Egyptian warnings return to the heart of the case
New revelations place Benjamin Netanyahu in the face of a central question about the events of October 7, 2023. What did the Israeli state summit know before the Hamas attack and what warnings had it received from its regional partners? According to The Atlantic of 26 September 2026, Egypt had multiplied the signals before the offensive. Abbas Kamel, then head of Egyptian intelligence and close to President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, reportedly secretly visited Israel on 26 September 2023. The displacement would have taken place eleven days before the attack. His plane would have stayed only 67 minutes at Ben-Gourion Airport. The newspaper highlights the unusual nature of such a brief visit by the head of Egyptian intelligence. According to officials quoted by The Atlantic, Abbas Kamel wanted to alert his interlocutors about a situation in Gaza that was becoming particularly dangerous. However, the warning did not include a precise date, target or description of an attack plan comparable to that carried out on 7 October. This distinction remains essential. The information published does not indicate that Cairo knew in detail the operation prepared by Hamas. They indicate, however, that Egypt considered the risk sufficiently serious to intervene directly with the Israeli authorities. The Atlantic of 26 September 2026 also claims to have consulted evidence to confirm the movement of the aircraft related to the Egyptian services. The identity of the interlocutors whom Abbas Kamel met during his visit to Israel remains at the centre of questions.
The case gained momentum with information published by The Wall Street Journal and reported by The Times of Israel on 28 September 2026. According to these elements, the September intervention would not have been an isolated episode. The Egyptian authorities reportedly issued several warnings in the months prior to 7 October. A first signal would have gone back to June 2023. Cairo then reportedly expressed concern about the situation in Gaza and advised a resumption of discussions with Hamas. Another warning was reportedly given during the displacement of Abbas Kamel on 26 September. Then the contacts continued in the following days. The Atlantic of 26 September 2026 even evokes a new warning on 5 October, only two days before the attack. Again, no specific operational scenario would have been communicated. However, the repetition of messages changes the nature of the debate. The question is no longer simply whether Israel had any information specifically announcing the assault. It also concerns the accumulation of signals indicating an abnormal situation in Gaza. Benjamin Netanyahu’s firm disputes this reading. According to The Times of Israel, September 28, 2026, he claims that Netanyahu neither met or discussed with Abbas Kamel during the months prior to October 7. He also claims that no Israeli intelligence official has sent the Prime Minister an Egyptian warning announcing an imminent attack.
A second warning was reportedly sent by the United Arab Emirates
The revelations concerning Egypt are now coupled with a potentially more sensitive case for Benjamin Netanyahu. It concerns Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates and Israel’s important partner since the normalization of relations between the two countries. According to information originally published by Haaretz and taken over by Ynet on 27 September 2026, Mohammed ben Zayed personally spoke to Benjamin Netanyahu about a week and a half before 7 October 2023. The interview would have lasted almost 45 minutes. The Emirati leader reportedly mentioned the risk of an operation prepared by Yahya Sinwar, then Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip. Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly replied that the situation in the enclave was under control and that Israeli concerns were more focused on the West Bank. The Prime Minister’s office denied this version. He claims that no such warning was transmitted to Netanyahu by President Emirati. The point is crucial, as a direct exchange between the two leaders would place the information at a different level than a note transmitted between intelligence services.
However, other testimonies reinforced the questions. The Atlantic of 26 September 2026 reports that several officials confirmed the existence of a warning from the United Arab Emirates. The Times of Israel of 28 September 2026 also states that it obtained confirmation from an Emirate source concerning the existence of the appeal. However, the Abu Dhabi authorities did not make public the content of a possible conversation between Mohammed bin Zayed and Benjamin Netanyahu. Their official reaction remained cautious. According to Ynet of 27 September 2026, the Emirati Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that it did not comment on private conversations between leaders. He also recalled that the United Arab Emirates and Israel had direct channels to exchange information. This response does not amount to confirmation of the warning. Nor is it an explicit denial. But this absence of denial became important after the new revelations. Benjamin Netanyahu is thus confronted with two separate sets of information. One concerns Egyptian warnings. The other concerns an intervention which was allegedly made directly to him by President Emirati.
Netanyahu’s mysterious move to Abu Dhabi
It is in this context that Benjamin Netanyahu’s secret displacement to the United Arab Emirates is of particular importance. According to the Associated Press of 28 September 2026, the Israeli Prime Minister went discreetly to Abu Dhabi on 27 September. He met Mohammed bin Zayed there. Two persons informed of the trip confirmed to the agency the existence of the meeting. It would have lasted about an hour. The trip had not been publicly announced before it took place. His proximity to the publication of revelations about warnings prior to 7 October immediately raised questions. According to Associated Press of 28 September 2026, one of the objectives of the displacement was precisely to obtain from the Emirati President whom he publicly denied having warned Netanyahu before the Hamas attack. This version was officially confirmed neither by the Israeli government nor by the Emirati authorities. It is based on people informed about the exchanges. It must therefore be presented as such. However, it is also reported by other Israeli media.
The Times of Israel of 28 September 2026 thus reports, quoting a person with direct knowledge of the meeting and a regional official informed of the discussions, that Netanyahu had asked Mohammed bin Zayed to publicly refute the information concerning the warning. According to the same publication, the Israeli request was made in a context in which Abu Dhabi refused to engage in a polemic considered to be primarily a matter of Israeli political debate. Channel 12, quoted by The Times of Israel on 28 September 2026, claims that the Prime Minister’s office had repeatedly called for a meeting. The aim would have been to convince President Emirati to publish a denial. The United Arab Emirates reportedly refused to do so. This alleged refusal is now one of the most sensitive elements of the case. It does not prove that the warning attributed to Mohammed bin Zayed was given in the terms reported. However, it leaves unanswered the central demand of the Israeli government: to obtain from Abu Dhabi a clear refutation of the account that Netanyahu was personally alerted before 7 October.
A confidential visit that did not last long
The confidentiality surrounding the trip was intended to allow the two leaders to meet away from public attention. Yet the trip was revealed even before the return of the Israeli delegation. Channel 12 broadcast information while Benjamin Netanyahu was still in the United Arab Emirates. This publication provoked an immediate reaction from its people. According to information published on 29 September 2026, the Israeli security services considered that premature disclosure of displacement could create a risk for Netanyahu, his wife and senior officials present with him. The delegation included several key Israeli security officials. The Prime Minister’s office therefore focused part of its reaction on the conditions under which information about the displacement had been made public.
However, this controversy over the confidentiality of the trip does not answer questions about its purpose. She even adds a new one. If the meeting were to remain secret, and if it was indeed aimed at obtaining a denial from Mohammed bin Zayed, its disclosure prevented this step from remaining outside the Israeli public debate. The timetable is particularly sensitive. The revelations concerning the Egyptian warnings had just been published. Those concerning the alleged appeal of President Emirati had also come back in the news. Then Netanyahu went to Abu Dhabi for a meeting that had not been announced. Associated Press of 28 September 2026 and The Times of Israel of the same day directly link this displacement to the controversy over the warnings before 7 October. The Israeli government has not confirmed this interpretation. Nor did the United Arab Emirates reveal the content of the interview. In the state, it is therefore impossible to present as an established fact that the sole purpose of displacement was to obtain a denial. On the other hand, several consistent sources argue that this issue was at the heart of the discussions.
What Netanyahu knew becomes the central issue
The new information does not show that Benjamin Netanyahu knew Hamas’ plan before October 7. None of the warnings described by the media cited included, according to their own information, all the elements necessary to anticipate precisely the offensive. Neither an exact schedule nor a full description of the objectives nor the extent of the attack on southern Israel is reported. This limit is important to understand the file. However, it does not remove another question. Several Israel regional partners reportedly considered the situation in Gaza to be dangerous enough to intervene with Israeli officials. Egypt reportedly issued several warnings. His head of intelligence reportedly moved to Israel. The messages reportedly continued until two days before the attack. At the same time, the President of the United Arab Emirates himself reportedly mentioned the threat with Netanyahu. These elements remain disputed to varying degrees, but their accumulation now feeds the Israeli debate on responsibilities.
Netanyahu’s firm opposes this narrative of specific denials. He disputes that Abbas Kamel met with the Prime Minister or spoke to him before the attack. He also disputes the existence of the personal warning attributed to Mohammed bin Zayed. Netanyahu has long maintained that the security services had not notified him of an alert to anticipate the offensive. Conversely, the revelations of September 2026 move the debate towards the circulation of information within the state. It becomes necessary to distinguish what the services knew, what was passed on at the political level and what would have happened directly to the Prime Minister. The distinction is major. A warning received by a service does not automatically imply that Netanyahu was aware of it. On the other hand, if the existence of direct conversation with Mohammed ben Zayed were established, this question of intermediate transmission would no longer arise in the same way.
A political battle around responsibilities on 7 October
Controversy arose as the issue of responsibility remained open in Israel. Several senior military and security officials acknowledged the serious failures that had occurred prior to the attack. Internal investigations documented misappraisals and underestimation of Hamas’ capabilities. Political responsibility, on the other hand, remains a subject of confrontation. The new revelations from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates can therefore be far beyond the relationship between Israel and its Arab partners. They directly concern the decision-making chain before 7 October and how external warnings were received, analysed and eventually transmitted.
The confidential move to Abu Dhabi now adds a second level to this case. It is no longer just a question of determining what happened before 7 October 2023. There is also a need to understand the steps taken three years later on the account of these events. According to Associated Press of 28 September 2026 and The Times of Israel of the same day, Netanyahu reportedly sought a public denial from Mohammed bin Zayed. According to the same information, the Emirati leader did not give him satisfaction. If this account is confirmed, the question will be as much on the alleged warning of 2023 as on the desire to have its reality publicly clarified in 2026. The secret nature of the trip, then its disclosure while Netanyahu was still in the United Arab Emirates, eventually produced the opposite effect of the discretion sought. They put the Egyptian warnings, the appeal attributed to Mohammed bin Zayed and, above all, the question that remains unanswered: what information did the Israeli authorities actually reach before 7 October?
