Why Nabih Berri becomes a must again

The return of Nabih Berri to the centre of the Lebanese negotiations was neither a sudden increase in popularity nor a clear political victory. It results from a deeper balance of forces. Every time Lebanon enters a phase of military confrontation, institutional blockage or regional bargaining, the Speaker of the Chamber becomes a point of almost compulsory passage. Recent news again showed. Discussions on the cease-fire, Israeli withdrawal, the disarmament of Hezbollah, the deployment of the army and international safeguards all ended up returning to Ain al-Tinah.

Nabih Berri occupies a singular position. He leads the Amal movement, chairs Parliament since 1992 and remains the main Shiite leader integrated into the regular functioning of the state. He is close to Hezbollah without being identical. He talks to the Americans without appearing as their relay. It maintains ties with several Arab capitals while maintaining a political channel towards Tehran. This combination gives it a rare ability: to transmit messages between actors who do not speak directly, without everyone having to recognize the other publicly.

Nabih Berri, the intermediary that no one can ignore

In the Lebanese system, power is not based solely on official functions. It also depends on the ability to have a decision accepted by major communities, armed parties, institutions and foreign sponsors. Nabih Berri cumulates these two dimensions. His presidency of Parliament gives him institutional legitimacy. His control over Amal gives him a popular and organizational basis. His alliance with Hezbollah finally allowed him to approach the decision centre of the Shiite camp.

This position explains why foreign negotiators regularly seek their views. They do not only consult him as Speaker of the House. They want to know if a proposal can be accepted, tolerated or blocked by the Amal-Hezbollah tandem. In recent discussions, this function has become particularly important. Hezbollah is not always a formal party to the negotiations. However, no lasting security agreement can be implemented without at least agreeing not to fight it.

Berri then served as a political translator. He reformulates international requirements in a language acceptable to his camp. In the opposite direction, it presents Hezbollah’s red lines in a form compatible with a state discussion. This mediation does not mean that it has an absolute mandate. It means that it can test a proposal, measure reactions and prevent an initial disagreement from immediately turning into a rupture.

Its role is reinforced by the absence of another Shiite interlocutor with a comparable scope. Other camp officials are either more closely associated with Hezbollah, less recognized abroad, or without an equivalent institutional function. The President of the Republic and the Head of Government may negotiate on behalf of the State. However, they cannot guarantee the reaction of the main Shiite block alone. Berri, on the other hand, cannot engage the entire country, but he can often open or close access to a decisive component.

The weight of a position held for more than 30 years

The longevity of Nabih Berri is a central element of his influence. Since 1992, he has seen the succession of presidents, governments, wars, military withdrawals, financial crises and several rounds of international negotiations. This has allowed him to accumulate files, contacts and a detailed knowledge of Lebanese compromise mechanisms.

In a country where institutions often operate through informal agreements, this memory counts. Berri knows the formulations that save the face of a party. He knows what words cause immediate rejection. It distinguishes a starting position from a real red line. It may also recall precedents, unfulfilled commitments and promises made by mediators in previous cycles.

This experience does not make his choices unquestionable. On the contrary, his opponents blame him for having helped freeze the political system. They accuse them of using the House’s rules, parliamentary calendar and community power to preserve its influence. These criticisms remain strong. However, they do not nullify an operational reality: in a crisis, actors tend to seek the one who controls procedures and knows the parallel channels.

The Speaker of the Chamber also has a direct institutional lever. Much of the major agreements eventually require a vote, a law, a ratification, a budgetary amendment or a parliamentary compromise. Even when a text is negotiated by the executive, its application may depend on Parliament. Berri can speed up the examination of a file, slow it down or condition its entry on the agenda. This capacity transforms political influence into concrete power.

The link with Hezbollah, a source of strength and vulnerability

The centrality of Nabih Berri is largely based on his alliance with Hezbollah. For years, the two formations have coordinated their positions on the big Shiite issues. They often stand as a tandem, especially in elections, appointments and national crises. This proximity gives Berri special value to foreign mediators.

Hezbollah remains under considerable military, political and financial pressure. Yet it retains an armed capacity, a social apparatus and parliamentary representation. Lebanon’s partners cannot therefore treat the issue of the South, weapons or the deployment of the army as a mere administrative matter. They must take into account an actor who has the means to block or challenge the application of an agreement.

Berri becomes useful precisely because he can speak to Hezbollah without being totally confused with him. He owns his own party, his own networks and his own interests. Amal remains located in the South, the Bekaa and the Shiite neighbourhoods of Beirut. The movement wants to preserve its place in the state. This difference allows Berri to defend a more institutional approach, even when he takes over the main demands of his ally.

The relationship, however, has a limit. The more Berri appears as Hezbollah’s indirect spokesperson, the less his room for manoeuvre. Its interlocutors may doubt its ability to impose a compromise. Within Lebanon, its opponents may accuse it of covering the choices of the armed party. Conversely, if he accepts a formula that is too favourable to American or Israeli demands, he may be disavowed by his own base or Hezbollah.

Its strength therefore comes from an unstable balance. He must remain close enough to Hezbollah to be credible to him. It must also maintain sufficient autonomy to be useful to other actors. This tension explains his sometimes firm statements, followed by discreet negotiations. Public discourse protects camp cohesion. Private trade maintains the possibility of an agreement.

The cease-fire put Ain al-Tiné back in the centre

Recent negotiations on the ceasefire have illustrated this mechanism. Berri insisted on the cessation of hostilities before any broader political progress. He rejected the idea that Lebanon could negotiate normally while the strikes continued and territories remained occupied. This position met the expectations of its base, but it also served as a bargaining logic.

By placing the ceasefire at the beginning of the process, he sought to separate the military emergency from the heavier ones. Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah disarmament, border control, the return of internally displaced persons and reconstruction cannot be resolved in a single step. Treating them simultaneously increases the risk of blocking. Berri therefore defended a sequence: stop fighting, get guarantees, and then open discussions on security mechanisms.

This method also allows him to avoid direct negotiations with Israel, a highly sensitive formula in Lebanon. It traditionally favours indirect exchanges, led by an international mediator. This architecture protects the Lebanese official position. It also allows each camp to negotiate without giving the impression of political normalisation.

When US proposals linked a progressive Israeli withdrawal to the surrender of Hezbollah’s weapons or their seizure in specific areas, Berri challenged the mechanisms considered unbalanced. He warned that an enforced application could cause internal divisions. This rejection did not remove its role. He reinforced it. If an agreement cannot be executed without local acceptance, the one who can negotiate this acceptance becomes indispensable again.

The risk of internal confrontation changes the hierarchy

The core of the problem is no longer just the border with Israel. It also concerns internal stability. Any attempt at the forced disarmament of Hezbollah could provoke confrontation between Lebanese. The government wants to restore state authority. The army must extend its control. Part of the population is calling for an end to non-State weapons. But no institution wants to turn this objective into a civil war.

In this context, Berri has a decisive advantage. It can present the preservation of civil peace as a common priority. This language is understood by both Hezbollah, institutions and foreign capitals. Everyone fears an internal collapse that would make any regional agreement inapplicable.

The Speaker of the Chamber may also act on the Shiite street. Amal has executives, municipalities, social networks and an old local presence. Berri has already shown that he can call his supporters to calm, even when he publicly denounced an agreement. This ability to mobilize and restrain interests mediators. A compromise is not only measured when a document is signed. It must also avoid uncontrolled demonstrations, clashes and a breakdown between the State and part of the population.

This stabilizer function shall not be idealized. Amal himself has participated in many power relations and remains a partisan actor. Berri is not an arbitrator outside the conflict. He defends his movement, community and influence. Its usefulness comes precisely from this involvement. He can obtain political discipline that could not be imposed by a neutral mediator.

An interlocutor in several capitals

Berri’s stature goes beyond the inner scene. The United States has known its role for decades. American officials used it as an indirect channel in previous negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. Even when they criticize his alliance with Hezbollah, they know that a proposal transmitted without it may not reach the decision makers concerned.

Saudi Arabia maintains a more complex relationship with the Speaker. Riyadh is wary of Iranian influence and Hezbollah. But the kingdom also seeks to preserve Lebanese institutions and avoid a new civil war. Berri can then be considered a useful interlocutor, provided that he does not block the reforms or political rebalancing requested by the Arab countries.

Iran sees him as a historical ally of the resistance camp, but also as a pragmatic leader. Berri does not always follow the same tone as Hezbollah leaders. It often favours negotiation, procedure and gradual compromises. This difference can serve Tehran when it is necessary to preserve the interests of its allies without directly assuming an escalation.

France, Egypt, Qatar and other regional actors are also familiar with Ain el-Tiné networks. This multiplicity of contacts gives Berri a function of crossroads. It can compare offers, detect differences between mediators and seek cross-guarantees. In a case where verbal commitments are often contested, the presence of several sponsors can make a compromise more acceptable.

Weak institutions strengthen centrality

Berri’s return is not only explained by his political qualities. It also reflects the limitations of Lebanese institutions. The President of the Republic has national legitimacy, but his powers are governed by the Constitution and by community balances. The Head of Government leads the executive action, but it depends on a fragmented Council of Ministers. The army enjoys strong confidence, but it cannot resolve a political conflict on Hezbollah’s weapons alone.

Parliament is therefore becoming a must. Berri, however, largely controls its operation. In a system where consensus often precedes the procedure, its political residence can count as much as the hemicycle. Delegations came to test formulas before making them public. The parties are seeking a compromise on appointments, laws, budgets and responses to foreign proposals.

The economic crisis further increases this dependency. The reconstruction of the South, the compensation of internally displaced persons, the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the financing of the army require budgetary decisions. International donors are conditional on reforms and guarantees. Berri can influence the passage of the necessary texts. It can also defend the interests of the regions where Amal is located.

This concentration of levers, however, fuels the challenge. Many Lebanese want the institutions to operate without dependent on agreements between a few leaders. They see the centrality of Berri as the symptom of a locked system. This judgment explains why his return to the forefront gives rise to both relief, distrust and anger.

The art of negotiating without appearing like the one who gives in

The Berri method is based on precise time management. He rarely refuses all discussions. Rather, it challenges the timing, format, guarantees or sequence of steps. This tactic allows him to maintain contact while avoiding immediate acceptance.

It also uses a constant distinction between principle and mechanism. It can accept the objective of a State exercising its authority throughout the territory, while rejecting an imposed disarmament procedure. It can support a ceasefire, but call for a verifiable Israeli withdrawal. He can accept American mediation, while refusing direct talks. This cutting creates spaces for compromise.

His public language is often used to set a ceiling. He denounces, warns or rejects in order to show that he will not yield under pressure. The negotiators then work on an intermediate formula. This practice is classic in Lebanon, but Berri mastered it better than most of his rivals thanks to his seniority and knowledge of the actors.

It also carries a risk. By delaying decisions, he can be accused of saving time to preserve the status quo. Foreign partners may consider negotiation as a method of blocking. Internal opponents may feel that each compromise strengthens their personal power. Its effectiveness therefore depends on its ability to produce a concrete result, even if limited.

A must, but never all-powerful role

Nabih Berri is essential because it brings together several functions that no other actor concentrates. He chairs a central institution. He runs a big Shiite party. He talks to Hezbollah. It maintains channels with Washington, Paris, Riyadh and Tehran. He knows the legal and diplomatic precedents. He can finally help contain the street.

This centrality does not mean that he decides alone. Hezbollah maintains its own chain of command. The government can sign commitments. The President of the Republic has specific legitimacy. The army controls the security application on the ground. Israel, the United States and Iran weigh directly on the outcome of the discussions. Berri acts at the intersection of these powers, but he does not replace them.

Its influence also depends on its ability to remain credible in opposing camps. If it appears as a mere Hezbollah relay, the other parties will seek to bypass it. If he moves too far away from his ally, he will lose the function that makes his worth. Its political space is therefore in the middle of two: sufficiently committed to guarantee a word, independent enough to negotiate.

Recent news shows that this balance still holds. The pilot zone projects, the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces, the deployment of the army and the debate on Hezbollah weapons all require local political acceptance. The difficulties encountered on the ground remind us that an international agreement is not enough. It also requires relays capable of translating it into Lebanese decisions.

Berri thus becomes inescapable again not because the system has been strengthened, but because it remains fragmented. As long as the state cannot impose a decision alone, as long as Hezbollah retains military autonomy and as long as foreign powers negotiate by separate channels, Ain al-Tiné will remain one of the places where the lines can move closer. The next steps will now depend on the ability of the actors to transform local arrangements in the South into a sustainable mechanism, without opening up an internal confrontation that all say they want to avoid.