On the evening of 1 June, the Lebanese embassy in Washington gave a diplomatic form to what was previously only a series of contradictory messages between Beirut, Washington, Jerusalem and Hezbollah. According to the communiqué issued by the Lebanese representative, the Beirut authorities have received confirmation of Hezbollah’s agreement to an American proposal for a « mutual cessation of attacks ». The mechanism initially provides for the cessation of Israeli strikes against the southern suburbs of Beirut in exchange for a suspension of Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel. It must then be extended to all Lebanese territory.
This announcement does not regulate war. It sets a starting point. After a day of Israeli threats against Dahiyeh, American pressure, Iranian warnings and direct discussions between President Joseph Aoun and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. She also intervened after the call between Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, presented by Washington as a decisive intervention to avoid a strike on Beirut. But the text of the embassy is of particular significance. He put official Lebanon in the chain of transmission of the agreement, instead of leaving the matter to the only exchanges between Washington, Israel and the Hezbollah channels.
A two-storey ceasefire
The announced device is based on a simple sequence in appearance. Israel stops its strikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut. Hezbollah halted its attacks on Israel. Then the cease-fire expanded to all Lebanon. This architecture responds to the urgency of the moment. The Israeli threat against Dahiyeh was the most dangerous threshold. A strike against the capital would have caused a political shock, panic and almost certain escalation. Washington therefore sought to block this option first, before opening a wider framework.
The choice to start with the southern suburbs of Beirut, however, reveals a fragility. South Lebanon remains the real heart of the war. This is where strikes, drones, artillery fire, destruction and displacement weigh the most heavily on the inhabitants. It is also where the Israeli army wants to maintain pressure against Hezbollah. A limited agreement in Dahiyeh would protect the capital, but would leave Marjayoun, Nabatieh, Tyre, Bint Jbeil, Khiam, Qalaya, Deir Mimas and other localities in an area of uncertainty. The communiqué therefore tries to avoid this criticism by indicating that the final objective is the extension to all Lebanese territory.
This precision is essential. It allows Lebanon not to appear as a State that negotiates only for Beirut. It also allows Hezbollah not to be accused of seeking protection for its urban bastion while accepting the continuation of the strikes in the South. The formula speaks to several audiences. To the inhabitants of the capital, it promises to remove the immediate risk. To the people of the South, it states that the truce must not stop at the Beirut ring road. To the Americans, it proposes a gradual exit. To the Israelis, it offers a halt to Hezbollah fire in exchange for verifiable military restraint.
The central role of the Embassy in Washington
The communiqué of the Lebanese Embassy in Washington is not merely an administrative text. He describes a specific diplomatic channel. Following the appeal between Joseph Aoun and Marco Rubio, the Lebanese authorities were reportedly confirmed that Hezbollah had agreed to the US proposal. Later, Donald Trump reportedly called Lebanon’s ambassador to the United States, Nada Hamadeh Mouawad, to tell him that he had obtained Benjamin Netanyahu’s agreement. The result of the discussions was reportedly passed on to President Aoun, who reportedly informed Hizbullah.
This chain shows how a Lebanese truce is being made today. Official Lebanon speaks in the United States. The United States is talking to Israel. The Lebanese President receives the messages and sends them to Hezbollah. The embassy in Washington becomes the place of passage between these levels. This mechanism is not ideal for a sovereign State, as it shows that Beirut does not control all armed actors or all military decisions in its territory. But it makes it possible to put the Lebanese institutions back in the circuit, instead of leaving them mere spectators of a negotiated arrangement above them.
As such, the role of Nada Hamadeh Mouawad is significant. It is not just relaying a general position. According to the press release, she receives the information directly from Donald Trump and then sends it to the President of the Republic. This sequence gives the embassy a high-level political channel function. It also reflects Washington’s importance in the Lebanese case. The centre of gravity of de-escalation is not in Beirut, Naqoura, or New York. He is in Washington, where the US administration can put pressure on Israel and ask Lebanon to engage Hezbollah.
Aoun, Rubio and the attempt to reintegrate the State
The call between Joseph Aoun and Marco Rubio prepares the sequence. He said that the Lebanese presidency was seeking to resume its negotiating role. Since the beginning of the escalation, the official Lebanon has fluctuated between two imperatives. It must denounce Israeli strikes, protect its population and refuse the occupation or expansion of the Israeli military presence. He must also deal with Hezbollah, an armed actor capable of triggering or suspending fire without dependent entirely on the government.
The American proposal gives the Presidency a role of transmission. Joseph Aoun informs Hezbollah of the results obtained from Trump and Netanyahu. This gesture may seem limited. It is important. It means that Hezbollah, even if it retains its own decision-making chain, receives the message through the Lebanese state. This mediation reduces the risk of a parallel agreement which would completely marginalise the institutions. It does not resolve the issue of military authority. It creates at least a political bridge.
The challenge for Aoun will be to avoid this gateway being used only to validate decisions taken elsewhere. If the agreement fails, official Lebanon can be accused of impotence. If it succeeds partially, it will have to transform a pause obtained under American pressure into a national mechanism. This requires coordination with the Lebanese Army, the Presidency of Parliament, the Government, Southern municipalities and international interlocutors. A real ceasefire cannot remain a sentence exchanged between capitals. It must be translated into orders, lines of control and a visible decrease in violence.
The decisive question: who respects what?
All the stake now lies in the application. The communiqué speaks of a mutual cessation of attacks. This formula seems balanced. Yet it masks different definitions. For Israel, a Hezbollah attack may include rocket fire, drone, infiltration or visible preparation near the border. For Hezbollah, an Israeli attack may include an air strike, artillery fire, incursion, drone operation or the maintenance of de facto occupation in the South. Both sides can therefore claim to be victims of a violation in the first few hours.
That is why enlargement to all Lebanese territory will be more difficult than stopping strikes on Dahiyeh. Protecting Beirut requires a clear political decision by Israel. Stabilizing all of Lebanon requires a change in the rules of engagement on several fronts. We need to know what happens to the Israeli positions advanced. It must be determined whether the so-called preventive strikes cease. It is important to know whether Hezbollah removes or freezes certain devices near the border. The role of the Lebanese army and that of international observers must be defined. Without this clarification, the agreement will remain vulnerable to the first incident.
The problem is not only technical. He’s political. Benjamin Netanyahu can agree to suspend a strike on Beirut under US pressure, while maintaining that the Israeli army will continue its operations in the South. Hezbollah can accept the principle of a reciprocal stop, while refusing to stop firing if Israel continues to hit villages and roads. Washington may announce a de-escalation, but hesitate to sanction an Israeli violation. Beirut may approve a mechanism but lack the means to enforce it. The truce will be played in these grey areas.
Protected Beirut, the South still exposed
The wording of the communiqué responds to a very present fear in Lebanon: that of a two-speed truce. The risk would be to temporarily save the southern suburbs of Beirut while leaving southern Lebanon under military pressure. This fear is not abstract. The past few weeks have seen an increase in Israeli strikes, threats to localities, destruction of houses and military movements around symbolic areas. The people of the South will not judge the agreement on how it is formulated in Washington. They will judge him at the silence of the drones, at the stop of the shells and at the possibility of returning to the roads.
It is also at stake for Hezbollah. The movement cannot appear to accept special protection for Dahiyeh without getting a stop to operations in the South. Such a reading would be politically costly. She would weaken her history of defending the territory. It would create a break between the capital and the border villages. The emphasis on enlargement throughout Lebanon is therefore aimed at protecting the coherence of its position. It makes it clear that the agreement is not simply a safeguard of its urban political space, but an attempt at a national ceasefire.
For the Lebanese government, the same logic prevails. No power in Beirut can permanently defend a truce that would exclude the worst hit areas. Southern municipalities, displaced families, farmers, schools, hospitals and relief networks are awaiting a real reduction in attacks. A break around Dahiyeh could be useful because it would avoid a disaster in the capital. But it would be insufficient if it were not accompanied by a halt to strikes on roads, villages, hospitals and agricultural areas.
Trump seeks success, Lebanon seeks guarantee
Donald Trump occupies a central place in this sequence. He already presented the call with Netanyahu as productive and claimed that the forces heading to Beirut had turned around. He also claimed that he had obtained a Hezbollah agreement by high-level representatives to stop the shooting. The Lebanese embassy’s statement echoes this logic by stating that Trump informed the ambassador of the Netanyahu agreement. The US administration is therefore seeking to show that the president controls the escalation.
But Lebanon does not only need communication success. He needs a guarantee. The difference is great. A successful communication can stop a strike for a few hours. A guarantee imposes lasting limits. It demands that Washington clearly tell Israel what it can no longer do. It also demands that Hezbollah understand that any attack on Israel would undermine the mechanism. Trump can get an immediate effect by his personal authority. The question is whether he wants or can transform this effect into a binding one.
This question is in line with Nabih Berry’s statement that Trump is the only one able to conclude a real ceasefire and compel Israel to respect it. The President of Parliament, Hizbullah’s central interlocutor, knows that the key is not only the engagement of the Shiite movement. It lies in the American ability to weigh on Netanyahu. If Israel continues to bomb while negotiating, the agreement will lose its credibility. If Hezbollah shoots after accepting the proposal, it will offer Israel a pretext to resume escalation. The guarantee must therefore be double.
Iran in the background, without explicit veto
The embassy statement does not place Iran at the centre of the mechanism. It’s an important choice. He presented the proposal as an arrangement between Israel, Hezbollah, Lebanon and the United States. He does not say that the agreement depends on a regional package with Tehran. Yet Iran remains in the background. Iran’s recent warnings have linked Israeli operations in Lebanon and Gaza to the continuation of discussions with Washington. Tehran wants to prevent Hezbollah from being isolated from the rest of the regional front.
For Beirut, this ambiguity can be useful. A separate agreement would prevent Lebanon from remaining hostage to broader negotiations between Washington and Tehran. But a totally disconnected agreement from Iran would be difficult to get Hizbullah to accept if the regional context remained explosive. The solution outlined in the communiqué is therefore pragmatic. It does not deny the Iranian context. Nor does it give him an explicit veto. It focuses on an immediate goal: to stop attacks and extend the truce to Lebanese territory.
This approach can work if the protagonists accept a simultaneous decrease in violence. It will fail if one of them uses the ceasefire as a tactical dead time. Israel could seek to maintain its positions and resume strikes at the first alert. Hezbollah could freeze its fire while maintaining a recovery capability. Iran could support the truce as long as it serves its own dialogue with Washington, and then harden it if this dialogue blocks. The strength of the agreement will therefore depend less on its announcement than on its ability to survive parallel calculations.
Tuesday and Wednesday meetings as the first test
The communiqué states that the negotiating meetings scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday must continue to discuss and build on this progress. This is the first concrete test. The parties will have to transform a general formula into a mechanism. They will need to clarify the areas, deadlines, violations, guarantees and the role of the actors on the ground. They will also have to answer a central question: is stopping strikes on Dahiyeh a step towards a national ceasefire, or a ceiling that some will want to maintain as an interim solution?
Lebanon will have to reach these discussions with a clear position. He must refuse a truce that only protects the capital. It will require the cessation of strikes throughout the territory, the termination of progress operations and a follow-up mechanism. He must also show that he can transmit and support Hezbollah’s commitment to suspend its attacks. This position is difficult because it requires the Lebanese State to speak for a military space that it does not control entirely. But it is essential to avoid the country being reduced to a diplomatic mailbox.
Israel, for its part, will seek guarantees in the north of its territory. Netanyahu cannot enter into a cease-fire that would be presented by his internal opponents as an abandonment under American pressure. He will probably demand that Hezbollah cease firing, drones and deployments near the border. It would like to preserve a margin of action in case of violation. That’s where Washington will have to decide. An agreement that leaves too much room for interpretation to Israel will not be accepted by Hezbollah. An agreement that seems too favourable to Hezbollah will be attacked in Israel.
The next few hours will therefore say whether the text of the Lebanese embassy marks a real turning point or only a diplomatic break in a continuing war. For now, it has at least one function: it sets black on white the goal of a ceasefire extended throughout Lebanon. It no longer allows de-escalation to be confined to Beirut. He publicly engages the Lebanese state, the US administration, Hezbollah and, according to Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu. It remains to be seen whether this chain of promises can withstand the ground, the fire, the Israeli electoral pressure and the regional calculations that surround each military decision.
