The transfer of millions of photographs to private infrastructure raises a question that goes beyond computer storage: for what purposes can these images be exploited? A Guardian investigation published on 16 November claimed that the Israeli army had transferred 3.5 million photos of Palestinians to Amazon services, as part of a project using facial recognition. The reported elements describe a massive processing capacity, without establishing the operational use of each image.
A transfer attributed to a military unit
The investigation is based on internal documents and interviews with military sources. It attributes the transfer to a unit known as Rolling Stone, which maintains information about the Palestinian populations in Gaza and the West Bank. Early in 2024, this unit reportedly indicated that it wanted to use Rekognition, Amazon’s image analysis service.
The volume announced concerns photographs, not necessarily so many different people. This distinction is important: the same person can appear in several images. Therefore, the number of files alone does not measure the number of individuals identified or the decisions made about them.
The origin of all images is also uncertain. The story distinguishes between existing bases and photographs collected at checkpoints in Gaza. It does not show that the 3.5 million files all come from these crossings.
Store, index and search are separate operations
The documentation from AWS allows to clarify the general operation of Rekognition, without validating the alleged military uses. The service can search for matches between a face provided as an input and a collection. This preserves mathematical representations of facial characteristics, called vectors, and not the photographs themselves.
Several images of the same person can produce multiple vectors. The documentation also provides for their consolidation to improve research. Thus, depositing photographs in a cloud infrastructure, extracting features and launching a comparison are different steps. Their existence does not automatically prove that a result triggered an arrest or other intervention.
Explicit limits in the facts reported
The investigation also referred to the presence of military personnel in Tel Aviv offices in early 2024. It does not affect their relationship with this batch of images or the possible operationalization of their work. These reservations prohibit all experiments described as being actually deployed.
AWS invokes customer confidentiality, denies seeing their data and describes visits as routine. The army refuses to comment.
Control issues remain open
The file therefore requires several separate checks: the source of the files, the conditions for their processing, the persons authorized to consult the results and the procedures for correcting an identification. These questions are not solved by the volume of images transferred.
The published evidence highlights the links between commercial infrastructure and military surveillance capabilities. They are not a demonstration of every possible use of technology. It is on this difference between technical capacity, documented project and demonstrated use that responsibilities must be examined.





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