Mohammad Ali Ibrahim succumbed to his wounds following the explosion of an Israeli submunition in Habush, Nabatiyah District. The child was injured with another minor when a remaining cluster bomb exploded on Monday. His father had already been killed in an Israeli attack in South Lebanon. This new death occurred as the Israeli army continued its strikes and, above all, its blasting operations in the South: on the only day of 1 September, destruction was reported in about 10 localities, with six operations in Houla and further explosions in Qantara, Taybeh, Kfar Tibnit, Deir Seryan and Haddatha.
Mohammad Ali Ibrahim succumbs after the explosion in Habush
Mohammad Ali Ibrahim died as a result of his injuries following the explosion of a remaining Israeli fragmentation bomb in the Al-Arid neighbourhood of Habush, Nabatiyah District. The explosion occurred on Monday 31 August while the child was with another minor. Both were injured. Mohammad Ali Ibrahim then succumbed, while no detailed information was provided on the condition of the second child.
The Lebanese National Information Agency attributed the explosion to a submunition left by Israeli attacks. The victim’s father, Ali Ibrahim, had himself been killed in an Israeli attack on the South. The same family is struck twice: first by a direct attack and then by an explosive that remained active after military operations.
The location of the drama underscores the extent of the problem. Habush is not a village directly behind the Israeli border. The town is located in the Nabatiyah area, north of the border band most exposed to land operations. The presence of a remaining cluster bomb in this sector shows that the threat of unexploded ordnance is far wider than the only localities currently occupied or subject to blasting.
Fragmentation bomb can kill long after strike
Submunitions are a particular hazard because they are scattered in numbers over a wide area. Not all do explode at the time of impact. Some remain on the ground, in fields, gardens, rubble or vegetation and can detonate when they are displaced, affected or simply disturbed.
For residents returning to bombed areas, these devices transform apparently calm spaces into potentially dangerous land. Farmers are exposed when they return to work on land. The workers are when they clear the rubble. Children are particularly vulnerable when a small explosive looks like an abandoned object whose danger they do not measure.
The death of Mohammad Ali Ibrahim thus reminds us that the results of a strike do not stop when the planes leave. Submunition may cause a new victim several days, months or years after use. This danger is of particular importance in Lebanon, where the consequences of the fragmentation bombs used during the 2006 war required years of clean-up operations.
Dynamiting is increasing in South Lebanon
The death of the child occurs mainly in a context where the destruction on the ground continues at a steady pace. The latest surveys available for the day of 1 September show an Israeli activity spread over several southern Lebanese cazas. It combines air strikes, artillery, armoured movements, rakings and blasting of buildings.
The destruction operations of 1 September involved Deir Seryan and Qantara, Rashaf twice, Mansuri, Hula six times, Taybeh twice, Yohmor al-Shqif, Mais al-Jabal, Kfar Tibnit and Haddatha twice. At the same time, raking operations were reported in Haddatha, Zawtar al-Sharqiya, Markaba and Kfar Tibnit.
This concentration is important. It is not an isolated explosion linked to a one-off target. Operations take place simultaneously or successively in several areas of the Marjayoun, Bint Jbeil, Nabatiyah and Tyre Districts. They testify to the continuation of a ground-based demolition campaign that adds to the bombings.
Hula appears to be one of the most affected sectors during this day, with six reported blasting operations. The destructions in Taybeh and Haddatha were also repeated. In Qantara, explosions add to several days of demolitions that have already profoundly transformed certain areas of the locality.
Qantara, Taybeh and Kfar Tibnit are still dynamic
The operations of 1 September extend directly from 31 August. The previous day, significant blastings had already been reported between Qantara and Taybeh, Marjayoun District, and Kfar Tibnit, Nabatiyah District, and Byout al-Siyad, Tyre District.
In Qantara, the successive destructions no longer concern only a few constructions. Repeated operations have changed the landscape of the sector. Buildings and land have been affected as the explosions unfolded, while Israeli military activity remains significant around the area.
Kfar Tibnit also undergoes repeated operations. The locality appears regularly in the bombardment and blasting records of recent weeks. It is located in a strategic area close to Nabatiyah and the Shqif, where Israeli forces have conducted numerous operations since the resumption of the offensive.
In Taybeh, the new destruction occurred after several similar episodes in August. Repeated explosions show that Israeli forces do not necessarily carry out the complete destruction of one sector in one operation. They return to the same localities and gradually demolish buildings and infrastructure.
A particularly intense campaign since late August
This method appears clearly in the chronology of the last days. On 25 August, extensive destruction operations had already been reported in Majdal Zun, Mansouri, Markaba, Zawtar al-Sharqiya, Ainata and Sarbine. Several of these operations were accompanied by artillery fire.
In Mansuri, in the Tyre District, dynamiting had taken on a particular magnitude. A Merkava tank then advanced and took position in the Rabeh district. In Zawtar al-Sharqiya, a further major explosion had been reported while the locality had already suffered several waves of destruction in the previous weeks.
Operations continued on 26 August in Majdal Zoun and several areas of Bint Jbeil. Then they continued until the end of the month. On 31 August, Qantara, Taybeh, Kfar Tibnit and Byout al-Siyad were again affected. On 1 September, blasting spread or repeated in about 10 localities.
The succession of names is revealing: some localities appear several times in a few days. Therefore, destruction is not a series of independent incidents. They constitute a continuous campaign in which the same villages can be energized several times.
Burning houses in addition to blasting
Destruction is not based solely on explosives. On the evening of 1 September, house fires by Israeli forces were also reported in the south. Armoured vehicles were used in several areas, while machine guns and new explosions were reported.
These methods are in addition to the bulldozers observed for several months. Israeli forces use construction equipment to destroy buildings, open passages, move embankments or change certain lands. Trees and agricultural land have also been destroyed in areas under operation.
The cumulative effect therefore exceeds the physical destruction of a dwelling. In several villages, operations simultaneously involve housing, roads, public infrastructure, agricultural land and vegetation. This combination makes the return of the inhabitants much more difficult, even when an area temporarily ceases to be bombed.
It also increases the risk of explosive remnants. Each newly bombed or dynamited area must be inspected before the inhabitants can move there normally. Gravats can hide ammunition, while land operations can move explosives already present.
Zawtar al-Sharqiya: school, clinic and town hall destroyed
Zawtar al-Sharqiya illustrates the magnitude of this campaign. In August, Israeli destruction affected the municipal building, the public school, a health centre, a day care centre and several homes.
The Lebanese army itself denounced the destruction. It considered that they prevented its deployment and complicated the return of the population. This dimension is important: destruction not only affects private property, but also the equipment essential for the functioning of a municipality.
A destroyed school prevents the normal return of families. A destroyed clinic deprives residents of community care. A destroyed municipality affects administrative services. When these buildings disappear simultaneously with houses, the question is no longer simply to rebuild some houses, but to restore all the functions necessary for the life of a village.
Israel asserts that its operations target infrastructure used by Hezbollah and meet military requirements. The Lebanese authorities contest this justification when it concerns residential areas and public buildings.
Majdal Zoun, a perceptible blasting for miles
Majdal Zoun is another example of the power of the explosions used. During the night of 28-29 June, a major Israeli operation had caused a deflagration in several surrounding villages. Israel had announced the destruction of an underground Hezbollah infrastructure about 200 metres long and containing weapons and launchers according to its army.
The power of blasting had profoundly transformed the sector. Residents described the village as physically cut in half by the destroyed area. The explosions were felt in Mansouri, Haniyeh and several more remote locations.
The Israeli forces then returned several times to the area. Majdal Zoun is still one of the localities involved in the late August operations. This regular return shows that a first mass destruction does not necessarily result in an end to military activity on the spot.
The case of Majdal Zoun also illustrates Israel’s justification: the destruction of underground infrastructure attributed to Hezbollah. The question remains, however, of the extent of the damage caused on the surface and its proportion to the military objective announced.
At Chqif, a blast equivalent to a magnitude earthquake 3.8
The power of some explosions could be measured scientifically. During the night of 30-31 July, an Israeli blasting in the Shqif region produced waves recorded by the entire Lebanese seismic network.
The National Geophysical Centre, attached to the National Council for Scientific Research, recorded the signal at 0002 hours. The released energy produced a signal comparable to that of a 3.8 magnitude earthquake.
This measure gives a concrete indication of the scale of certain operations. The detonations heard several kilometres away do not always result from the destruction of a single dwelling. Some involve large quantities of explosives and may simultaneously involve several buildings or infrastructures.
They also produce effects beyond the directly destroyed perimeter. Vibration can weaken buildings already damaged by previous bombardments, while debris and ground movements further complicate access to the sectors concerned.
Dhayra: 71 per cent of buildings destroyed
To measure what can happen in successive months of blasting, Dhayra’s precedent remains one of the best documented. A satellite image analysis conducted by Amnesty International had identified 264 buildings destroyed in the municipality between October 2024 and January 2025.
This represented approximately 71% of Dhayra’s constructions.
This figure does not mean that 71 per cent of the village was destroyed in a single explosion. On the contrary, it shows how successive bombardments, blastings and demolitions can gradually eliminate most of a locality.
This distinction allows us to understand the current campaign. The explosions reported in Hula, Qantara, Taybeh, Kfar Tibnit, Haddatha or Mansouri do not necessarily have to be spectacular individually to produce, after several weeks, a massive destruction of the built fabric.
Kfar Killa and Maroun al-Ras already deeply destroyed
Other border villages show the same evolution. In Kfar Kila, satellite analyses had identified 897 destroyed structures, or about 36 per cent of the structure studied. In Maroun al-Ras, approximately 700 structures had disappeared, accounting for nearly 31 per cent of the constructions.
These destructions were not only the result of direct fighting. Buildings had also been demolished after Israeli forces entered the areas concerned, using bulldozers and explosives.
It is precisely this point that feeds legal questions. International humanitarian law permits the destruction of civilian property when imperative military necessity justifies it in certain circumstances. A systematic destruction of civilian property in an area already controlled meets much stricter criteria.
International human rights organizations have requested investigations into some of these destructions to determine whether they could constitute violations of international humanitarian law or even war crimes. Israel maintains that Hezbollah used civilian housing and infrastructure for military purposes.
Dynamiting complicates the deployment of the Lebanese army
The campaign of destruction also has an immediate political consequence. The agreement negotiated on 26 June provides for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from certain sectors in exchange for the deployment of the Lebanese army and the taking over of weapons and military infrastructure in the areas concerned.
The first experience in Zawtar al-Gharbiya showed the difficulty of the process. The Lebanese army entered on 21 July after the Israeli withdrawal. However, it discovered a town that was largely destroyed and contaminated with unexploded ordnance.
The soldiers had to first secure the ground and neutralize the explosives before allowing a wider return. Three soldiers were injured on 8 August during an operation to neutralize unexploded ordnance in Zawtar al-Gharbiya.
Experience sums up the problem facing Lebanon: retaking a village does not mean that it can immediately return it to the inhabitants. First, we have to check the buildings, clear the roads and neutralize the remnants of war. Habush’s drama shows what can happen when an explosive remains accessible.
Destruction Beyond Houses
The transformation of the South is not only measured by the number of dynamic buildings. Military operations also affected agricultural land, olive groves and forested areas.
Data from the Lebanese National Council for Scientific Research estimate the area burned by Israeli military activities since October 2023 at approximately 160 square kilometres, or 16,000 hectares. About half would be agricultural land.
Hundreds of olive trees have also been uprooted in some localities. Bulldozers and fires change land on which part of the rural economy of the South depends.
The destruction of an orchard has consequences different from that of a building. A house can be rebuilt if funding exists. An adult olive tree takes years to be replaced by a tree with a comparable yield. Economic loss therefore continues long after the end of operations.
Residents return to a still dangerous territory
The death of Mohammad Ali Ibrahim must be seen in that reality. In South Lebanon, the distinction between war and post-war is unclear. Villages are still bombarded or dynamised while, a few kilometres further away, families are already trying to resume normal life.
This coexistence increases the risks. Residents may return to an area that is no longer directly targeted but where submunitions, shells or other explosives remain. Children can access land that has not yet been fully inspected. Farmers sometimes have to choose between waiting for complete clean-up and returning to an activity essential to their income.
In Habush, this threat now has a name. Mohammad Ali Ibrahim survived when the ammunition was dispersed or abandoned. His subsequent explosion was fatal. His father had already been killed in an Israeli attack.
Meanwhile, operations You’re right. I’m going onexactly after the place where the first version was interrupted, without replacement or repetition.
Dynamiting maintains military activity on the ground
The continuation of blasting in border areas shows that Israeli activity in South Lebanon is not based solely on air strikes. These operations require a presence on the ground or direct access to the buildings concerned. They thus reflect a situation in which certain sectors remain subject to military intervention despite the mechanisms supposed to lead to the gradual stabilization of the border.
For Lebanon, such destruction is also a matter of sovereignty. Beirut calls for the Israeli withdrawal of positions maintained in its territory and the return of the Lebanese army to all sectors concerned. Israel, for its part, affirms that its operations meet security requirements and the need to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding military capabilities near the border.
The consequences for the inhabitants are immediate. Each dynamic building increases the volume of destruction in villages that already have many uninhabitable houses. Roads, electricity grids, water installations and agricultural land may also be affected. Reconstruction therefore depends as much on available funding as on the physical possibility of safe access to the neighbourhoods concerned.
A border where multiple risks overlap
The current situation in South Lebanon is the result of several threats. Israeli strikes continue on a point-by-time basis against persons or sites identified by Israel as linked to Hezbollah. Drones remain in the sky. Land operations and blasting maintain tension in the border strip. In addition, mines, bombs, shells and other explosive remnants left by the various phases of the fighting are added.
This combination explains why returning residents does not necessarily mean a return to security. A locality may no longer be bombed daily while remaining dangerous because of a buried munition, unstable building or proximity to an area where military operations are still being carried out.
The death of Mohammad Ali Ibrahim illustrates precisely this difference between the decrease in fighting and the disappearance of danger. The child was not killed during another strike against Habush. He was fatally injured by a device that remained active after use.
The Lebanese army facing the challenge of mine clearance
The Lebanese army and the specialized teams must inspect the affected areas before they can be considered safe. This work is not just about removing conventional mines. It also covers unexploded air bombs, shells, rockets, grenades, submunitions and various military components that may remain dangerous.
The size of the territory concerned complicates this mission. The bombings affected urban areas, hills, valleys and large agricultural areas. Some ammunition may be visible. Others are buried, hidden in vegetation or locked under rubble.
Demining operations must also be coordinated with reconstruction. Before moving tons of rubble with mechanical equipment, crews must ensure that no ammunition is likely to explode. The same precaution is necessary before farmers return to certain plots.
Children particularly exposed to explosive remnants
Children are one of the most vulnerable groups to unexploded ordnance. They may not identify a military object or ignore that an apparently inert device may still explode.
This threat is particularly important when ammunition is small. Submunitions dispersed by fragmentation weapons can have very different shapes and dimensions than conventional bombs. Some may be partially hidden by land or vegetation.
The authorities and specialized organizations therefore usually insist on a simple rule: never touch, move or pick up a suspicious object and immediately report its presence to the security forces. In villages where families return after months of fighting, this awareness becomes an essential component of civil protection.
The Habush explosion, however, shows the limits of prevention when explosive remnants are already scattered in areas frequented by the population.
The 2006 heavy fragmentation bomb precedent
The danger of submunitions has a particular resonance in Lebanon. During the 2006 war, the southern part of the country had been heavily contaminated with cluster munitions. Some of the small scattered bombs had not exploded immediately and had remained active after the cessation of hostilities.
Those devices had subsequently resulted in deaths and injuries among civilians and demining specialists. Agricultural land had been particularly affected, with lasting economic consequences for families dependent on their crops.
The clean-up had taken several years. This precedent explains why the discovery of any ammunition suspected of being a submunition causes immediate concern in the South.
In the case of Habush, the exact qualification of the equipment remains important. Available information indicates that an unexploded Israeli ammunition detonated. If its identification as a submunition from a fragmentation bomb is officially confirmed, the case of Mohammad Ali Ibrahim will be directly reflected in this issue already deeply rooted in recent South Lebanon history.
Same family twice struck
Habush’s drama takes on a particular dimension because Mohammad Ali Ibrahim had already lost his father in the conflict. Ali Ibrahim was killed in an Israeli attack on southern Lebanon.
The father was the victim of a direct attack, while his son died of the delayed consequences of a military operation. This succession summarizes how the war continues to produce victims beyond the precise time of the bombings.
For the family, the distinction between active war and post-war war was therefore not abstract. The disappearance of aircraft or the temporary reduction of strikes is not enough when explosives remain on the ground.
The second child injured in the Monday explosion also recalls that Mohammad Ali Ibrahim was not the only victim of the incident. Its state and medical evolution are now another element to follow.
Rebuilding the South first implies being able to live there
The destruction of homes and infrastructure is the most visible aspect of damage in South Lebanon. But physical reconstruction can only begin normally when the areas concerned are secure.
A house rebuilt in the middle of an area contaminated with ammunition remains inaccessible. A field cannot be cropped again if the passage of a tractor could trigger an explosive. A clear road cannot be returned to traffic if its surroundings have not been inspected.
Israeli blastings in the border areas exacerbate this difficulty by adding further destruction to those accumulated during the fighting. They can also delay the time when Lebanese teams will have full access to certain areas.
The stabilization of the South therefore depends on a number of operations that must move forward together: the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the deployment of the Lebanese army, demining, the security of villages and the reconstruction of infrastructure.
The death of Mohammad Ali Ibrahim reminds us that the danger remains
The death of Mohammad Ali Ibrahim transforms an abandoned munition into a new human impact of the conflict. The explosion is not an abstract vestige of fighting. She killed a child several days or weeks after the operation in which the device was used.
This is also a warning to other affected communities. As long as the bombed areas have not been systematically inspected, it remains impossible to know with certainty the number of vehicles likely not to have exploded.
The continuation of Israeli blasting and operations in certain border areas also means that this contamination does not belong solely to the past. Further destruction continues to be produced while Lebanese teams are still working on those left behind by previous phases of the conflict.
In Habush, the technical identification of the device must be used to determine whether it was actually a submunition from a fragmentation bomb. In the villages of the front, the challenge remains simultaneously that of access to houses and land. The death of Mohammad Ali Ibrahim recalls that, for the people of South Lebanon, security is measured not only by the number of strikes recorded in one day, but also by what remains in the ground when the bombings cease.
