In an interview with the New York Times, Nabih Berry placed Donald Trump at the centre of the Lebanese equation. The Speaker said that « US President Donald Trump is the only one capable of concluding a real ceasefire and forcing Israel to respect it. » The formula is strong. It recognizes Washington’s decisive weight on Jerusalem, but it also exposes Lebanese impotence in the face of a war on its territory, under Israeli fire, with Hezbollah as a central armed actor and Iran as a regional background.
The statement comes the day after a high tension sequence. Israel threatened the southern suburbs of Beirut. Donald Trump claimed to have obtained a de-escalation between Israel and Hezbollah. Benjamin Netanyahu then maintained that the Israeli army would continue its operations in southern Lebanon. Fires were reported again. In this context, Berry seeks to move the debate. He’s not talking about a simple break around Beirut. It calls for an effective cessation of hostilities, applicable on the ground, in the air and in all affected areas.
Nabih Berry refuses partial truce
Berry’s sentence summarizes a brutal political reality. Lebanon can negotiate, transmit, propose and guarantee certain commitments. He cannot, alone, compel Israel to cease its strikes. Nor can it impose lasting discipline on Hezbollah without a comprehensive architecture that reduces the military pretext of armed resistance. The President of Parliament therefore presents himself as an intermediary able to speak to Hezbollah, but he sends the key to execution to Washington. For him, Trump must not only announce a truce. He must enforce it.
Berry’s position does not arise in the void. For several weeks, American mediators have been seeking a gradual formula. Hezbollah would cease its attacks on Israel. In return, Israel would refrain from striking Beirut and its suburbs. The proposal aims to avoid an extension of the war to the Lebanese capital. But it leaves South Lebanon in a dangerous area. That’s exactly what Berry is challenging. A limited ceasefire in Beirut would create a hierarchy of territories. The capital would be protected, while southern villages would remain exposed to drones, shells and incursions.
The President of Parliament therefore defends another sequence. He claims that Hezbollah is « open to a real ceasefire ». This opening, according to him, is not worth a partial break. It presupposes a complete cessation of fire and strikes. It also assumes that Israel stops bombing while it claims to negotiate. In its reading, the problem is not only lack of agreement. This is the gap between the diplomatic table and the military ground. Tel Aviv, he says in essence, wants to negotiate while continuing the bombings. Lebanon pays the human, economic and territorial price.
Israel negotiates under military pressure
This criticism directly targets the Israeli method. Since the beginning of the escalation, Israel claims that it has responded to ceasefire violations and Hezbollah attacks. But its operations have grown in scale in southern Lebanon. Strikes hit roads, houses, areas close to Nabatiyah, Tyre, Marjayoun and Litani. The Israeli army has also advanced in symbolic positions, including the Beaufort area. For the Lebanese authorities, this dynamic makes any dialogue politically fragile. Negotiating under the bombs is like talking under duress.
Berry’s formula on Trump must be read through this observation. He did not say that Lebanon chose to hand over its destiny to a foreign leader by political preference. He says the real power ratio goes through Washington. Israel can ignore Beirut. He can challenge European calls. He may challenge UN warnings. But it is much more difficult for him to break up frontally with the White House when it decides to exert clear pressure. Berry therefore asks Trump to use the lever at his disposal: aid, diplomatic coverage, military coordination and US political weight.
This application includes a bet. Donald Trump likes to present himself as a man capable of quickly reaching agreements. He has already claimed a de-escalation by claiming that Israel and Hezbollah had agreed to cease their mutual attacks. But recent experience shows that the announcement is not enough. After his statements, hostilities continued in the South. Netanyahu confirmed the continuation of military operations. Hezbollah did not publicly endorse the American version. Trump’s diplomacy can stop a move, like a strike on Beirut. It has not yet proved that it can impose a lasting ceasefire.
Trump ordered to move from ad to execution
Berry seeks to transform this diplomacy from announcement into execution diplomacy. His sentence on Trump alone capable of getting a real ceasefire is also a test addressed to Washington. If Trump claims to have control of de-escalation, he must demonstrate that this control applies to Israel, not just Lebanon or Hezbollah. An agreement that would force Hezbollah to stop firing without preventing Israel from bombing the South would be immediately challenged. It would feed the idea that truce is an instrument of unilateral pressure. It would also reinforce Hezbollah’s discourse on the need to retain its weapons.
This is one of the political hubs of the case. Hezbollah can be opened to a complete ceasefire if it does not resemble a disguised capitulation. He can accept the cessation of fire if Israel also ceases operations. But he will refuse to be the only actor ordered to calm down while the Israeli strikes continue. Berry, as a political ally of Hezbollah and president of a national institution, tries to dress this position in state language. He doesn’t just speak for a camp. It seeks to bring Hezbollah’s commitment into a national ceasefire logic.
This position gives it a central role, but also a vulnerability. The United States and Israel know that Berry maintains a channel with Hezbollah. They use it because it can transmit messages that the Lebanese State cannot always carry directly. But they doubt its ability to fully guarantee the application of a halt to fire. This reservation is not negligible. If Hezbollah accepts a cease-fire through Berry, then a shot from Lebanon, Washington may say that the Lebanese guarantee did not hold. Berry therefore plays a part in this mediation.
Iranian bond, useful and risky
The other difficulty comes from Iran. Berry claims that it is urgent to obtain a ceasefire, whether it is separated from or linked to Iran. This sentence deserves attention. She leaves a double lane open. Lebanon can enter an autonomous de-escalation, if Washington manages to impose a halt to Israeli strikes. But it can also remain part of a broader regional negotiation, in which Tehran links Lebanon, Gaza, the Red Sea and the Gulf. Berry doesn’t close any options. Most importantly, it seeks to prevent Lebanon from becoming hostage to an external calendar.
This caution reflects Lebanese balance. Part of the political actors want to separate Lebanon from the Washington, Tehran and Jerusalem conflict. They fear that the country will be used as an exchange currency. Hezbollah and its allies consider that the Lebanese front cannot be separated from regional pressure on Israel. Berry tries to formulate a synthesis. He says the link with Iran should not block the immediate goal. The ceasefire is necessary, with or without a regional package. Priority is not diplomatic form, but cessation of destruction.
This analysis is a reality on the ground. South Lebanon cannot wait for all the powers to settle their accounts. Villages empty, roads become dangerous, houses destroyed and municipalities operate under pressure. Displaced families do not judge agreements to their theoretical architecture. They judge them to be a simple question: do strikes really stop? Berry’s on this field. He opposed a real ceasefire to a press release truce. The real word means verifiable, general, applicable and guaranteed.
Four readings of the same ceasefire
The problem is that each actor defines the reality of a ceasefire differently. For Israel, a real ceasefire demands that Hezbollah cease threatening the north of the country and that its capabilities be removed from the border. For Hezbollah, it first demands the cessation of Israeli strikes and the withdrawal of areas occupied or held by the Israeli army. In Washington’s view, it requires a reduction in escalation sufficient to preserve discussions with Iran and relaunch the Lebanese-Israeli talks. For Beirut, it must prevent the collapse of the South and preserve a margin of sovereignty. These objectives overlap, but they do not overlap.
Berry’s statement therefore has a tactical function. She puts Trump in front of her responsibilities. She told Washington that Hezbollah may be forced to commit, but the real question is Israel. She told Israel that he could not demand security while continuing the bombings. She tells the Lebanese that mediation is not abandoned. She told Iran that Lebanon was seeking a halt to the war without necessarily waiting for the conclusion of a great regional bargain. It’s a short sentence, but it speaks to several audiences.
It also reveals a Lebanese embarrassment. The Speaker of the Chamber states that an American leader is the only one able to enforce a truce on Lebanese territory. This reality illustrates the imbalance in sovereignty. The Lebanese state claims its authority, but it depends on an external power to coerce Israel and an internal compromise to engage Hezbollah. The country lies between two dependencies. One is external to Washington. The other is internal, towards Berry’s ability to move Hezbollah’s position into a national framework. This double dependence weakens the state, even when it allows for an interim solution.
The risk of a fait accompli in the South
Berry’s criticism of Israel goes further than a moral reproach. It describes a negotiating strategy under military pressure. Israel wants guarantees by maintaining its operational advantage. This method is not new. It consists of striking, advancing, demolishing or threatening, and then negotiating from a modified terrain. For Lebanon, it is unacceptable, because it turns talks every day into an additional loss. The longer the discussions last, the more the military card changes. The more the card changes, the more the agreement, if any, may dedicate a fait accompli.
That is why the question of timing is decisive. A cease-fire that comes after the Israeli occupation is extended to the south, after the destruction of villages or after a strike on Beirut has not the same scope as an immediate stop. Berry insists on the word now. The priority is to block the mechanics before it produces a new threshold. The Lebanese experience shows that temporary situations can last. A temporary security zone can become a long occupation. A limited operation can become a permanent front. A partial truce can become a normalization of the war in the South.
Trump’s margin will therefore depend on his ability to impose clear limits on Netanyahu. The US President can obtain an indirect commitment from Hezbollah through the Lebanese channel. But this commitment will not stand if Israel maintains complete freedom of strike. On the other hand, Trump will not want to appear as the one who forces Israel to stop without security guarantees. All the difficulty lies in this symmetry. A real ceasefire must prevent Hezbollah fire and Israeli strikes. It must also define what happens if one party accuses the other of a violation.
Berry’s declaration finally comes at a time when the diplomatic front is widening. Discussions in Washington between Lebanese and Israeli representatives should continue. France is critical of the Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanese territory. The UN recalls the need to respect the territorial integrity of Lebanon and international resolutions. Iran threatens to link the Lebanese crisis to regional stability. In this environment, Berry seeks to give Lebanon a simple sentence: first cease fire, then discuss. This reversal of order is fundamental. It refuses to allow negotiations to be used as a cover for military operations.
The question of trust remains. Israel does not spontaneously believe in the guarantees transmitted by Berry. Hezbollah does not believe in Israeli promises without American pressure. Official Lebanon does not believe that a limited ceasefire can save the South. The United States does not want the Lebanese crisis to fail its Iranian bet. Berry’s statement does not resolve these contradictions. She puts them in full light. It only indicates the place where, according to him, the lock can jump: in Washington, if Trump decides to switch from ad to constraint.
The follow-up will depend on concrete signs. Will Israel cease its strikes in the South and its demolitions? Will Hezbollah suspend its fire to the north of Israel? Will the Washington talks deal only with Beirut or with all Lebanese territory? Will Iran accept a Lebanese de-escalation separate from its own case? Berry opened a door saying that Hezbollah remains available for a real ceasefire. He also laid down a major political condition: without US pressure on Israel, no truce will be anything other than a fragile pause in a war that continues to be very costly in Lebanon.
