, the Lebanese authorities did not only receive information from Damascus. Western intelligence services also reportedly provided information concerning former officers of the previous regime present in Lebanon.
This information also concerned their locations and movements.
The importance of this is obvious.
If intelligence were to come only from the new Syrian power, Beirut could be particularly cautious in responding to requests from former political or military opponents of Damascus. The alleged intervention of Western services would, on the other hand, give another dimension to the case.
It would still not be sufficient to establish judicial evidence. Intelligence is not a judgment.
But it would increase pressure on the Lebanese services to verify the information received.
Sources also refer to data on what some of these men would prepare from Lebanon. Again, no sufficiently substantiated detail is provided to describe these projects as established facts. Caution is required especially as the charge of organizing activities against a neighbouring State can have considerable political and judicial consequences.
The important fact is therefore elsewhere: Damascus believes that it has transmitted to Beirut a sufficiently precise subject to wait for an answer.
Why Lebanon can’t just run a Syrian list
The impatience of Damascus, however, faces a fundamental constraint.
Lebanon cannot legally treat a list transmitted by a foreign government as an automatic arrest order.
The presence of a former Syrian officer on Lebanese territory is not in itself an offence. Nor does his past membership in the institutions of the previous regime justify his arrest or surrender.
It is necessary to determine what he is accused of, the possible existence of judicial proceedings and the legal framework within which Lebanon can intervene.
This distinction is essential in a relationship that now seeks to be built on the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty.
The new Syria claims to want to break with the practices of the old system in its dealings with Lebanon. Beirut cannot therefore accept that security cooperation should reproduce a logic in which requests from Damascus would be executed without going through Lebanese institutions.
This is where the case becomes politically sensitive.
Lebanon wants to cooperate with the new Syrian State. However, it does not want to give the impression of becoming a space in which the Syrian authorities can directly pursue their opponents.
The border turns the Syrian problem into a Lebanese problem
The sensitivity of the file also comes from geography.
Lebanon and Syria share a long border, with official passages but also an ancient history of secondary roads and traffic. Movements of people between the two countries are difficult to dissociate completely from security issues.
The new Syrian authorities attach great importance to the consolidation of their internal control. In this context, the possible presence in Lebanon of former military cadres capable of maintaining networks in Syria is naturally perceived in Damascus as a potential threat.
For Beirut, the problem is different.
Lebanon must prevent its territory from being used to prepare operations against a neighbouring country. At the same time, however, he must ensure that any action of his services is based on his own right.
It is this narrow line that the Lebanese authorities must maintain.
The issue becomes even more sensitive if some people have local networks, protections or financial means to move quietly.
The available information does not make it possible to publicly identify the individuals concerned or to determine their number. This absence prohibits any generalization of the extent of the phenomenon.
Damascus chose not to poison its economic offensive
The decision not to entrust these files to the delegation of six ministers is probably the most revealing political element.
Damascus could have used such a large-scale visit to put Beirut under public pressure.
She didn’t.
Ministers discussed trade, investment, transport, agriculture, health and infrastructure. Security records were left on a separate channel.
This method allows Syria to divide its relationship with Lebanon.
On the one hand, both countries can try to reduce transit charges, boost rail, study the use of energy infrastructure and attract investors.
On the other hand, political and security teams continue discussions on prisoners and former officials of the previous regime.
This separation protects economic rapprochement.
It also shows that the new Syrian authorities do not want the entire bilateral relationship to remain a prisoner of security issues.
But separation has its limits. If Damascus considers that the security commitments already signed are not fulfilled, this frustration will inevitably contaminate other areas.
The old disputes come back in an entirely new form
The paradox is striking.
For decades, Lebanese-Syrian relations have been dominated by the security weight of Damascus in Lebanon. Today, Syria returns to ask the Lebanese State to cooperate with it on security issues concerning its own territory.
The relationship was therefore reversed in its form.
Damascus no longer has the instruments it once owned in Lebanon. It should transmit information, seek cooperation and wait for a response from the Lebanese institutions.
This explains the importance of processing these files.
The way Beirut responds to Syrian demands will be a test of the new state-to-state relationship.
Too little cooperation will fuel Syrian accusations of slowness and bad will. Cooperation without legal guarantees would awaken Lebanon’s memory of an unbalanced relationship with Damascus.
In between, there is an institutional path: information verified by the Lebanese services, documented judicial records and implementation of bilateral agreements in accordance with established procedures.
Two files, two levels of difficulty
Prisoners and former officers should not be confused.
In the first case, there is an agreement, convicted persons and a concrete precedent with the surrender of 68 prisoners. The problem is the implementation of the second phase and its timetable.
In the second, the available information essentially describes intelligence work. Damascus reportedly identified individuals, transmitted locations and provided information on their movements. Western services would have provided additional information.
However, this matter still needs to be transformed into an exploitable legal basis for each individual concerned if a coercive measure is envisaged.
That’s why the second file is potentially much longer to settle.
It also raises a question that the economic relationship cannot forever be circumvented: what will Lebanon do if Damascus formally submits requests concerning men whom it claims they are preparing from Lebanese territory for activities against the new Syrian authorities?
The available documents do not yet provide the answer.
However, they allow us to understand what is happening behind the economic façade of the rapprochement. As ministers publicly discuss trains, ports, oil and investment, another dialogue takes place behind closed doors. It covers men, prisons, intelligence and the capacity of two neighbouring States to build security cooperation that does not duplicate the practices of their common past.
