A new US sanctions package places Hezbollah, the Amal movement and Lebanese army-related officials in the centre of an arm between Washington and Beirut. The United States has included nine people on OFAC’s blacklist, accusing them of helping Hezbollah to maintain its influence in institutions, obstructing its disarmament and curbing ongoing diplomatic efforts. The decision, announced on 21 May 2026, targets deputies, political cadres, two Amalist leaders, one Iranian diplomat and two Lebanese security officials.
The measure strikes first by its perimeter. It does not only concern Hezbollah’s financial or military networks, which have been repeatedly targeted by Washington. It also affects elected officials, an allied movement represented at the heart of the Lebanese political system and officials attached to security institutions. The United States presents this approach as a response to what it describes as a state infiltration by Hezbollah. On the contrary, the parties concerned see this as a political pressure to impose the disarmament of the United States and Israeli coerced movement.
The case takes place in a sensitive timetable. Military and security discussions must continue in Washington around the southern front, the ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal and Hezbollah’s place in the Lebanese equation. Israel demands guarantees on the disarmament of the party. Beirut calls for a halt to the strikes, an end to the incursions and the return of Lebanese authority to the border areas. The US sanctions therefore add financial and political pressure to an issue already marked by war, displacement and institutional fragility.
US sanctions: Hezbollah-related names
The US Treasury has named Mohamed Abdel-Mottaleb Fanich, also known as Mohammad Fneich. Former minister and former deputy, he is presented by Washington as the head of the Hezbollah Executive Council. The US authorities blame him for participating in the administrative and institutional reorganization of the movement, with the aim of maintaining its armed presence in Lebanon. His journey embodies the link between Hezbollah’s partisan structure, its political implantation and its internal apparatus. He was elected to Parliament in 1992 in the Resistance Loyalty bloc, before occupying the portfolio of Youth and Sports.
The list also includes Hassan Nizammeddine Fadllallah, Member of Parliament for Hezbollah since 2005. Washington recalls its past role in media close to the party, including Al-Nour and Al-Manar, already sanctioned by the United States. The United States authorities mostly blame him for defending the political line of the movement and opposing calls for disarmament. In the current context, its name is of particular significance. A few days before the announcement, he had accused Washington and Israel of seeking to instrumentalize the Lebanese army against Hezbollah. This position is in line with the party’s speech, which refuses to separate its weapons from the Israeli strikes and the territories still occupied.
Ibrahim al-Musawi is also one of the target groups. Head of the Hizbullah media commission and deputy, he represents the party in the political and communication battle. The U.S. Treasury presents him as a long-time official, charged with publicly defending the line of movement. Its inscription illustrates Washington’s desire to target not only operational actors, but also those who carry the political narrative of Hezbollah. This logic is part of a broader strategy: to reduce the margin of elected officials and cadres defending the maintenance of an autonomous military structure against the state.
The fourth official in charge of Hizbullah is Hussein al-Hajj Hassan. He has been a deputy since 1996 and a former minister, one of the most well-known faces of the party in Parliament. The United States accuses it of being a key figure in the opposition to disarmament. His reaction was immediate. In a statement relayed by the Arab press, he denounced an attack on Lebanon’s sovereignty, in particular because the sanctions also affect those responsible for the army and the General Security. He claimed that Washington was seeking to intimidate the Lebanese military delegation expected at the Washington talks, and presented these sanctions as an « honor » for the individuals targeted.
Amal directly involved
The US sanctions then target two cadres of the Amal movement, a political ally of Hezbollah and a formation led by the President of Parliament, Nabih Berry. Ahmad Asaad Baalbaki is presented by Washington as the director of security of Amal. The US authorities accuse of coordinating demonstrations of force with Hezbollah officials in order to intimidate political opponents in Lebanon. This charge places Amal in a security registry, not just a political one. It exposes a formation that has played a role of institutional mediation for decades, while remaining linked to the Shiite axis dominated by the Amal-Hezbollah tandem.
Ali Ahmad Safawi, also designated by OFAC, is described as the commander of an Amalist structure in southern Lebanon. Washington states that it coordinated its action with Hezbollah and took instructions from the party in operations directed against Israel. The United States also blames him for leading Amalist forces in joint operations with Hezbollah. These accusations are heavy. They suggest that Washington considers part of Amal’s security apparatus as an active partner of Hezbollah, not as a separate actor. For Amal, this reading amounts to challenging its national role and its anchoring in institutions.
The Amal movement rejected the sanctions against Ahmad Baalbaki and Ali Safawi. In a statement, he described them as unacceptable and unjustifiable. The movement considered that they were primarily aimed at Amal himself, his political role, his commitment to national causes and the protection of the State and institutions. This reaction seeks to move the debate. Amal does not only respond to accusations of security cooperation with Hezbollah. It presents the US measure as an attack on its political legitimacy and on a major component of Lebanon’s institutional balance.
Lebanese Army and General Security at stake
The most sensitive aspect concerns the two Lebanese security officials. Khattar Nasser Eldin, Brigadier General and Head of a Department of General Security, is targeted for having, according to Washington, shared important information with Hezbollah during the ongoing conflict. It is attached to the General Directorate of General Security, a central institution in border control, administrative security files and internal balances. The fact that a current official is sanctioned gives the decision a different scope. It questions the state’s ability to control its own intelligence channels.
Colonel Samir Hamadi, also mentioned under the spelling Samer Hamadi, is presented as head of the Dahiyeh branch in the Lebanese Army Intelligence Directorate. Washington also accuses him of providing information to Hezbollah. Geographical accuracy is important. The southern suburbs of Beirut remain the main political and security bastion of the party. The questioning of a military official assigned to this area feeds American suspicions of porosity between some official structures and Hezbollah. It also places the Lebanese army in a delicate position, while it depends on significant international support and must preserve its national image.
No detailed institutional response by the Lebanese Army or the General Security was clearly published in the material available at the time of writing. This caution may be explained by the sensitivity of the file. Publicly defending sanctioned officials would open a direct confrontation with Washington. To disavow them too quickly could, on the other hand, provoke internal tensions and fuel the idea of foreign pressure on institutions. The relative silence of the security authorities shows the difficulty of the moment. The army must remain a central player in the return of the state to the south, without appearing as an auxiliary to an American or Israeli strategy.
Iranian diplomat in the same list
Mohammad Reza Sheibani completes the list. Iran’s diplomat and Ambassador-designate of Iran in Lebanon, he had been declared persona non grata by the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the withdrawal of his approval. Washington accuses him of being linked to Iranian support for Hezbollah. His case adds a regional dimension to the decision. The United States is not only targeting Lebanese actors. They also recall that Hezbollah, in their view, remains an organization supported by Iran and incorporated into a broader regional strategy. In the current sequence, this signal is addressed as much to Tehran as to Beirut.
Political financial pressure
The legal consequences are classic in the US sanctions regime. The property and interests of the affected persons who are in the United States or under American control are frozen. Entities held 50 per cent or more by these persons are also blocked. Transactions with United States nationals and entities are prohibited, unless otherwise authorized. The effects may, however, extend beyond the United States. Foreign banks, transfer companies and financial intermediaries often avoid dealing with individuals on the SDN list for fear of exposure to secondary sanctions.
The State Department has also reactivated the financial dimension of the case. He recalled that a reward of up to $10 million could be paid for information to disrupt Hezbollah’s financial mechanisms. This complements political and security targeting. Washington wants to isolate the party on several fronts: its elected officials, its allies, its alleged institutional relays and its funding channels. The message is designed to produce a deterrent effect. It targets the appointees, but also all those whom the United States considers to be potential facilitators.
The reactions of Hezbollah and d-Amal
Hezbollah denounced sanctions as an attempt to intimidate. In its reaction, the party claimed that the decision would have no effect on its strategy or political positions. He accuses Washington of supporting the Israeli offensive and seeking to obtain by financial pressure what Israel would not have obtained by military force. The movement portrays the persons targeted as officials engaged in the defence of Lebanon. He also stressed that disarmament could not be discussed until Israeli strikes continued and violations of sovereignty continued.
This line responds to the American position, which calls for a state monopoly on armed force. Washington believes that a stable and sovereign Lebanon requires the complete disarmament of Hezbollah and the restoration of exclusive government authority over security matters. Hezbollah rejects this approach, which it considers dictated by Israeli interests. The disagreement, therefore, is not just about sanction. It concerns the very definition of sovereignty. For the United States, it passes through the state and the army. For Hezbollah, it also goes through armed resistance as long as Israel remains a direct threat.
The American decision may also complicate the role of Nabih Berry. The President of Parliament remains one of the few leaders able to maintain channels with Hezbollah, Amal, the executive and foreign actors. By targeting two Amal officials, Washington indirectly reaches a mediation space. The movement was an interlocutor in several Lebanese crises, including those related to the south. Increased tension with Amal could make it more difficult to discuss internally the security, the deployment of the army and the guarantees demanded by foreign powers.
Beirut in the face of a small margin
For the Lebanese government, the main challenge is to avoid a double loss of control. On the one hand, it must convince its Western partners that it can restore state authority and prevent autonomous armed action. On the other hand, it must avoid a brutal internal confrontation with Hezbollah and Amal, whose political and social base remains strong. The US sanctions exacerbate this constraint. They push the executive to clarify its position, but also reduce its space for manoeuvre. Any decision on disarmament, southern control or security reform could now be read through the prism of American pressure.
The immediate scope of the sanctions will depend on the real assets of the persons concerned, their banking relations and their international exposure. But their political impact is already visible. They name the actors that Washington sees as obstacles to peace and disarmament. They isolate parliamentary officials from Hezbollah, question Amal, target an Iranian diplomat and shed a raw light on two Lebanese security officials. They therefore transform a financial list into an instrument of diplomatic pressure. The next meeting will take place in the military discussions expected in Washington and in how Beirut will protect, or reorganize, its security decision-making channels.
