Ali al-Taher, new fracture line in the South

Developments in southern Lebanon largely dominate the newspapers of Friday, September 11, 2026. The point of convergence is the destruction by the Israeli army of underground infrastructure in the heights of Ali al-Taher. The operation caused a tremor in a large part of the South. It comes as Nabatiyeh has become a major issue for the Lebanese State. The authorities are seeking to strengthen their presence there before further Israeli developments change the situation on the ground.

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 describes a Lebanon facing a regional « earthquake » and a phase deemed complex and dangerous. The newspaper places Ali al-Taher’s explosion at the centre of his treatment. According to his information, the Lebanese authorities had not yet received an official notification on Wednesday evening concerning the date of the next negotiating session. However, Israeli media reported a meeting in Rome on Tuesday and Wednesday. Meanwhile, the state is seeking to consolidate its presence in Nabatiyeh and its surroundings. The newspaper points out, however, that the deployment of the army cannot be separated from the continuation of Israeli operations and the absence, according to its analysis, of US pressure sufficiently strong to stop this escalation.

Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026 confirms that the heights of Ali al-Taher have become the symbol of the new balance of power. The newspaper reports that a 4.1 magnitude shake was recorded after the explosions. The Israeli army claimed to have completed the destruction of underground roads in the area. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his defence minister also presented the operation as a step in the establishment of what they call a security zone in southern Lebanon. This formulation feeds Lebanese concerns. It suggests that Israeli operations are no longer limited to one-off strikes against infrastructure attributed to Hezbollah.

Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 also reports a 4.1-magnitude shock and indicates that the Israeli explosions used more than 1,100 tons of explosives to destroy the tunnels at Ali al-Taher heights. The daily puts this episode in a broader question: how far can climbing go and who can prevent its extension to Nabatiyeh? The city thus becomes a test for the state’s ability to occupy the land politically, administratively and militarily before the situation is again transformed by force.

Asharq Al-Awsat of 11 September 2026 describes explosions as an event comparable to a small earthquake. The newspaper also takes up the magnitude of 4.1 and the Israeli announcement that more than two kilometres of underground infrastructure had been destroyed. This convergence of newspapers on the power of explosions gives Ali al-Taher a reach that exceeds the military dimension. The site becomes a political marker. Israel intends to show that it can change the territorial reality. On the other hand, Lebanon seeks to prevent this precedent from extending to other sectors.

Nabatiyeh puts the state before the test of its sovereignty

The debate is therefore moving rapidly towards the presence of the state. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports Joseph Aoun’s words at the Council of Ministers. The President of the Republic states that « the time has come for the State to return to the South ». He assures the inhabitants of Nabatiyeh, Tyre and Arab Salim that the institutions cannot stay away from their concerns. He also asked each ministry to contribute to the support of the inhabitants. The message goes beyond the only security issue. The presence of the State must also take the form of roads, schools, housing and public services.

Nawaf Salam develops the same logic. According to Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026, the Prime Minister considers the military presence in the South as a confidence factor. He stressed that the people were primarily demanding essential services. The Government had examined road rehabilitation, the return to school and the provision of prefabricated housing. Military deployment is therefore presented as one of the components of a wider return of administration.

Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports the same orientation of the Council of Ministers. In particular, the Government approved a project to prevent real estate transactions in areas occupied by the Israeli army. This decision gives a land dimension to confrontation. The challenge is no longer just to prevent new military advances. It is also about preserving property rights in territories where Lebanese sovereignty is directly tested.

However, the problem remains with the effectiveness of this strategy. Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026 notes that the strengthening of the official mechanism in Nabatiyeh aims to create a new model of the state presence in areas under Israeli pressure. The aim is to reduce the security gaps and arguments used by Israel. But the newspaper also reports fears: these measures may remain mere palliatives if they are not accompanied by international coverage capable of curbing Israeli operations.

The question of the army became central. Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports on a new European cooperation programme for the Lebanese security forces, with particular attention to the army. It should include training, advice, equipment and administrative capacity building. The newspaper notes, however, that this does not foresee the deployment of a new European force in Lebanon or a European mission to disarm Hezbollah. The responsibility for this case would remain with the State and the Lebanese army.

Negotiations under threat of escalation

The third major element is the fragility of the diplomatic channel. Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports that Israeli media are announcing an eighth negotiating session in Rome. However, the Lebanese authorities indicate that they did not receive an official United States summons. Lebanon also reportedly indicated that it preferred a meeting after 16 September, due to Joseph Aoun’s planned presence in Paris in preparation for the military support conference.

This uncertainty illustrates the gap between negotiation and the ground. On the one hand, Washington continues to present the negotiating framework as the way to address security and sovereignty issues. On the other hand, Israel continues its strikes and destruction. This contradiction fuels an increasingly intense internal debate on the usefulness of the process.

Nabih Berri expresses one of the most pessimistic positions. Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports that the President of Parliament claims not to be optimistic. It considers that the current diplomatic movements are worthless and considers that the framework agreement has become obsolete. He also claims that the situation is dangerous and that solutions remain remote. His appreciation contrasts with the presidential will to maintain a political path.

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 mentions two potentially decisive months. The daily is linked to the Israeli elections on 27 October and the United States mid-term elections at the beginning of November. According to sources cited by the newspaper, Benjamin Netanyahu could be tempted to seek a military result that could change the political report before the election. The risk is that of a wider operation in Lebanon. This assumption remains an assessment attributed to the newspaper’s sources and not an established fact. Nevertheless, it allows us to understand why Nabatiyeh focuses so much attention.

Hezbollah seems, in several accounts, to avoid for the moment an answer that would immediately open a general confrontation. Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026 believes that the movement is seeking a new way to respond to Israeli operations after the transformation of the balance of power since 2024. According to the newspaper, the old deterrence logic is no longer directly reproducible. Hezbollah would also take into account the Israeli electoral calendar and try not to provide Netanyahu with the pretext of a wider escalation.

From Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab, Lebanon caught up in the regional crisis

At the same time, the Lebanese crisis is part of a much wider regional confrontation. Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 places in the foreground tensions between Washington and Tehran. Donald Trump says the war could end after the US mid-term elections on November 3. Iran responds with a firm speech. A commander of the Revolutionary Guards announced that the Iranian forces were ready to conduct rapid offensive operations. At the same time, the newspaper reports on continued diplomatic efforts by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Oman to reduce escalation and preserve maritime navigation.

Yemen is the other major change of the day. Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 reports the capture of Mokha by the Houthis after the rapid collapse of government positions in Hays and Khokha. According to the military officials mentioned above, the Huthies are approaching Bab al-Mandab and have also advanced to several Red Sea islands. This evolution alters the scope of war. Bab al-Mandab is one of the key parts of world maritime trade. Its control or disturbance would therefore have effects far beyond Yemen.

Al Akhbar of 11 September 2026 directly links this progression to the confrontation with Iran. The newspaper considers that the evolution of the balance of power around Bab al-Mandab, combined with tensions in the Strait of Ormuz, increases the pressure capacity of the Iranian camp. He also stressed the role of Saudi, Omani and Pakistani mediation. In this reading, Lebanon is not an isolated theatre. Its southern front also depends on the evolution of confrontation between Washington, Tehran and their allies.

Asharq Al-Awsat of 11 September 2026 presents the Yemeni situation from a different angle. The President of the Yemeni Presidential Council, Rashad al-Alimi, claims that he will not allow Bab al-Mandab to become another « hormuz ». Government forces reorganized their arrangements south of Mokha after the Huthie advance. This discrepancy in treatment between newspapers is important. The central facts converge on a major military advance of the Houthis. However, their strategic significance varies considerably according to the editorial lines.

The leading thread of this One is therefore less a unique event than the same dynamic. Lebanon is trying to consolidate state authority in the south as Israel transforms the military situation around Ali al-Taher. At the same time, negotiations remain uncertain and the confrontation between the United States and Iran extends to regional sea routes. The progress of the Houthis towards Bab al-Mandab adds a new pressure factor. The Lebanese South is thus at the crossroads of three calendars: that of the return of the State, that of Israeli military choices and that of a regional confrontation whose outcome remains open.

Local policy: the state seeks to resume the initiative in the South while the debate on arms and sovereignty is getting tougher

The return of the state to the South becomes the political priority

The situation in southern Lebanon imposes its pace on domestic politics. Israeli operations, the fate of Nabatiyah and the strengthening of the army’s presence now place the issue of state authority at the centre of the debate. Several newspapers on September 11, 2026 note that the file is beyond security. It affects the functioning of institutions, public services, Hezbollah’s weapons and the Government’s ability to implement its own decisions.

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that Joseph Aoun devoted an important part of the Council of Ministers to the situation of the inhabitants of Nabatiyah, Tyre and Arab Salim. The President assured them that the State had heard their appeals. He called for all available means to be mobilized to help them stay on their land. He said above all that « the time has come for the state to return to the South ». This declaration establishes a political line. The return of the State must not be limited to military deployment. Each ministry is called upon to intervene in its area in order to restore services and support the population.

Nawaf Salam advocates a comparable approach. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that the Prime Minister sees the military presence as a confidence factor. The Government wants to involve this presence in the rehabilitation of roads, the preparation of the school year and the installation of prefabricated housing. The issue of the South is thus treated as an administrative and social file as well as a military one. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 also reports that Nawaf Salam insists on the role of the South Council, in coordination with the Council for Development and Reconstruction. In his view, the means available must benefit all inhabitants without distinction.

Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 points to the same orientation. Joseph Aoun presented the South as an essential part of Lebanon. The Government is therefore seeking to give concrete expression to this statement. In particular, the Council of Ministers approved a draft law preventing real estate transactions in areas occupied by the Israeli army. The decision is intended to protect land rights in areas where the State authority is directly challenged. It also responds to concerns that changing the military situation will have lasting consequences for land ownership.

The question of Nabatiyeh thus becomes a test. Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 stresses that the State intends to strengthen the presence of its institutions and services in the city. Interior Minister Ahmad al-Hajjar mentioned, inter alia, the strengthening of the presence of the Internal Security Forces after the rehabilitation of the administrative buildings. The official logic is to occupy space by institutions before Israeli operations create a new reality. However, this policy remains subject to a major limitation: Lebanon’s ability to prevent Israel from continuing its operations is not solely dependent on the decisions taken in Beirut.

The army at the heart of the new inner power relationship

The rise in the role of the army appears in almost every treatment of local politics. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that the army commander, Rodolphe Haykal, witnessed a live ammunition manoeuvre in the Jurd d’Al-Qaaa in the Bekaa. He emphasized the maintenance of operational readiness despite the increasing number of missions. His message to the military is political as well as military: the bet of the Lebanese remains that of the army, and a strong institution must allow the country to pass through the current period.

This centrality of the army also feeds expectations for the international conference dedicated to its support. Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 reports that Ibrahim Kanaan considers this conference an essential step. He called on the international community to turn its commitments into concrete measures. It directly links support to the army to the state’s ability to resume its role. Kanaan also claims that the pain of the South concerns the whole country and that a political solution is a real possibility of getting out of the war.

Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026 describes a new European programme to strengthen the Lebanese security forces, primarily the army. The programme should cover training, counselling, administrative capacity and certain equipment. The newspaper states that it is not about creating a European force to replace the United Nations Interim Force or disarm Hezbollah. Disarmament remains a responsibility of the Lebanese State and its army.

This distinction is important in the internal debate. Part of the political forces consider that the strengthening of the army must lead to a faster application of the principle of State monopoly of arms. Another stresses, first, the cessation of Israeli operations and the withdrawal of the occupied territories. These two priorities are not always presented as incompatible. However, there is disagreement as to the order in which they should be applied.

Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 thus reports the position of former Minister Wadih al-Khazen. He believes that Lebanon is fulfilling its obligations while Israel continues its operations. It therefore calls for the full implementation of resolution 1701 and the protection of the military mission in the South. According to this approach, strengthening the State cannot produce its effects if the commitments imposed on the various actors remain unbalanced.

Hezbollah weapons still divide the political scene

The weapons file remains the main political divide. Newspapers have clearly opposite positions, sometimes in very harsh terms. Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports that MP Sami Gemayel asks the government what it has actually implemented of its sovereign decisions. The President of the Kataëb calls for a precise timetable and wants to know the obstacles to their implementation. He also affirms that the army must play a central role in the state’s arms monopoly and in the implementation of government decisions concerning Hezbollah.

Hezbollah responds with a reverse reading. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports the statements of MP Ali Ammar, member of the Resistance Loyalty bloc. He accused the United States of intervening in Lebanese internal affairs and asked Washington to stop imposing its policies on the country. He claims that Lebanese people must determine their choices through dialogue between their various components. Deputy Hassan Fadllallah, for his part, places the Israeli occupation, the displacement of the inhabitants and the social consequences of the war among the priority challenges.

This confrontation shows that the issue of weapons is not limited to a technical discussion on the role of the army. It refers to two concepts of sovereignty. For Hezbollah’s opponents, the existence of an autonomous military capability prevents the state from fully controlling the decisions of war and peace. For Hezbollah and its allies, sovereignty first requires the ability to resist occupation and not allow a foreign power to dictate Lebanon’s choices.

Al Akhbar of 11 September 2026 also deals with this fracture through relations between the Lebanese Forces, Syria and Hezbollah. The newspaper reports that Samir Geagea would be hostile to any dialogue between Damascus and Hezbollah before resolving the issue of the movement’s military and security structures. According to the information published, this position was exposed to Syrian officials. The daily also states that Turkey would promote a different approach based on dialogue in order to avoid an increase in tensions between Lebanon and Syria. This information is attributed by the newspaper to its sources and should therefore be considered as such.

Berri shows his pessimism while Parliament regains its role as arbitrator

Nabih Berri occupies a particular place in this sequence. Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports that the Speaker of the Chamber said he was pessimistic about developments. It considers that the solutions remain distant and considers that the ongoing diplomatic movements have not produced any significant results. At the domestic level, however, he maintained the idea of parliamentary control of the government. When asked about the executive’s action, he said that accountability must take place in Parliament.

The parliamentary calendar itself has been changed for political and symbolic reasons. Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports that Berri had scheduled a government discussion session on 13 and 14 September. After an exchange with Sami Gemayel, he agreed to take into account the commemoration of the assassination of Bachir Gemayel. The daily presents this decision as a desire not to add a memorial tension to the current political divisions.

At the same time, MEPs are preparing social and financial debates. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that Hadi Aboul Hosn considers the current social claims to be legitimate. He called for increasing public revenues without imposing additional burdens on citizens. In particular, it cites the improvement of customs revenues, the fight against tax evasion and the recovery of revenue from maritime and river public goods. In his view, such resources should be used to increase social spending and to review the remuneration of the public sector and pensioners.

The Council of Ministers also addressed the situation of military and civilian pensioners. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 states that the Ministry of Finance has been given the task of studying the figures and ways of financing new expenditure by means of revenue which do not weigh more heavily on citizens. This question heralds an important budget battle. Wage claims face the need to maintain financial balance while the state is trying to restore its services.

Reforms, university and amnesty complement the institutional agenda

Despite the security emergency, the government is pursuing several institutional issues. The Council of Ministers appointed five members of the Competition Council: Adnan Rammal, Jamil Jalilati, Pascal Daher, Eliane Nehme and Anis Bou Diab. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that this appointment must in particular strengthen the fight against monopoly situations. The government also decided to devote a specific session to the waste issue.

The situation of the Lebanese University is also open. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 states that the Government maintains the criteria for full-time tenure of contract teachers. Seniority, faculty needs, specialization, competence and equity must be taken into account. The contracts would be divided into four stages, with final control of names prior to the continuation of the proceedings. This case shows that the executive is trying to preserve ordinary institutional activity despite the crisis in the South.

Finally, the decision on the application of the general amnesty law introduces a new political and legal front. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports that the Constitutional Council suspended, by majority, the application of the law on general amnesty and the exceptional reduction of certain sentences. Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 states that the decision comes after the appeal against the text. It must be officially communicated to Joseph Aoun, Nabih Berri and Nawaf Salam prior to publication in the Official Journal.

All these dossiers reveal an internal policy organized around two simultaneous levels. The first is existential: sovereignty, south, army, Hezbollah weapons and risks an extension of the war. The second concerns the normal functioning of the State: budget, university, competition, waste, wages, reforms and legislation. The government’s challenge now is to deal with both without allowing the military emergency to suspend the reforms on a sustainable basis, or the institutional activity to mask the gravity of the balance of power in the South.

Quotes and speeches by political figures: sovereignty, South and weapons at the heart of speeches

Joseph Aoun places the return of the state at the centre of his speech

Joseph Aoun’s statements occupy an important place in the Lebanese press of 11 September 2026. They draw a political line centred on the return of the state, the protection of the South and the refusal of clashes between Lebanese. The President of the Republic also seeks to combine sovereignty with the reconstruction of institutions. His speech is therefore not limited to military matters.

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that Joseph Aoun addressed himself directly to the inhabitants of Nabatiyah, Tyre and Arab Salim at the Council of Ministers. « We have heard your calls, we are at your side, » he said. He added that the State could not stay away from them and must mobilize the means available to ensure their retention on their lands. His most political formula is clear: « The time has come for the state to return to the South. He describes this presence as a collective responsibility. Each department must participate in the effort.

Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 repeats the same declaration and insists that the South is an essential part of the country. Joseph Aoun does not reduce this return to the army. It calls for a mobilization of the entire public apparatus. This clarification gives him a wider scope. Sovereignty must be translated into present administration, services and capacity to meet the needs of the people.

Another presidential intervention, reported by Al Binaa of 11 September 2026, deals with relations between Lebanese and foreign powers. In front of a delegation, Joseph Aoun states that « our loyalty must go to our country » and that whoever seeks foreign support against an internal partner ends up losing. He recalls that no Lebanese war has produced any real victor and that the country has always paid the price of the clashes. This statement comes at a time when accusations of foreign interference go back to the political scene.

Joseph Aoun also links state restoration to administrative reform. Al Liwaa of 11 September 2026 reports that he asked the new officials of the Public Procurement Authority to consider himself « on the first line of defence of public money ». It believes that the success of this institution is a condition for restoring the confidence of donors and partner States. The fight against corruption thus appears in his speech as another aspect of the restoration of public authority.

Finally, the President stressed the need to seize the economic opportunities offered to the country. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that he asked ministers to work quickly on projects that could attract investment, particularly those mentioned with the United Arab Emirates. « We must use positive direction towards us in the interest of Lebanon, » he says. The political reconstruction sought in the South is therefore associated with a more general restoration of confidence in the State.

Nawaf Salam defends the army and the civilian presence of the state

Nawaf Salam’s interventions extend this direction while placing greater emphasis on government action. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that the Prime Minister considers the military presence in the South as « a confidence factor ». He adds that the inhabitants require essential services. This formula reflects his willingness not to present the southern question as an exclusively security issue.

Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports that Nawaf Salam insists on civilian support for the security deployment. The Government wants to strengthen services in the sectors concerned, including Nabatiyah. He referred to measures taken for roads, schools and the needs of people. The presence of the army must therefore be followed by that of the administrations.

The Prime Minister develops the same concept when he receives a delegation from the Southern Council. According to Al Binaa of 11 September 2026, the institution must fulfil its role in coordination with the Council for Development and Reconstruction. He said that the means available must serve all the inhabitants of the South « without exception ». This formulation is of particular political significance in a region where the question of state representation and the question of Hezbollah influence remain closely linked.

The press also makes Nawaf Salam appear in the debate on foreign policy and weapons. Al Akhbar of 11 September 2026 gives him a position in support of government decisions on the state monopoly of force. The daily, however, presents this policy from a critical perspective. This difference in treatment reminds us that the same statements are interpreted very differently according to the newspapers. The point remains that the Government places sovereignty and state control of arms among its political objectives.

Nabih Berri: « I’m not optimistic »

Nabih Berri holds one of the most pessimistic speeches of the day. In an interview published by Al Joumhouria on 11 September 2026, the Speaker of the Chamber stated: « I am not optimistic. He believes that the general situation is dangerous and that solutions are remote. His appreciation is mainly based on the death, destruction and evolution of the southern front.

Berri also states that « the framework agreement has fallen. » It considers the current diplomatic movements worthless as long as they do not produce effects on the ground. Its language contrasts with that of the executive, which continues to rely on negotiation mechanisms. However, he did not question the role of the army. On the contrary, Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 attributes this formula to him: « The army is the fundamental column and even the fundamental bridge of the Lebanese construction. »

The Speaker also referred to his relationship with Joseph Aoun. He acknowledged the existence of disagreements on several topics, but said that they did not prevent their relationship. This clarification is significant in a context where issues in the South, negotiations and arms can cause tension between institutions.

On the domestic front, Berri also promises a genuine parliamentary discussion with the government. When asked by Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 about the assessment of the executive’s action, he replied that it would be necessary to wait until the moment of accountability. It then confirms that such accountability will take place. Its position is therefore to maintain Parliament as a place of political confrontation while preventing divergence from turning into an institutional rupture.

Hadi Aboul Hosn links the South to national unity and social demands

Hadi Aboul Hosn developed in Ad Diyar on 11 September 2026 a speech that combines sovereignty in the South, parliamentary dialogue and the social crisis. The deputy for the Democratic Rally believes that the deployment of the army corresponds to an old claim: the state must exercise its authority over the whole territory.

However, he made a reservation. According to him, partial measures are not enough to solve the problem. It calls for a return to legal and political references, including Resolution 1701, the Armistice Agreement and the Taëf Agreement. According to Ad Diyar, the objective must be the liberation of the territory and the restoration of the State’s decision.

Aboul Hosn also accuses Israel of destroying villages in order to prepare conditions for sustainable settlement. It links this policy to the project of a « Great Israel ». Faced with this threat, it calls for solidarity between the Lebanese and an agreement on the main national principles.

At the same time, the Member defends the parliamentary debate. He considered the sessions devoted to the inquiry of the government as an opportunity for national discussion. According to him, it is sound that differences should be expressed under the roof of Parliament, provided that they remain subject to the requirement of national unity and do not fuel tensions.

At the social level, his speech becomes very concrete. He described the claims of civil servants and retirees as legitimate. He called on the government to increase its revenues without burdening citizens with new burdens. It cites the improvement of customs revenues, the fight against tax fraud and the collection of revenue from maritime and river areas, careers and other public property. These resources should then be used for health, social and public remuneration.

Sami Gemayel asks government for accounts

Sami Gemayel takes a much more offensive position on the arms monopoly. Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 reports that the president of the Kataëb asks the government what he really executed of his sovereign decisions. His questions are direct: what have you applied, what is the obstacle and what is the timetable?

Gemayel believes that the army must be supported in order to fully exercise its responsibilities. It explicitly links this support to the issue of State monopoly of arms and to the disarmament of Hezbollah. This position was also presented at his meeting with the French Ambassador to Lebanon, Patrick Durel, during an exchange devoted to the international conference in support of the army.

He also refused that the fear of an internal confrontation paralyzes institutions. According to Al Sharq of 11 September 2026, Gemayel claims that talking about the risk to civil peace means that a group threatens this peace and that the State cannot submit to this logic. The President of the Kataëb thus transforms the issue of arms into a constitutional authority: the State must, according to him, be able to implement its decisions without the threat of an internal conflict making them ineffective.

Hezbollah denounces US pressure and defends its concept of sovereignty

Hezbollah responds to this line with a speech focused on American interference and Israeli occupation. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports that MP Ali Ammar accuses the United States of « obviously » intervening in Lebanese affairs. He criticizes the statements of the American embassy and believes that Washington is seeking to impose conditions and guidelines on Lebanon.

Ali Ammar claims that what the Lebanese want is for the United States to stop harming them and stop interfering in their affairs. It also calls on Washington to cease supporting Israel and to compel it to cease its operations and occupation of Lebanese territory. He argued that Lebanese people could determine their own choices through dialogue between the different components of the country.

He also claims that Hezbollah wants a strong state. According to Al Binaa’s report of 11 September 2026, this State must be independent in its decision, with its army, people and national unity. The disagreement with Hezbollah’s opponents, therefore, does not relate in this speech to the principle of a strong state. It deals with the definition of the conditions for this State to be sovereign and the place of the weapons of resistance in this equation.

Hassan Fadllallah insists on the concrete consequences of the war. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports that it places the occupation of southern territory at the forefront of the challenges. He then referred to the issue of internally displaced persons from border villages and other affected areas. His intervention aims to maintain the debate on weapons in the wider context of Israeli operations and their human consequences.

The political declarations of 11 September thus draw two competing views, but often use the same words: state, sovereignty, army and national unity. Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam highlight the concrete return of institutions. Nabih Berri warns about the impasse and demands results. Sami Gemayel demands the implementation of decisions on weapons. Hezbollah makes the cessation of Israeli operations and the refusal of foreign interference an essential condition of sovereignty. Between these positions, Parliament and the government become the main places to resolve a political conflict that the military situation in the South makes every day more urgent.

Diplomacy: Lebanon focuses on Rome, Paris and international support in the face of escalation in the South

An eighth negotiating session announced but still surrounded by uncertainties

Lebanese diplomacy is evolving under direct pressure from military operations in the South. The destruction in the heights of Ali al-Taher, concerns around Nabatiyah and Israeli statements about a safe area put the negotiations in a paradoxical situation. Beirut maintains diplomatic choice, but the results achieved on the ground remain disputed. The differences now relate as much to the content of the discussions as to their timing and their ability to lead to a lasting halt to Israeli operations.

Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports that the Israeli broadcasting authority announced an eighth negotiating session between Lebanon and Israel in Rome on Tuesday and Wednesday. In particular, the meeting should consider the establishment of a mechanism to verify the situation in experimental areas. However, the Lebanese official sources cited by the newspaper indicate that Beirut had not yet received any official United States notification of the appointment.

The timetable is also problematic. According to Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026, Lebanon informed the Americans of its preference for a meeting after 16 September. Joseph Aoun must be in Paris during this period as part of the preparations for the international conference in support of the Lebanese army. Two diplomatic processes thus intersect. The first concerns negotiations with Israel. The second aims to strengthen the capacity of the military institution responsible for extending State authority.

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 confirms this uncertainty. According to its official sources, the Lebanese State had still not been informed of the date of the new meeting in Rome despite Israeli information. The newspaper points out that this expectation comes as Israeli operations continue daily. For Beirut, negotiations must therefore move forward as military conditions deteriorate.

However, Al Liwaa of 11 September 2026 indicates that Lebanese officials do not wish to suspend the process. According to news reports from the daily newspaper, Joseph Aoun had reiterated that negotiations would continue. The Presidency sees this as an instrument to avoid a wider war. However, it refuses to interpret further discussions as acceptance of Israeli operations, occupation or destruction.

This presidential line is important. It means that diplomacy is not presented as an alternative to sovereignty, but as one of the instruments intended to restore it. The problem lies in the gap between this objective and immediate outcomes. The destruction in Ali al-Taher has rekindled criticism of the process.

Nabih Berri challenges the effectiveness of the diplomatic process

Nabih Berri strongly expresses this distrust. In his interview with Al Joumhouria on 11 September 2026, the President of the Chamber stated that « the framework agreement fell ». It also considers that the current diplomatic movements are of no value in the light of events on the ground. His position does not mean a general rejection of diplomacy. Rather, it reflects the idea that negotiation loses its meaning when it fails to prevent destruction, death or expansion of occupation.

Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports an even more explicit position of MP Hani Kobeissi. He called for a return to the direct negotiations after several sessions, which he said had not produced any results. He called for the priorities to now be stopped, the return of the inhabitants, the reconstruction and recovery of prisoners.

These statements show the existence of a fracture in the process evaluation. The Presidency and the Government maintain the negotiating channel. Berri and officials close to the Amal movement insist more on the lack of concrete results. This divergence can become greater if Israel continues to change the military situation as discussions continue.

The position of former Minister Wadih al-Khazen, reported by Al Binaa on 11 September 2026, partially joins this criticism. He asked what might be the usefulness of the framework agreement if Israel failed to comply with it, while Lebanon remained the only country bound to implement its commitments. It calls for full implementation of resolution 1701 and believes that international actors supporting existing arrangements also have a responsibility to protect the Lebanese Armed Forces mission.

The diplomatic issue was therefore gradually being redrafted. It is no longer just a question of whether Lebanon should negotiate. It covers guarantees obtained in exchange for its commitments. The authorities must demonstrate that the process effectively reduces military operations and promotes Israeli withdrawal.

Washington pushes for state sovereignty and arms monopoly

The role of the United States remains crucial. Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports the statements of an official of the State Department that Washington closely follows calls from southern Lebanon for an increased state presence. He said that Hezbollah’s weapons had brought destruction and suffering to Lebanon. He also considered the movement an obstacle to peace.

The American message is not limited to the South. Washington asks the government to prepare a plan for weapons throughout the country. The United States presents the negotiating framework as the main road map towards peace. American diplomacy therefore directly links the settlement of confrontation with Israel to the strengthening of the state monopoly on military decisions.

Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports the reaction of Hezbollah. MP Ali Ammar accuses the United States of interference in Lebanese affairs. He claims that Washington seeks to impose political choices on the country and calls for it to stop supporting Israeli operations. This reaction illustrates one of the major difficulties of American mediation: Washington is a central player in the negotiations, but its neutrality is strongly challenged by part of the Lebanese scene.

Asharq Al-Awsat of 11 September 2026 raises another dimension of American activity. The newspaper believes that Washington is seeking to develop its relations with Shia community personalities and institutions outside Hezbollah. The visit of American Ambassador Michel Issa to the Shiite Islamic Higher Council is presented in this context. The daily explains that this approach comes as Hezbollah and its relatives regularly accuse the United States of hostility towards the Shia community.

Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 gives details through Michel Issa himself. The ambassador described his visit to the Shiite Islamic Higher Council as positive. It states that each party was able to present its views. However, it rejects the idea that this approach constitutes the opening of a direct dialogue with Hezbollah. He claims to be an ambassador to all Lebanese components.

This American diplomatic activity therefore goes beyond military discussions. Washington is also seeking to influence political and community balance. This strategy immediately encounters an opposition from Hezbollah, which refuses to use relations between the United States and Shia actors to isolate the movement.

Paris prepares support for the Lebanese army

France is the other major focus of diplomatic activity. The conference on military support becomes more important as Beirut presents this institution as the main instrument for the return of the state to the South.

Al Liwaa of 11 September 2026 reports that logistical and technical preparations are already advanced. The army and other security institutions have prepared detailed lists of their needs. Lebanese officials want to take advantage of the conference to secure concrete commitments. Joseph Aoun’s announced presence alongside the army commander, Rodolphe Haykal, must give an additional political dimension to the meeting.

According to Al Liwaa of 11 September 2026, Lebanon wants to explain in particular the difficulties that slow down the deployment of the army to the South. The absence of a complete Israeli withdrawal must be part of the argument presented to international partners. The authorities are therefore seeking to prevent external support from being reduced to a requirement addressed only to Lebanon. They want to recall the obstacles imposed by the military situation.

Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports that American Ambassador Michel Issa assures that the United States continues to support and participate in the conference. He thus denies the speculation that Washington could move away from it because of criticism of the army’s action. He pointed out, however, that the United States expected the military institution to do its utmost.

The question of means remains central. Michel Issa admits, according to Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026, that the army does not have the same military capabilities as Hezbollah. Washington would not necessarily ask for direct confrontation. However, it expects a more active use of the resources available to it in the sectors in which it is deployed.

The European Union prepares a complementary arrangement

The European Union also wants to strengthen its commitment. Al Jumhouria of 11 September 2026 reports information from a European diplomatic source on a new programme for the Lebanese security forces. It should cover training, advice, equipment and improved inter-institutional coordination.

According to the same source, preparations could continue until late 2026 or early 2027. A first activity on the programme should clarify its mechanisms. The aim is to help Lebanese institutions improve their capacities without creating a new international structure that operates directly on the ground.

The diplomat quoted by Al Joumhouria insists on an essential limit: the European Union does not intend to deploy a Hezbollah disarmament force. Nor does it seek to replace the United Nations Interim Force. The arms file remains a Lebanese responsibility.

The newspaper reports that since 2023 the European Union has spent approximately €220 million on the security sector in Lebanon, including almost €180 million on the army. The equipment concerned is mainly vehicles, means of transport and logistical equipment. They don’t understand offensive weapons. The Paris conference should allow for a more precise identification of future needs.

The European strategy therefore complements the French strategy. Paris offers the political platform. The European Union seeks to structure support programmes. Washington maintains a decisive influence on the political conditions associated with this aid.

The Vatican and Arab contacts expand diplomatic coverage

Lebanese diplomacy is not limited to Western partners. Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 reports a meeting at the Vatican between Cardinal Pietro Parolin and a group of Shiite Lebanese personalities. The Secretary of State of the Holy See reportedly reaffirmed the Vatican’s support for the Lebanese State and for the exercise of its sovereignty over the whole territory.

The Vatican also supports dialogue with all Lebanese components. According to Al Sharq of 11 September 2026, Pietro Parolin stressed the opening of the Holy See to the various currents present in Lebanese communities, including the Shiite community. The participants thanked the Vatican for its support for the process of stabilizing borders and allowing the return of displaced inhabitants.

On the Arab level, Joseph Aoun also continues the contacts. Al Liwaa of 11 September 2026 reports his telephone interview with Bahraini king Hamad bin Issa Al Khalifa. The Lebanese President expressed Lebanon’s solidarity with him after the attacks on the kingdom. Both leaders also discussed bilateral relations and economic and political cooperation.

Al Liwaa also reports that energy minister Joe Saddi presented Joseph Aoun with the results of discussions with Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Qatar and Cyprus on electricity, oil and gas. These contacts show that economic diplomacy now accompanies security efforts.

Lebanese foreign policy is thus developing in several simultaneous circles. Rome must remain the place for negotiations with Israel. Paris must be used to consolidate the army. Washington is putting political pressure on the weapons issue. The European Union is preparing institutional support. The Vatican is trying to maintain bridges between the various Lebanese components. Finally, Arab partners remain essential for energy, investment and regional stability.

This multiplication of channels responds to the weakness of the available guarantees. Lebanon seeks to transform diplomatic support into concrete means of protecting its territory and consolidating the State. However, the events of Ali al-Taher show that diplomatic time remains slower than military time. It is precisely this gap that the authorities will have to reduce if they are to preserve the credibility of the choice of negotiation.

International politics: Washington-Theran confrontation extends from Iran to Bab al-Mandab

Washington and Tehran tighten their positions around a war without immediate outcome

The confrontation between the United States and Iran is the main international issue dealt with by the newspapers of 11 September 2026. It is no longer limited to direct military exchanges. It affects Iran’s nuclear facilities, the American bases in the region, maritime traffic, the oil market and balance in Yemen. At the same time, several mediations try to maintain a diplomatic channel. However, the public statements of both sides remain dominated by the threat.

Al Arabian Al Jadeed of September 11, 2026 reports that Donald Trump is planning an end to the war after the US mid-term elections on November 3. The US President believes that Iran will not be able to sustain the confrontation on a lasting basis. He stated that negotiations were still possible, but that they were not his preferred option. It also links the continuation of the war to high oil prices and anticipates a decline in oil prices after the end of hostilities.

Donald Trump threatens in parallel to hit the Iranian site of Jabal al-Faas, located near the Natanz nuclear facility. He claims that the United States has observed an activity in this sector. Asharq Al-Awsat of 11 September 2026 reports that Rafael Grossi, Managing Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirms the existence of indices showing a new activity around the site. However, it states that the Agency’s inspectors did not enter the underground complex.

The nuclear issue is therefore at the forefront. Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 states that the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency decided to refer the alleged failure of Tehran to comply with its obligations to the Security Council. The Iranian representative to the agency, Reza Najafi, rejects this decision. He presents it as the result of US political pressure and asserts that it is groundless.

Asharq Al-Awsat of 11 September 2026 reports that the Security Council then considered the issue of sanctions. At the same time, an official of the Iranian Parliament referred to the possibility of withdrawal from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This threat adds an additional element to the balance of power. It does not mean that Tehran made such a decision. However, it shows that Iranian officials are seeking to broaden the options available in the face of international pressure.

Iran announces that it has moved from defensive posture to offensive logic

Iranian military statements are equally firm. Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 reports the words of Hassan Hassan Zadeh, commander of the Revolutionary Guards forces in the Tehran region. He claims that Iranian forces are now ready to conduct « rapid attacks » and intervene in any part of the country.

The Iranian leader claims that his country has gone beyond a purely defensive confrontation. He announced the formation of units capable of conducting rapid special operations. His speech seeks to present Iran as still having an initiative capability despite US and Israeli operations.

This rhetoric is accompanied by military actions. Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 reports, citing American sources, that several American military aircraft were damaged in an Iranian attack on the Muwaffaq al-Salti air base in Jordan. Approximately eight combat aircraft were reported to have suffered limited damage and another aircraft was reported to have been more seriously affected. Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 also reproduces this information by assigning it to an American official.

The confrontation thus extends to American installations spread out in the region. It increases the risk of a cycle in which each attack leads to a response in another territory. Countries hosting US military facilities are directly exposed.

Israel also remains a stakeholder. Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 reports that the Israeli Defense Minister threatens Iran’s main energy infrastructure in the event of another attack on Israel. He claims that the Israeli army is prepared to inflict much greater damage on Iran. The American and Israeli statements thus converge on the desire to maintain a credible military threat against Tehran.

Hormuz focuses on energy and diplomatic issues

The question of the Strait of Ormuz is one of the main extensions of the war. Al Akhbar of 11 September 2026 describes negotiations between Iran and Oman concerning a maritime traffic mechanism. According to the sources cited by the newspaper, discussions had progressed on the definition of a waterway between Iranian and Omani waters.

The daily reports that the technical and legal teams had worked on maps and on the procedures for securing the passage. Oman would act in coordination with several regional and international actors. This information remains attributed to Al Akhbar sources and does not constitute the official announcement of a final agreement.

According to the same newspaper, Tehran would demand broader guarantees before any lasting settlement. These include the lifting of the blockade, access to Iranian funds and the complete end of the state of war. The issue of Ormuz would therefore not be separated from the rest of the negotiations between Iran and the United States.

Saudi Arabia would also play a role in mediation. Al Akhbar of 11 September 2026 reports that Riyadh maintains contacts with Iranian and American officials. The newspaper also refers to the possibility of displacement of Iranian officials to Saudi Arabia. Again, this is information attributed to daily sources.

Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 confirms, more generally, the intensification of regional diplomatic efforts. Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdelrahmane Al Thani, met with his Saudi counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan. Doha affirms its support for efforts to ensure freedom of navigation and to reach a wider agreement. The Saudi minister also exchanged with his Omani counterpart, Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi.

The Gulf monarchies are thus seeking to prevent confrontation from making the major sea routes unworkable. They are directly exposed to the economic consequences of a prolonged closure or disturbance of Ormuz.

Military changeover in Yemen places Bab al-Mandab at the centre of the crisis

The second major upheaval is taking place in Yemen. Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 reports that the Houthis took control of Mokha after the collapse of government forces positions in several areas of the western coast. This progress brings their forces closer to Bab al-Mandab, a strategic passage linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

The newspaper describes a rapid reversal of the balance of power. Government forces had been presented a few days earlier as capable of progress. The Houthis finally launched coordinated attacks and used several axes to bypass the opposing defences. The disruption of supply lines between Hays and Mokha would have played an important role in the collapse.

Government military officials quoted by Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 claim that the Houthis have progressed to several Red Sea islands. The Houthi military spokesman, for his part, affirms that international navigation will remain safe and that operations are linked to the continuation of the war and blockade against Yemen.

Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 also presents the capture of Mokha as a strategic event. A Houthi military official interviewed by the newspaper explained that the previous fighting had cut off the supply routes of the opposing forces. At the same time, the newspaper reports that government forces are talking about a withdrawal and a reorganization of their positions.

Asharq Al-Awsat of 11 September 2026 adopts a different reading. The newspaper insists on the Yemeni government’s willingness to reconstitute its lines south of Mokha. Rashad al-Alimi claims that Yemen will not allow Bab al-Mandab to become « another Hormuz ». It considers the protection of this passage not only a Yemeni issue, but also a regional and international one.

The narratives thus diverge on the scope of the Houthie progression. However, they converge on an essential fact: the battle for the West Coast now has a direct impact on Bab al-Mandab.

Strait control turns war into a global economic crisis

Simultaneous tensions in Ormuz and Bab al-Mandab give confrontation a global economic dimension. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 places this question at the center of its front page. The newspaper points out that oil prices increase as the risks to the waterways increase.

According to Al Binaa of 11 September 2026, Brent’s barrel exceeded 107 dollars, while U.S. crude oil exceeded 100 dollars. The newspaper combines this increase with attacks on ships, tensions around Ormuz and events in Yemen. His analysis stresses the growing capacity of Iran’s allies to influence the two strategic passages.

Al Akhbar of 11 September 2026 develops a similar reading. He believes that the haughty progression increases pressure on the United States and its partners. The newspaper considers that Ormuz and Bab al-Mandab have become elements of the same strategic confrontation. This reading reflects the daily life and must be distinguished from factual information on military movements.

However, the consequences are concrete. A simultaneous disruption of the two crossings would affect energy exports, shipping and insurance costs. It would also affect trade through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. It is precisely this dimension that explains the intensification of Saudi, Qatari and Omani mediation.

Gaza, the West Bank and Israeli elections remain under tension

The regional war does not erase the Palestinian issue. Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 reports the death of a family of four in an Israeli strike in northern Gaza. The newspaper also reports other military operations and new victims in the enclave.

At the same time, the United Nations warns about the humanitarian situation. According to Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026, stocks of essential supplies are insufficient due to lack of financing and restrictions on the entry of goods. The newspaper also reports on fuel supply difficulties.

Palestinian policy also remains uncertain. Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 reports that Jibril Rajoub is dismissing the holding of Palestinian parliamentary elections on 28 November under current conditions. He called for a national dialogue and believed that a presidential should precede the legislative process.

In Israel, the elections of 27 October also become a factor of regional policy. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports polls showing Benjamin Netanyahu’s difficulties in securing a parliamentary majority in his camp. The newspaper highlights the progress of Gadi Eisenkot and the divisions on the right. The Israeli campaign is therefore taking place as the Lebanese, Palestinian and Iranian fronts remain open.

The day of September 11 thus shows a region where crises previously treated as separate fronts become increasingly interdependent. The war between Washington and Tehran is affecting energy prices and American bases. Ormuz becomes a negotiating issue. The huthie advance places Bab al-Mandab at the heart of the confrontation. Israel maintains operations in Gaza and Lebanon while entering a decisive electoral period. In this context, regional mediations try less to resolve all conflicts immediately than to prevent their merger into an even wider confrontation.

Economy: budget, bank deposits and investments put Lebanese recovery at the centre of the debate

Budget 2027 under pressure from wages and social demands

The Lebanese economy returns to the foreground through several dossiers that meet around the same difficulty: how can the normal functioning of the state be restored without imposing new burdens on an already fragile population? Draft budget 2027, public sector remuneration, bank deposits, bank restructuring, the port of Beirut and the revival of hydrocarbons are the main economic subjects of the newspapers of 11 September 2026.

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 gives an important place to the draft budget. Joseph Aoun stressed that his examination at successive meetings should allow its adoption within the constitutional deadlines. The Chair noted that it was a project submitted within the deadline for the second time. Behind this procedural issue appears a political objective: to gradually restore budgetary regularity after years of institutional and financial crisis.

However, the debate becomes much more difficult when it comes to remuneration. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports the words of former Member of Parliament Chamel Roukoz, who believes that the budget should not be adopted before the introduction of an increase in wages. The demands of civil servants, retired military personnel and other State-dependent categories therefore have a direct bearing on budget preparation.

The Council of Ministers itself addressed this issue. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that the government discussed with military and civilian retirees on the basis of figures. The Ministry of Finance has been charged with examining the necessary amounts and seeking revenue that can finance expenditure without imposing an excessive additional cost on citizens.

This constraint summarizes much of the budgetary problem. The State must increase its social and wage expenditure while avoiding a new tax burden. At the same time, it must finance reconstruction, public services and the return of its institutions to the South.

Hadi Aboul Hosn offers several tracks in Ad Diyar on September 11, 2026. It calls for improved customs revenues, more effective fight against tax evasion and better collection of revenue from the maritime and river public sectors. It also cites careers and other State-owned resources. In his view, these revenues should be used primarily for the health and social sectors, as well as for the revision of public sector salaries and pensions.

The honourable Member therefore considers that the problem lies not only in the amount of expenditure. It concerns the ability of the administration to collect existing revenues. This distinction is essential. An increase in consumption taxes would quickly generate revenues, but would affect purchasing power. Improved recovery requires longer administrative reforms, but would limit this burden.

Bank deposits remain at the heart of financial reconstruction

Deposits remain the other major economic issue. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports the statements of Ibrahim Kanaan after his meeting with the Maronite Patriarch Bechara Rai. The honourable Member believes that any phase of economic transition requires restoring the confidence of Lebanese and depositors whose funds remain blocked.

Kanaan claims that the amounts lost or immobilized can still, at least in part, be saved. It places the project on financial regularization and return of deposits at the centre of this process. He said that the financial texts and reforms had reached an advanced stage, but their completion required cooperation between several actors.

In particular, he mentioned the State, the Bank of Lebanon and the International Monetary Fund. He called for definitive and reliable figures. This requirement reflects one of the problems that accompany the banking file since the beginning of the crisis: any allocation of losses depends first on a recognised valuation of assets, liabilities and liabilities.

The question, therefore, is not only that applicants should recover their money. It is necessary to determine the resources available, their timing of mobilization and the share of the banks, the Bank of Lebanon and possibly the State.

Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 also addresses the problem from the perspective of past financial transactions. The daily highlights the legal complexity of any recovery of funds related to policies and operations carried out in the years preceding the collapse. It recalls that many of these operations have been carried out through laws, regulations and formal decisions.

This question complicates the search for responsibilities. A financial transaction may have had very negative effects while being authorized by the rules then in force. Reform work must therefore distinguish between possible infringements and costly financial policy choices.

The debate on the recovery of deposits is thus inseparable from the debate on liability. Depositors are awaiting a refund mechanism. At the same time, institutions must avoid the cost of the crisis being transferred to all taxpayers without considering the responsibilities of banks and financial authorities.

Banking restructuring advances on the legislative front

At the same time, the banking sector is experiencing new legal developments. Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 reports that Joseph Aoun promulgated the law on bank reform and reorganization. The text amends certain provisions of the legislation adopted in August 2025.

This enactment constitutes an additional step in the construction of the legal framework to deal with the consequences of the banking crisis. However, it does not automatically regulate the file of applicants. The restructuring of institutions and the processing of deposits are linked, but they respond to separate mechanisms.

The priority is to identify viable banks, recapitalisation needs and institutions that cannot continue to operate in their current configuration. The restoration of confidence will then depend on how the losses will be recognized and distributed.

The Bank of Lebanon’s file therefore remains central. Ibrahim Kanaan, in Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026, specifically calls for cooperation with the central bank in order to arrive at definitive figures. Without this step, any promise of repayment may remain theoretical.

The banking debate is all the more important as the revival of investment requires a financial system capable of playing its part again. The deposit crisis is not just about savers. It also limits the ability of banks to finance productive enterprises and projects.

The port of Beirut becomes a symbol of the investment sought

The reconstruction and extension of the port of Beirut is one of the few economic dossiers clearly presented positively by the sources. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 highlights the project led by CMA CGM and Rodolphe Saadé. The newspaper considers the development of the port as an opportunity to make Beirut an important place in the Mediterranean maritime trade.

Joseph Aoun himself referred the matter to the Council of Ministers. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that he describes the laying of the first stone of the extension of the port of positive event capable of restoring hope to the Lebanese. He hoped that this operation would be followed by other projects.

The economic scope is twofold. The port is first and foremost an essential infrastructure for imports, exports and logistical activities. Its modernization can then serve as a signal to foreign investors. In an economy marked by the banking crisis and war, the ability to attract capital on long-term infrastructure is an important indicator of confidence.

The President also referred to the opportunities for Emirati investments. According to Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026, the Lebanese authorities asked the ministries to prepare projects that could be submitted to the United Arab Emirates. Emirati officials and businessmen had reportedly expressed interest and delegations had already visited Lebanon.

Joseph Aoun therefore asked the ministries to work quickly and coordinate their projects. His message was to prevent administrative or political rivalries from losing financing opportunities in Lebanon.

However, external investment remains directly dependent on security. Infrastructure projects require visibility that military operations in the South make more difficult. The contrast between port expansion and destruction in the South sums up the economic dilemma of the moment: opportunities for recovery exist, but they remain vulnerable to regional evolution.

Oil and gas: a fourth phase of licensing in preparation

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 also devotes a detailed file to hydrocarbons. The Ministry of Energy and the Petroleum Management Authority are preparing a fourth phase of licensing. The aim is to make the conditions more attractive for businesses after the difficulties encountered in the previous phases.

The newspaper states that the proposed changes include financial and technical guarantees. Their reduction could allow medium-sized companies and regional alliances to participate, rather than effectively reserve tenders for major international groups.

The income sharing framework could also be adjusted. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 refers to a direct share of the State estimated at 4% for gas and between 5% and 12% for oil. The proposed mechanism would also include cost recovery and progressive profit sharing. Enterprises would benefit from a higher share at the beginning, while the State’s share would increase with profitability.

Exploring times could be made more flexible in exceptional security circumstances. This provision is particularly important in the current context. Military risk is precisely one of the main obstacles to the presence of international companies in Lebanese waters.

The northern blocs present an additional difficulty: the lack of a complete delimitation of the maritime border with Syria. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 refers to a disputed area between 750 and 1,000 square kilometres. The establishment of a joint Lebanese-Syrian commission should make it possible to move the matter forward.

Among the possibilities studied is a common exploitation formula in the sectors concerned. The newspaper also mentions coordination with actors already having rights on the Syrian side. The aim is to reduce the legal risk for companies likely to participate in the next phase.

Block 8 would be excluded from the new procedure after the signature of its exploration agreement, while Block 9 could return after full recovery by the State. Other available blocks would also be proposed. The fourth phase could be launched in late autumn or early 2027 if political and security conditions permit.

Regional energy and investment: Beirut expands the track

Al Liwaa of 11 September 2026 reports that energy minister Joe Saddi presented Joseph Aoun with the results of discussions on electricity, oil and gas with several countries. Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Qatar and Cyprus were among the speakers mentioned.

This increase in contacts shows that energy policy is not based solely on offshore hydrocarbons. Lebanon is also seeking regional solutions for its electricity and energy supply. Energy costs remain a major obstacle to the competitiveness of enterprises and the functioning of public services.

Infrastructure development, banking reform and energy therefore appear to be three linked conditions for recovery. The port can strengthen the country’s commercial role. Hydrocarbons can open up a medium-term source of revenue. Regional energy agreements may reduce some immediate constraints. But all these projects require a lasting improvement in security and governance.

Budget 2027 gives these files an immediate deadline. The government must respond to salary demands while funding its priorities. It must restore the trust of depositors without creating a new unsustainable burden for public finances. At the same time, it seeks to attract foreign capital and re-start long-delayed energy projects.

The Lebanese economy of 11 September 2026 thus appears to be less confronted with a lack of projects than with difficulties of implementation. There are ways: bank restructuring, return of deposits, better revenue collection, port investment, energy cooperation and oil exploration. Their success now depends on three conditions that the sources show repeatedly: having reliable financial figures, restoring the functioning of the institutions and preventing security instability from destroying the first signs of recovery.

Justice: General amnesty suspended, while financial and criminal cases place responsibility at the centre of the debate

Constitutional Council suspends general amnesty

The decision of the Constitutional Council to suspend the application of the general amnesty law dominates the Lebanese judicial news of 11 September 2026. It takes place less than a month after Parliament adopts the text and opens a new phase in a sensitive legal, political and Community dossier. Several newspapers report the decision, which is not yet a final judgement on the merits of the appeal.

Annahar of 11 September 2026 states that on 10 September the Constitutional Council issued Decision No. 2026/10 suspending the application of Law No. 2026/70. This concerns a general amnesty and an exceptional reduction in the duration of certain sentences. The decision was taken by a majority in a session chaired by Judge Tannous Mechleb.

The daily reports that judges Aouni Ramadan, Ahmad Akram Baassiri, Albert Serhan, Riad Abu Ghida, Fawzat Farhat, Michel Tarzi, Elias Mecherkani and Mireille Najm participated in the session. The Vice-President of the Council, Omar Hamza, was absent for health reasons. The Council decided that the suspension would be officially notified to President Joseph Aoun, the President of the House Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, and then published in the Official Journal.

Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 also reports the suspension of the text and stresses that it intervenes following the appeal against the law. Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 repeats the same decision and recalls that it temporarily blocks the application of the provisions concerning amnesty and reduction of sentences.

Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 brings an additional political element. The newspaper states that the appeal was brought by the strong Lebanese parliamentary bloc, chaired by Gebran Bassil. The bloc believes that the formula adopted by Parliament raises constitutional problems. The newspaper recalls that the law had been passed at the parliamentary sitting on 12 August 2026.

The suspension should not, however, be confused with a cancellation. At this stage, the Constitutional Council prevents the application of the law during the examination of the appeal. The issue now concerns the decision on the substance and the specific provisions which the Council will find to be in conformity or contrary to constitutional rules.

The dossier also has a sensitive political dimension. Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 reports that Sunni activists criticized the appeal and announced their intention to politically sanction the deputies concerned in the upcoming elections in several constituencies. The legal dispute is thus doubled by a Community and electoral reading. However, this reaction reported by the newspaper does not prejudge the legal review conducted by the Constitutional Council.

A stolen car case reveals a complex transnational network

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 devotes an important judicial file to an investigation into vehicles suspected of having been stolen and international ramifications that initially appeared in a drug case. According to the newspaper, the file links Lebanon, Dubai, Armenia, Saudi Arabia, Syria and other territories that have been crossed by certain commercial operations.

The Attorney General of the Mont-Lebanon Court of Appeal, Judge Sami Sader, has prosecuted several persons in connection with the case concerning the theft of vehicles and alleged participation in these operations. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 cites Jad Hadchiti, born in 1996, and Wael Claude Jamaas, born in 1990, both prisoners. The newspaper also mentions Georges Rizk, born in 1967, and Elias Tayoun, presented as a fugitive.

The case was forwarded to the first investigating judge of Mount Lebanon, Nada Asmar. According to Ad Diyar, he had previously gone to the Public Prosecutor ‘ s Office at the Court of Cassation after proceedings under the supervision of the General Counsel of that court, Samaranda Nassar.

The particularity of the case lies in its origin. According to the evidence published by Ad Diyar on 11 September 2026, some leads appeared during investigations on an international drug network and following a report from Dubai through the international criminal police organization. The operation of conversations, images and data relating to sales and shipments would then have opened a separate window for cars.

Investigators are interested in buying, selling, temporarily entering and re-exporting vehicles between the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon. Some transactions were also reported to have involved passages through Syria, Jordan or Saudi Arabia. In addition, persons related to the case were reported to have carried out activities in Armenia and Georgia.

However, Ad Diyar insists on the judicial status of information. Some of the published material comes from the investigations and still needs to be verified by the courts. Suspicions cannot therefore be presented as definitive facts.

The name of Georges Rizk appears centrally in the elements reported by the daily. The investigators would examine the extent of its activities in the car trade between Dubai and Lebanon. Elias Tayoun, for his part, is presented in a statement as a person working with him and participating in certain procedures relating to vehicles and formalities.

The file above all illustrates the complexity of contemporary criminal cases. An investigation into narcotics can reveal financial flows, vehicles and commercial operations across several borders. Lebanese justice must then work with information from foreign jurisdictions and services.

Investigations must distinguish suspicions from established responsibilities

The vehicle case also raises an essential question of judicial method. Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that the investigators requested a review of the conversations and photographs and the identification of the vehicles appearing in the exchanges. Expertise is needed to verify their legal situation.

Requests for information from relevant international agencies are also addressed. The aim is to determine whether the cars concerned have been reported stolen and to reconstruct their movements between the different countries.

The newspaper also refers to information from a security source that certain amounts related to sales were collected by relatives of a suspect. Again, Ad Diyar states that this information remains subject to investigation and judicial verification. This precaution is fundamental. The existence of a transaction or personal bond is not in itself sufficient to establish criminal responsibility.

The transition from a security investigation to a judicial investigation must clearly distinguish between evidence, testimony and established facts. The investigating judge shall determine the role of each person prosecuted and verify the provenance of the vehicles concerned.

This case thus provides one of the most developed criminal files of the Lebanese press of the day. It combines organised crime, international cooperation and transaction traceability. It also shows why cross-border movement of goods complicates investigations when several legal systems are involved.

The financial issue remains dominated by the issue of liability in the banking crisis

Financial justice is the other important axis of the heading. Sources on 11 September include operations before and during the banking crisis, institutional responsibilities and procedures related to the former Governor of the Bank of Lebanon, Riad Salamé.

Al Sharq of 11 September 2026 posts at its One the position of the lawyer of Riad Salamé according to which 230 million correspond to loans and not commissions. This is a defence claim and must be presented as such. However, it shows that the legal characterization of financial movements remains at the heart of litigation.

Al Joumhouria of 11 September 2026 deals more widely with the difficulty of recovering funds from old financial transactions. The newspaper notes that some of the transactions that were currently contested were carried out within the framework of laws, regulations and administrative decisions that were then in force.

This situation poses a delicate judicial question. A financial policy with significant losses is not automatically an infringement. Political responsibility, administrative responsibility and criminal responsibility meet different criteria. In order to establish an offence, justice must therefore identify specific acts and confront them with the rules applicable at the time they were committed.

The debate on public funds and bank deposits reinforces this requirement. Claims for restitution are strong, but must be accompanied by a precise reconstruction of financial flows. The sources thus show a tension between the political urgency to designate the responsibilities and the necessary slowness of the judicial establishment of the facts.

Oversight institutions are taking on a growing role in the fight against corruption

The strengthening of oversight mechanisms complements this judicial timeliness. Al Liwaa of 11 September 2026 reports the words of Joseph Aoun during the swearing-in of the President and members of the Public Procurement Authority. The Head of State asks them to consider themselves on « the first line of defence of public money ».

The President believes that governance of public procurement is a component of the economic and financial recovery plan. It also links the success of this authority to the restoration of the confidence of international institutions and countries likely to assist Lebanon.

Even if this authority is not a jurisdiction, its role is at the forefront of judicial work. The transparency of public procurement and the traceability of procedures can reduce the possibility of irregularities. They also facilitate the work of oversight bodies when suspicions arise.

The presidential message therefore places the fight against corruption in a wider chain. Justice comes when offences are suspected. The control bodies must reduce the areas of opacity that may favour these offences.

The reform takes on particular importance as Lebanon seeks external funding for the army, infrastructure, energy and reconstruction. Foreign partners want guarantees on the use of funds. The functioning of the supervisory bodies thus becomes part of the financial credibility of the State.

Judicial issues go beyond individual cases

The files of 11 September 2026 finally show a justice faced with three categories of problems. The first is constitutional, with general amnesty and control over a law passed by Parliament. The second is criminal, with the investigation of the alleged stolen vehicle network and its international ramifications. The third is financial, with the files resulting from the banking crisis and the search for responsibilities.

In each of these cases, the same issue appears: to distinguish between political and legal decisions. Parliament may vote for an amnesty, but the Constitutional Council must verify its compliance with higher standards. The security services may identify an alleged network, but the accused remain under investigation and trial. Financial transactions may be politically challenged without their criminality being automatically established.

This distinction is all the more important in the Lebanese context as major judicial cases quickly become political or Community subjects. The suspension of amnesty already provides an example. The constitutional remedy is immediately interpreted through electoral and confessional balances.

The judicial day of 11 September is therefore not just a succession of proceedings. It directly raises the question of the capacity of the institutions to establish responsibilities according to common rules. Between the suspended amnesty, cross-border criminal investigations and financial litigation, justice is expected to play a central role in a period when the restoration of the State also depends on the confidence given to its control mechanisms.

Society: return of displaced persons, vulnerable housing and public services under pressure from war

In the southern suburbs of Beirut, the return takes place under fragile buildings

The social consequences of the war do not stop with the return of the inhabitants to their neighbourhoods. Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 devotes a detailed investigation to the situation in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The newspaper describes families returning after the ceasefire but forced to live in buildings damaged by Israeli operations. Housing, which was meant to make it possible to get out of the displacement and avoid the cost of rents, thus becomes a new source of concern.

According to Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026, more than 34 buildings considered to be at risk are currently being consolidated by the Union of Municipalities of the Southern Suburb. This figure is used to measure the extent of a problem that does not concern only fully destroyed buildings. Part of the housing stock is still standing but does not necessarily guarantee the safety of its occupants.

The daily newspaper describes residents who had moved to schools, collective spaces or temporary housing. Their return meant the end of that period. Yet he confronts them with cracked ceilings, weakened structures and fear of collapse. Fear thus changes form: the immediate danger of bombing is replaced by that of fragile housing.

This situation places families in a difficult position. Leaving their home again means finding another home and paying for it. Staying can reduce expenses, but can expose occupants to material risk. The lack of alternative solutions therefore leads some families to accept a level of danger that they would not have considered in a normal situation.

Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 also highlights the lack of funding and compensation available. The problem becomes particularly serious when the building is not completely destroyed. It must be determined whether it can be repaired, what type of work is needed and who must finance it. This phase is less visible than the complete reconstruction of a building, but it directly concerns the daily safety of the inhabitants.

The social question of reconstruction thus begins well before the reconstruction itself. First, it involves the expertise of buildings, the security of structures and the possibility of temporarily relocating threatened families. Without these steps, the return can simply shift the risk.

The South is trying to prepare for the return of the inhabitants and the return to school

The same problem arises in the South, where travel remains linked to military operations and infrastructure conditions. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports that the President of the South Council, Hashem Haidar, presented to Nawaf Salam the measures currently being taken in the southern villages. The rehabilitation of schools is one of the priorities.

According to Hashem Haidar, a large part of the establishments concerned have already begun to be repaired. The Southern Council is seeking to complete the work in all schools so that the school year can begin under as normal conditions as possible. The programme also includes the clearing and rehabilitation of infrastructure.

Back to school thus becomes a concrete indicator of the return to normal life. A family can hardly consider a sustainable return to its village if the children do not have a school, if the roads are impassable or if the basic services do not work. Social reconstruction cannot therefore be separated from material reconstruction.

Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 also reports on Hashem Haidar ‘ s statements on the rehabilitation of schools and the return of displaced persons. For its part, Nawaf Salam insists on the need to direct available resources to all the inhabitants of the South without distinction. The Prime Minister presents the Southern Council as one of the instruments for meeting these needs, in coordination with the Council for Development and Reconstruction.

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 adds that the Government has examined the rehabilitation of roads, the return to school and the provision of prefabricated housing. These three files are directly linked. Housing allows immediate return. Roads make travel and supply possible. Schools transform temporary return into family relocation.

According to Ad Diyar of September 11, 2026, Joseph Aoun insists on supporting the inhabitants of Nabatiyah, Tyre and Arab Salim. He asked to provide them with the means to stay on their land. Behind the political formula of the « return of the State » thus appears a very concrete social issue: preventing insecurity and the deterioration of services from producing a sustainable displacement of the population.

Nabatiyeh also becomes a battle for daily functioning

The situation in Nabatiyeh illustrates this link between security and daily life. The authorities want to strengthen the army and the Internal Security Forces, but they are also seeking to restore local administrations.

Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 reports that Interior Minister Ahmad al-Hajjar considers the strengthening of the security presence as a national responsibility. This presence must protect the inhabitants, but also ensure the continuity of administrative work and public services.

The distinction is important. A city may be under official control while remaining socially paralyzed if the administrations are closed, schools are not functioning and infrastructure remains damaged. The government strategy therefore seeks to advance the security and administrative machinery simultaneously.

This approach, however, runs counter to the continuation of Israeli operations. Any rehabilitation can be undermined by further escalation. The people must decide whether they are returning to areas where the state is gradually restoring its services, but where the military risk has not disappeared.

This uncertainty produces a social cost that is difficult to measure only by physical destruction. Families may delay their return. Shops are reluctant to resume their activities. Schools must organize their operation in an unstable environment. The reconstruction of a community therefore requires predictability that the military context does not yet guarantee.

Civil servants and retirees call for income improvement

The social crisis is not limited to war-affected areas. Public sector wage claims are also prominent in the September 11, 2026 newspapers. Civil servants and retirees demand an improvement in incomes weakened by the years of economic crisis.

Ad Diyar of 11 September 2026 reports that the government discussed with military and civilian retirees on the basis of figures. The Department of Finance must examine the necessary amounts and seek sources of funding that do not cause the public to bear any additional overburden.

Hadi Aboul Hosn, interviewed by Ad Diyar on 11 September 2026, described these claims as legitimate. It believes that the government must improve public revenues by strengthening customs collection, combating tax evasion and recovering revenue from public property.

The honourable Member asks that the resources thus obtained be used, inter alia, for social and health expenditure and for the revision of public sector and pensioner salaries. This position reflects one of the main social tensions of the moment: incomes need to be raised, but an increase financed only by new taxes could worsen the difficulties of other categories of the population.

The problem of public remuneration also affects the functioning of the institutions. Administrations whose employees cannot meet their basic needs have greater difficulty in retaining their staff and providing regular services. The wage issue thus becomes a question of state capacity.

Lebanese University awaits the settlement of the teacher file

The Lebanese University is another area where social and institutional issues join together. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports that the Council of Ministers reaffirmed the criteria for the full-time transfer of contract teachers.

Seniority, the needs of each faculty, specialization, competence and fairness must be taken into account. Contracts must be organised in four stages. The Government also provides for a final verification of names taking into account the comments made by Ministers.

According to the evidence reported by Al Binaa on 11 September 2026, the first set of contracts is to take effect from the beginning of 2027. The government has given itself a deadline to complete the examination of the file.

The issue goes beyond the professional situation of the teachers concerned. The Lebanese University is the country’s main public higher education institution. Its ability to maintain qualified teachers and deliver its courses directly concerns students whose families cannot bear the cost of private education.

The file therefore illustrates how the state crisis is passed on to social services. The professional stability of teachers, university funding and the quality of teaching become interdependent.

Waste goes back to government agenda

Waste management is also returning to executive priorities. Al Binaa of 11 September 2026 reports that the Council of Ministers decided to devote a specific meeting to this matter at the request of Joseph Aoun. At the same time, the Council for Development and Reconstruction should assist municipalities in their scanning and collection.

The decision shows that the file is not considered to be settled by existing mechanisms. Municipalities must provide a significant portion of services while their resources remain limited. Pressure is even greater in war-affected areas, where rubble adds to ordinary waste.

The clearing has a different dimension in the bombed areas. Routine waste should be distinguished from materials from destroyed or damaged buildings. The rehabilitation of neighbourhoods requires greater logistical and financial resources.

The file thus joins that of reconstruction. In the South as well as in the southern suburbs of Beirut, making a new neighbourhood means restoring municipal services along with housing and infrastructure.

War turns housing into the first social emergency

The various information published on 11 September 2026 finally shows housing as one of the main drivers of the social crisis. In the southern suburbs, some families have returned to fragile buildings because they cannot continue to pay for another dwelling. In the South, the authorities are preparing prefabricated housing for return. In villages, the reopening of schools and the rehabilitation of roads must make this return sustainable.

This situation shows that the number of displaced persons is not sufficient to measure the social consequences of war. A family can have officially returned while remaining in a precarious situation. Geographical return does not necessarily mean an end to social displacement.

Al Araby Al Jadeed of 11 September 2026 gives this reality its most concrete form with damaged buildings in the southern suburbs. Residents have returned to their neighbourhood, but not necessarily a safe dwelling. The buildings at risk recall that the consequences of the strikes may appear long after their end.

In the South, the efforts of the Southern Council show conversely the conditions for resettlement: schools, infrastructure, clearing and services. The government is trying to add a stronger administrative and security presence.

These direct consequences of the war are compounded by the difficulties of the rest of society: low public salaries, the situation of pensioners, the needs of the Lebanese University and waste management problems. Social pressure is therefore spread over several levels at a time.

The challenge for the state is no longer just to finance repairs. It should enable residents to live in safe housing, children to return to their schools, public administrations to function and public employees to have sufficient income. The social issue thus becomes one of the most concrete measures of Lebanon’s ability to move from a mere stop to a real return to normal life.

Culture: Beirut maintains its musical agenda while cinema, literature and arts question a world in crisis

Amine Boudchar chooses Beirut for a first meeting with the Lebanese public

The cultural matter of 11 September 2026 is less abundant than that of politics or war. Nevertheless, several trends can be identified. Beirut maintains a musical activity despite the security environment. Cinema directly captures contemporary conflicts. Literature explores the boundary between real and imaginary. Cultural pages thus show a creation that does not cut off from political crises, but tries to translate them into other forms.

Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 announces the first performance in Lebanon of Moroccan conductor and singer Amine Boudchar. The artist is scheduled to perform on Saturday 26 September in Beirut Hall, in the capital. He himself presented this stage of his 2026 tour as an « exceptional evening. » The rendezvous is his first on-stage encounter with the Lebanese public.

The show is based on the participatory formula that contributed to Boudchar’s reputation. Al Quds Al Arabi of September 11, 2026 explains that the audience does not remain simple spectator. He participates in the performance of a collection of Arabic, Moroccan and heritage songs and musical selections. The orchestra accompanies this collective participation. The concert is therefore built around an exchange between the musicians and the room rather than around an entirely descending interpretation.

This formula has already been used by Amine Boudchar at concerts in Morocco as well as in several Arab and European countries. Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 notes that it enabled him to attract a large audience. The Beirut stage is part of this international tour, but it has a special reach as it marks its entry into the Lebanese scene.

The announcement also deserves to be seen in the context of the day. The first pages of the newspapers are dominated by explosions in the South, fears around Nabatiyeh and the risk of war widening. Maintaining a musical appointment in Beirut therefore does not mean that culture operates outside the crisis. Rather, it shows that organizers and artists continue, when conditions permit, to schedule demonstrations in front of a Lebanese audience.

However, the source does not provide sufficient evidence to establish the economic status of the concert sector alone or to measure the expected attendance. It would therefore be excessive to present this announcement as evidence of a general resumption of cultural life. It is, on the other hand, a precise and documented appointment in the cultural pages of 11 September.

International music remains a part of the cultural agenda

Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 also reports several musical meetings that may interest jazz and international music lovers. The presence of these events on the cultural pages confirms that music remains one of the most visible areas of the cultural agenda available in the sources of this edition.

Music programming appears mainly as a space of circulation between Arab artists and publics from different countries. The case of Boudchar is representative. His repertoire and participatory arrangements are based on Arabic and Moroccan musical references, but his tour goes beyond his country of origin. Beirut becomes one of the stages of this cultural circulation.

This dimension is particularly visible in a capital which retains the function of meeting Lebanese, Arab and international productions. However, today ‘ s sources do not provide a comprehensive enough inventory to provide a comprehensive calendar of all events in Lebanon. It is therefore necessary to limit the agenda to explicitly documented events and not fill the gaps with demonstrations absent from the corpus.

The main clearly established Lebanese rendezvous remains the 26 September concert of Amine Boudchar. Other available cultural content makes it easier to monitor trends in Arab and international creation than to provide a comprehensive Lebanese agenda.

This distinction is necessary in order to respect the priority given to Lebanese culture. The material of the day does not allow artificially to build a long list of exhibitions, concerts or local performances. It is best to keep established appointments and use the rest of the sources to observe the major cultural themes that cross the region.

In Venice, cinema directly confronts the war in Gaza

Annahar of September 11, 2026 devotes part of his cultural pages to the Venice International Film Festival. The newspaper is interested in a documentary presented in the framework of the event held from 2 to 12 September. The film evoked deals with Gaza and looks critically at the war through Israeli protagonists.

Annahar’s treatment of 11 September 2026 directly raises the question of the place of cinema in the face of an ongoing war. The stake is not only aesthetic. It deals with the responsibility of cinema when it works on events whose human consequences continue to take place at the very moment when the works are shown to the public.

The film is directed by Yuval Abraham and Rachel Zor. Annahar of 11 September 2026 also states that its production involves The Guardian and the French producer and distributor Marin Karmitz. The choice of a documentary rooted in immediate news shows the place taken by contemporary conflicts in major cinematographic events.

For the Lebanese public, this issue has a particular resonance. Readers are simultaneously following the situation in Gaza and climbing in southern Lebanon. A documentary devoted to this war cannot therefore be received as a cinematographic object completely removed from regional experience.

The subject also shows how the boundaries between politics and culture become more porous. The same events can be examined in the international pages from a military and diplomatic perspective, then in the cultural pages under image, representation and testimony. Cinema does not replace information. It proposes another way of questioning the individuals at the heart of the conflict and the responsibilities that accompany it.

This presence of Gaza in a major international festival finally confirms that the war has become a cultural object even before its completion. It requires filmmakers, producers, festivals and spectators to think about the distance needed to represent events that are still open.

Arab literature works strangely in everyday life

Al Quds Al Arabi of 11 September 2026 also has an important place in literature. The daily is interested in the fantasy of reality and narrative strangeness in the novel Qahirat al-Yawm al-Daïe. The subject is one of the main cultural contents announced by the newspaper.

The value of treatment lies in how the novel transforms reality into narrative matter. The fantastic is not necessarily conceived as a complete break with reality. It can be used to make perceptible what the daily life already has insurd, unstable or worrying.

In an edition dominated by regional wars and upheavals, this literary question forms a counterpoint. However, it is not entirely separate from the context. Societies faced with rapid transformations themselves provide a material where real can take on a strange appearance. Literature then has different means than journalism to make this experience sensitive.

The policy pages seek to determine what has happened, which actors are responsible and what consequences can result from it. The novel can work the experience of time, loss, uncertainty or strangeness. The cultural source thus emphasizes narrative processes and the relationship between reality and imagination.

However, this subject should not be turned into a dossier on Lebanese literature. The sources of 11 September 2026 do not provide here a Lebanese work corresponding to the priority focus requested. Content remains relevant in an Arab cultural journal, but it should not be artificially presented as a Lebanese literary news.

This limit is indicative of the entire entry. The sources maintain a true Culture section, but they provide less material specifically Lebanese than in the political, economic or social sections. Priority should therefore be given to events in Lebanon and to the best-documented regional cultural topics.

Plastic arts question construction behind disorder

Al Liwaa of 11 September 2026 also contains a reflection on the plastic arts and mentions in particular Willem de Kooning. The text is interested in the geometry of his works and in how an order may appear behind what seems, at first glance, to be a disorder.

This approach is different from other cultural topics of the day. She does not start a concert or immediate conflict. It returns to the very construction of the work and to the gaze necessary to exceed the first impression.

The use of Kooning allows us to approach the tension between gesture, composition and perception. The apparent disorder does not exclude the structure. The viewer’s gaze must look for the lines, balances and relationships that organize the canvas beyond the immediate impression.

This type of content brings a breath to cultural pages. Where cinema documents violence and literature questions the strangeness of reality, the visual arts place attention on form and the creative process.

The material provided by Al Liwaa on 11 September 2026, however, remains more critical and reflexive than eventual. It does not allow a specific Lebanese exposure to be reported on this basis alone. It would therefore be wrong to artificially integrate it into an exhibition calendar in Beirut.

This caution also makes it possible to distinguish two different functions from cultural pages. Some are used to announce events and inform the reader on a specific appointment. Others offer a critical reading of a work, an artist or a movement. Both are necessary, but they cannot be used in the same way to create an agenda.

A small but clearly identifiable Lebanese agenda

The strictly Lebanese cultural agenda that emerges from the sources of 11 September 2026 is ultimately more limited than all the cultural pages consulted. The most clearly documented appointment is that of Amine Boudchar in Beirut Hall on Saturday, September 26. Al Quds Al Arabi of September 11, 2026 presents this evening as the artist’s first performance in Lebanon.

At the same time, sources report an activity around jazz and international music. However, they do not permit the same accuracy in all dates, places and artists without the risk of introducing insufficiently established information. The agenda must therefore be deliberately limited to genuinely documented events.

This relative quantitative weakness is itself significant. The newspapers of 11 September devoted a much larger part of their space to war, politics and regional crises. Even cultural pages are partly caught up in this news, as shown by the film treatment of Gaza.

However, culture does not disappear. The arrival of Amine Boudchar in Beirut bears witness to the continuing artistic exchange between Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world. The major international festivals present works that directly question the wars of the region. Literature continues its exploration of reality through imagination. The plastic arts maintain a reflection on form and look.

However, the available material imposes a net limit. It allows to document the continuity of a cultural life and some specific meetings, but not to claim a profusion of Lebanese events that does not appear in the sources. For this edition of September 11, 2026, culture remains present, but in a more narrow form: a musical agenda in Beirut, an Arabic creation in circulation and works that, from cinema to literature, continue to question contemporary crises.