The Iran-USA negotiations are entering a new zone of turbulence, just as Washington and Tehran still claim to maintain an open diplomatic door. Thursday, 28 May, begins with a double signal: indirect discussions that are no longer taking place, and cross strikes that weaken the April ceasefire. In the Gulf, the United States claims to have destroyed Iranian drones near the Strait of Ormuz and hit a checkpoint in Bandar Abbas. Iran claims to have responded against an American base, while Kuwait confirms that it has activated its defences in the face of missile and drone threats. The file is no longer just nuclear. It now affects maritime sovereignty, sanctions, frozen assets, the role of Oman and the security of American bases in the Gulf monarchies.
The sequence is followed with particular attention in Lebanon. For Beirut, every blockage between Iran and the United States affects the southern front, Hezbollah’s posture and the Lebanese government’s margin of manoeuvre. The regional war has already transformed Lebanon into an exposed theatre. It also weighs on energy prices, expatriate transfers and maritime road safety. The Lebanese view is not to reduce this crisis to a distant arm. It is a reminder that Lebanon is in the shadow of any decision taken in Washington, Tehran, Muscat or Kuwait City. When Iran-USA negotiations are blocked, South Lebanon often becomes one of the first areas to measure its cost.
Iran-USA negotiations: Ormuz at the heart of the blockade
The current block has crystallized around the Strait of Ormuz. An Iranian state television reported the existence of a draft unofficial framework. It would provide for a gradual resumption of commercial shipping, a US military withdrawal from the immediate zone and traffic management between Iran and Oman. Washington immediately denied any compromise of this type. The White House called the manufacturing document. Donald Trump added that no country would control the Strait alone, presented by him as an international route. The point could have remained diplomatic. It took a more brutal turn when the American President threatened Oman, yet an ancient ally of the United States and traditional mediator between Washington and Tehran.
This threat surprised by its target as well as its tone. Oman has occupied a unique place in the Gulf crises for years. The Sultanate dialogue with Iran, maintains security ties with the United States and avoids too rigid alignments. In the current sequence, Muscat appears as a useful or even indispensable channel for discussing Ormuz without official direct contact. The fact that Donald Trump publicly warned Oman translates American exasperation to any formula that would give Tehran de facto recognition of the Strait. This also reflects Washington’s desire not to let regional ombudsmen redefine only the rules of passage, the rights of control or the possible levies on ships.
On the Iranian side, the political response was determined. Iranian officials reiterated that American threats would not backtrack Tehran on its red lines. These include the maintenance of a right to uranium enrichment, the lifting of sanctions, the return of frozen assets and the recognition of an Iranian role in the security of the Strait. The message is clear: Iran does not only want a military break. It requires a concrete change in the balance of economic and maritime strength. In return, Washington demands that Iran permanently renounce any military nuclear capability, accept strict restrictions and reopen Ormuz without blackmail power on global energy traffic.
Kuwait caught up with Iranian response
The Iranian response on an American base in the region gives a military dimension to the diplomatic blockade. The Revolutionary Guards have announced that they have struck a base used, in their view, to launch the attack on Bandar Abbas. They did not clearly identify the site. However, international and regional media have referred to a base in Kuwait, a country that hosts important United States facilities. Kuwait reported that its defences were responding to missile and drone threats. This caution in formulations shows the sensitivity of the moment. Kuwait City does not want to appear as a direct party to a regional war, but the American presence on its territory exposes it to Iranian reprisals.
Bandar Abbas’ episode is also central. The United States claims to have shot down four Iranian drones that threatened US traffic or forces near Ormuz. They claim to have hit a ground control station that was about to launch a fifth drone. Washington presents the operation as limited, defensive and intended to preserve the ceasefire. Tehran describes it as a new aggression. In this difference of vocabulary is read the whole blockage. The United States wants to impose a freedom of navigation under American military protection. Iran believes that this presence is part of the problem and is a direct pressure on its territory, ports and economy.
The April ceasefire therefore seems increasingly fragile. He did not end the hostilities. He only installed a frame in which each camp tests the other’s boundary. US strikes are presented as responses to specific threats. Iranian strikes are claimed as reprisals. Both stories can coexist without opening any de-escalation. On the contrary, they allow each actor to justify the next blow. For the Gulf States, this mechanism is dangerous. US bases are close to civilian areas, ports, airports and energy infrastructure. Each interception can become a regional incident.
Nuclear, sanctions and assets frozen
The nuclear part has not disappeared. He even became more difficult to isolate. Washington wants to place Iranian enrichment at the centre of a deal. The US Secretary of State reiterated that Iran must never obtain nuclear weapons. Tehran replied that its programme was civilian and that its right to enrichment was not negotiable under threat. Between these two positions, mediators seek a formula. It should be strict enough to reassure the United States and Israel, but political enough not to resemble an Iranian capitulation. At this stage, neither side seems ready to bear the domestic cost of a visible compromise.
The issue of frozen assets is equally important. Iranian officials are calling for the full and unconditional return of funds blocked by sanctions. For Tehran, this money belongs to the Iranian nation and must come back before any lasting normalization. For Washington, a speedy lifting of sanctions or a massive release of assets would be difficult to defend without major Iranian concessions. Blockage is therefore both financial and strategic. It covers billions of dollars, but also a question of sovereignty. Iran wants to prove that it does not negotiate under asphyxiation. The United States wants to prove that pressure produces results.
Pakistan’s role, already visible in recent days, illustrates the search for an alternative channel. Islamabad has increased contacts with Tehran and Washington. Pakistan officials have made proposals, while Qatar and Oman are also mentioned in the mediation channels. This multiplication of intermediaries can help to avoid a complete rupture. It can also make negotiation more opaque. Each carries a message, corrects a formulation, tests a concession. But nobody seems able yet to impose an exit architecture. For Lebanon, this opacity complicates reading events. An agreed rumor can lower the tension for a few hours. A knock makes her go up immediately.
For Lebanon, the shock also involves energy
The Strait of Ormuz remains the nerve center of the crisis. Prior to the war, a major portion of liquefied oil and natural gas was transported daily. Since the first Israeli-American strikes against Iran, traffic has fallen sharply. Shipping companies assess transit risks, insurers increase premiums and markets respond to any incidents. Crude prices rebounded after Thursday’s strikes, erasing part of their decline the previous day. For importing countries, the crisis is immediate. For Lebanon, it means higher costs on fuel, private electricity, transport and basic necessities.
This economic dimension is a source of concern in Beirut. Lebanon imports almost all its energy and depends heavily on the dollar. Any sustained increase in oil costs households, generators, hospitals, bakeries and transportation. It quickly affects prices. The country no longer has sufficient budgetary margins to absorb a new regional shock. The Iran-USA negotiations are therefore not an abstract issue for the Lebanese. They influence the cost of living, the expectations of traders, the behaviour of expatriates and the capacity of institutions to manage a prolonged crisis.
Hezbollah is following this issue with strategic attention. The movement is allied with Iran and engaged against Israel in southern Lebanon. Relaxation between Washington and Tehran could reduce regional military pressure. Failure, on the contrary, could reinforce the logic of confrontation on several fronts. Hezbollah does not alone determine the Iranian trajectory, but it is evolving in its political and military environment. Each American strike against Iran reinforces, in its speech, the idea of a war led by Washington and Israel against the axis of resistance. Each Iranian response allows him to stress that the American bases in the region remain vulnerable.
For the Lebanese government, the equation is narrower. Beirut does not wish to see Lebanese territory become an adjustment variable in regional negotiations. The authorities seek to preserve what may be the ceasefire in the South, while calling for an end to Israeli strikes and respect for Lebanese sovereignty. But reality often exceeds their ability to act. If Washington further tightened its line against Tehran, Israel could increase pressure in Lebanon. If Iran chooses to expand the response, the fronts linked to its allies could become pressure instruments again. In both cases, Lebanon may suffer more than it decides.
Oman and Kuwait, two pressurized allies
Oman finds itself in a delicate position. The sultanate does not want to be seen as a partner in an Iranian strait control. Nor does he want to lose his role as mediator. The American threat blurs this function. She puts Muscat under public pressure, even though negotiations need discreet channels. The Gulf diplomacy knows that a humiliation of Oman would reduce the space for dialogue. They also know that any arrangement on Ormuz without the United States would be immediately challenged by Washington. The Omani margin is therefore reduced as statements become more explosive.
Kuwait faces a comparable dilemma, but from a security perspective. The country has been hosting American forces for decades. This presence is part of a defence architecture born after the Iraqi invasion of 1990. It reassured some of the Kuwaiti authorities, but it also transformed the territory into a potential target when Iran hit regional American infrastructure. The response attributed to the Guardians of the Revolution recalls this vulnerability. Even if Kuwait avoids accusing statements, Thursday’s warning shows that the Gulf monarchies cannot remain outside a war that is being waged over their waters and sometimes over their skies.
Donald Trump’s communication adds unpredictability. The U.S. president says he wants an agreement, but at the same time he threatens to resume the offensive if Tehran does not give in. He accuses Iran of delaying the mid-term elections in the United States. It publicly refuses any lifting of sanctions without concessions. This method aims to maintain pressure. It also creates permanent uncertainty on the American line. Negotiators can move forward on a technical document and then find themselves contradicted by a presidential sentence. The allies themselves must interpret whether a threat is a calculated message, improvisation or verbal confusion.
Iran exploits this ambiguity. Tehran presents Washington as a power locked in a strategic impasse. Iranian officials claim that the United States alternates between threats and calls for agreement because they fail to reopen Ormuz by force. This story targets Iranian opinion, but also regional opinions. It seeks to show that Iran has resisted strikes, retained military means and imposed the strait as a central subject. In this context, the nuclear issue becomes a part of wider bargaining, which includes sanctions, navigation, American bases and recognition of Iran’s regional weight.
A still unstable dead end
The standstill does not mean the absence of discussions. It means that the discussions no longer produce clear convergence. The proposals exist. The middlemen are moving. Channels remain open. But the main requirements contradict each other. The United States wants a safe reopening of Ormuz, an Iranian step back on nuclear power and a limitation of regional military capabilities. Iran wants a real lifting of sanctions, the return of its assets, the maintenance of enrichment and a recognized role in the Strait. Between these two lists, no verification, timetable or compensation mechanism appears to be accepted by both sides.
The next sequence will therefore depend on three thresholds. The first is military: a new strike against an American base, ship or Iranian facility could break the ceasefire. The second is maritime: an announcement on Ormuz, even partial, can change the oil market and the posture of foreign mariners. The third is political: a statement by Trump, an Iranian official or a mediator can relaunch negotiations or bury them. In Beirut, this issue will be read through its immediate effects: the South Lebanon, the price of fuel, the security of the Gulf expatriates and the possibility, still suspended, of a new extension of the war.
