Nawaf Salam in Paris not only places the Lebanese army at the heart of a bilateral discussion with France. It places it at the centre of a much larger equation: Israeli withdrawal from the South, the future of the international force, the return of displaced persons, the reconstruction of villages and the restoration of the State as the sole authority on its territory. In a sequence dominated by the regional agreement between Washington and Tehran, the Lebanese Prime Minister seeks to translate sovereignty into concrete means. A press release doesn’t hold a border. A resolution does not secure a road. A promise of a ceasefire is not enough to reassure the families of the South. In order for the state to return, a national force must be present, equipped, paid, mobile and politically covered.
The Paris visit comes as the South Lebanon remains unstable. According to press reports, Israel is discussing with the United States the continuation of a military presence in certain areas of the South, despite the provisions of the regional agreement that reaffirm Lebanese territorial integrity. This data weighs on all conversations. Beirut cannot speak of a return to normal if the Israeli army retains positions. Paris cannot talk about stabilization if the villages remain under the threat of drones, strikes or a de facto imposed security zone. The diplomacy of Nawaf Salam therefore starts from a simple observation: Israeli withdrawal and the strengthening of the Lebanese army are not two separate dossiers. They are a single condition of sovereignty.
A French visit in a rocking moment
Paris offers Nawaf Salam a useful political relay. Emmanuel Macron has already received the Lebanese Prime Minister at the Elysée in a sequence marked by the continuing tensions in the Middle East and the fragility of the ceasefire in Lebanon. Elysée then recalled the French commitment to full respect for this ceasefire, while linking the stabilization of the country to its sovereignty, reconstruction and reforms. This French line today serves as a framework for the new diplomatic moment.
Salam’s displacement is not just about obtaining statements of support. Lebanon has already received many. He’s looking for abilities. The country faces a series of simultaneous tasks: accompanying the return of internally displaced persons, documenting destruction, restoring essential services, defending its position in the Security Council, maintaining coordination with UNIFIL and preparing for the wider deployment of its army. Each of these tasks requires means, a clear chain of command and international political protection.
France can act on several levels. It can plead with its European partners. It can support the Lebanese army through equipment, training and diplomatic mobilization. It can defend the role of international force. It can also remind Israel that maintaining a military presence in southern Lebanon contradicts any stabilization logic. But Paris cannot replace Washington. The United States remains the player with the most direct leverage on Israel.
This French limit explains the usefulness, but also the inadequacy, of the visit. Salam seeks to multiply the support points. He can’t settle for one godfather. Paris brings the language of sovereignty. Washington can weigh on the Israeli army. Doha can contribute to financing. The United Nations provides the legal framework. The Lebanese government is trying to hold these channels together without losing its autonomy.
The Lebanese Army, pivotal to the return of the State to the South
The Lebanese army is at the centre of the discussions because it is the only institution capable of embodying the state in the South. Departments can manage the aids. Municipalities can identify the damage. Diplomats can negotiate. But on the roads, in the villages and near the Blue Line, sovereignty takes a concrete form: deployed units, guarded posts, regular patrols, coordination with the inhabitants, response capacity and an organized relationship with UNIFIL.
This function is more political than military. A weak or absent army leaves the ground to other actors. Israel can then justify its presence by the security vacuum. Hezbollah can justify its weapons by its inability to protect villages. Foreign powers can discuss Lebanon without him. Conversely, a visible, supported and recognized army gives the government an argument: the territory may be held by the State, not by a foreign force or by an armed party.
This reasoning does not mean that the army can settle the Hezbollah case alone. The debate on arms remains political, national and regional. It cannot be imposed by a simple administrative decision. But the army can create the framework for this debate. It can secure the ground after an Israeli withdrawal, reduce pretexts for foreign military retention and offer a national alternative to militia logic.
That is why the question of means becomes central. The Lebanese Armed Forces require vehicles, fuel, communications, spare parts, surveillance, engineering units, demining capabilities and sustainable logistics. They also need sufficient wages to maintain internal cohesion. In a country marked by financial collapse, supporting the army is not just about delivering equipment. We have to keep an institution standing.
UNIFIL, safety net or fragile transition
Salam’s visit to Paris is also taking place in a moment of uncertainty around UNIFIL. The United Nations force remains one of the few international instruments in South Lebanon. It does not replace the Lebanese army. It did not prevent all violations. It faces Israeli criticism and operational constraints. But its brutal weakening would create a dangerous vacuum.
Nawaf Salam has already stated, during a trip to Paris reported by AFP, that Lebanon would still need an international presence, preferably United Nations, after UNIFIL’s departure or transformation. This position is based on a realistic observation: the South cannot pass in a few weeks from a war open to full national security without external support. An international force, even imperfect, offers surveillance, a link channel and a form of neutrality that Beirut needs.
The question is therefore not to choose between the Lebanese army and UNIFIL. We have to articulate both. The army must be the sovereign actor. UNIFIL should be the international support, observer and liaison mechanism. This complementarity can only work if the mandate is clear, the rules of engagement are understood and international partners do not treat UN force as a substitute for the state.
Paris has a direct interest in this matter. France participates in the international force and has paid a human cost in South Lebanon. The death of peacekeepers in the region has increased concern about the security of the mission and the conditions for its maintenance. In this context, supporting the Lebanese army also becomes a way of protecting the future of a useful but vulnerable international presence.
Israeli withdrawal: the condition without which everything blocks
The centrality of the army must not mask the main prerequisite: Israeli withdrawal. Without withdrawal, the Lebanese deployment will remain incomplete. Without withdrawal, Hezbollah will retain its main argument. Without withdrawal, the inhabitants of the South will remain suspended from the military decision of a neighbouring State. Without withdrawal, Paris, Washington and the United Nations could talk about sovereignty, but the ground would say something else.
Israeli officials justify maintaining positions in the South on security grounds. They refer to strategic areas, the protection of northern Israel and the need to prevent Hezbollah from relocating near the border. This reading responds to a real concern of Israeli society. But it is colliding with Lebanon’s right to control its territory.
For Beirut, logic must be reversed. The Israeli withdrawal must allow the deployment of the army, and then the opening of a national debate on weapons and the defence strategy. If we demand first the disarmament of Hezbollah while Israel remains present, the Lebanese state risks the internal explosion. If we never talk about weapons after withdrawal, the state will remain incomplete. The difficulty is not only the principle. She’s the calendar.
Salam’s diplomacy therefore consists in defending a sequence. First step: verifiable cessation of strikes and violations. Step two: complete Israeli withdrawal. Third stage: enhanced military deployment with international support. Step four: return of internally displaced persons and reconstruction. Step 5: National dialogue on the monopoly of force and defence strategy. This sequence can be challenged. It has the merit of avoiding the trap of a debate launched under occupation.
Financial needs that Lebanon cannot cover alone
Sovereignty has a cost. The Lebanese state, weakened by years of financial crisis, cannot take on alone the rise of its army or the reconstruction of the South. According to information reported in previous Franco-Lebanese exchanges, Nawaf Salam mentioned considerable humanitarian needs for the coming months. These needs are in addition to the military, social and administrative expenditures necessary for stabilization.
International aid must therefore avoid two mistakes. The first would be to finance only the humanitarian emergency without strengthening the state. This would relieve families, but leave the security ground unchanged. The second would be to finance only the army without meeting civilian needs. This would create armed sovereignty, but socially fragile. The South needs both: security and daily life.
The Qatari dimension can play a major role here. Doha has financial resources and a mediation capacity that Beirut can use. Qatar can help support balances, equipment, logistics or civilian return programmes. But this aid must be part of a national road map. It must not produce a new dependency or multiply parallel circuits.
France can serve as a platform. A conference in support of the Lebanese army and the security forces, mentioned by several media and officials, could bring together European, Arab and international commitments. But a conference will not be enough if it does not lead to deliveries, multi-annual funding, monitoring and precise indicators. The Lebanese army does not need a family photo. It needs operational resources.
Salam between external support and internal balance
Nawaf Salam must also manage an internal political equation. Talking to Paris, Washington or Doha is not enough. The Prime Minister must convince the Lebanese forces that the strengthening of the army is not aimed at one faction against another, but at the state against the vacuum. This nuance is decisive. If military support is perceived as Western pressure against Hezbollah before the Israeli withdrawal, it may further polarize the country. If it is presented as an instrument of sovereignty after withdrawal, it can gather more broadly.
Salam’s position is based on institutional prudence. He does not promise that the army will solve all Lebanese contradictions alone. He seeks to give him a central place in a transition. This approach may seem slow. Yet it responds to the fragility of the country. Lebanon cannot endure an internal war on the issue of arms at the time when the South is being destroyed, the internally displaced are returning and Israel retains its ability to strike.
This caution must not become static. The government will have to quickly produce a plan. It should indicate where the army should deploy, with what means, in what time frame, under what coordination with UNIFIL and with what international commitments. It will also have to prepare a political framework for the future. Sovereignty cannot remain a repeated formula for every official move.
The stakes are all the higher as the regional agreement between Washington and Tehran can change the balance of power. If the United States imposes a de-escalation on Israel and Iran encourages Hezbollah restraint, a window will open for the Lebanese state. If one of the two sponsors fails, Lebanon risks returning to confrontation. Salam therefore seeks to prepare the state to seize an opportunity that may be short.
The credibility of the state will be on the ground
The article can be summarized as follows: the Lebanese army is at the centre of diplomatic discussions because it is at the centre of the return of the State to the South. Without it, Israeli withdrawal can create a vacuum. Without withdrawal, it cannot fully deploy. Without UNIFIL or international presence, it may be exposed. Without funding, it will remain fragile. Without political consensus, it will be instrumentalized.
Paris is a useful passage, but not a final destination. The true measure of Nawaf Salam’s visit will not be the statement of the Elysée. It will be visible in the villages of the South: reactivated posts, secure roads, reassured inhabitants, coordination with the municipalities, documentation of violations, gradual return of services and ability to prevent the recurrence of war by incident.
France can help structure this transition. It can push its partners to support the army. It can defend an international presence in the South. It may recall that the disarmament of Hezbollah must be handled by the Lebanese and not imposed under occupation. But Lebanon itself will have to define the sequence, assume the choices and avoid foreign aid replacing the national decision.
Salam’s trip to Paris therefore says something of the Lebanese moment. The country wants to become a subject of its own security. It no longer wants to be only the space where Israel strikes, where Iran negotiates, where the United States arbitrates and where France pleads. The army will become the concrete face of this ambition. It remains to be seen whether Lebanon’s partners will give it the means to exist in the South, and whether Lebanese forces will accept that the return of the State is no longer just a promise, but a visible organization on the ground.
