Can the framework agreement prevent a new war in Lebanon?

The Washington-supported mechanism offers Lebanon and Israel a path of de-escalation, but its implementation remains threatened by disagreements over the withdrawal, Hezbollah weapons and the role entrusted to the Lebanese army

Several Lebanese newspapers on 20 July 2026 present the framework agreement negotiated under American mediation as the only immediate way to prevent a new war in Lebanon. This assessment does not reflect absolute confidence in the mechanism. Above all, it reflects the absence of another solution that can link Israeli withdrawal, the deployment of the Lebanese army, arms control and the prevention of a resumption of fighting.

The agreement does not constitute a peace treaty or a final settlement of the conflict. It is based on a series of progressive measures designed to produce verifiable de-escalation on the ground. Israel should withdraw from certain occupied positions in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese army should then take control of the areas evacuated and prevent their re-use by armed groups. The United States and several international partners would be responsible for supporting, supervising or ensuring this sequence.

The mechanism seems consistent in principle. However, there is a central difficulty in its implementation: each party first demands guarantees from the other. Israel wants to ensure that Hezbollah will not return to the evacuated areas. Hezbollah refuses to address the issue of its weapons before the Israeli withdrawal. The Lebanese State wants to restore its sovereignty without turning its army into a force to execute Israel’s security demands.

The success of the agreement will therefore depend less on its general provisions than on the order in which they will be applied.

Israeli withdrawal as first test

The issue of withdrawal is central to the discussions. Lebanon calls for the first steps to be taken in areas where Israeli forces are actually present. A pilot zone would be meaningless if it were chosen from a village already controlled by the Lebanese army and where no Israeli unit is deployed.

The divergence is not secondary. It determines whether the agreement begins with a real decline in occupation or with an essentially symbolic operation.

The Lebanese side believes that the first phase should set a clear precedent. Israel would evacuate an identifiable position, the Lebanese Army would enter and a verification mechanism would see the change of control. This sequence would allow the Lebanese Government to present the process as a progressive restoration of national sovereignty.

Israel was also seeking to reduce the risk associated with each withdrawal. Its officials invoke the possibility of a return of Hezbollah, the alleged presence of hidden military infrastructure and the lack of surveillance available in certain border areas.

However, this position allows Israel to make any evacuation conditional on potentially impossible guarantees to obtain before the withdrawal itself. The greater the number of prerequisites, the greater the risk of the Israeli army maintaining the positions it occupies.

The agreement will therefore be able to produce a result only if the United States obtains a real, limited but verifiable initial withdrawal. Without this first step, Lebanon will have few political reasons to assume the most sensitive obligations requested of it.

Pilot zones, a more political than a technical test

The use of pilot zones is intended to prevent disagreement over the whole border from immediately blocking the process. The idea is to start in one or more small areas, check compliance, and then gradually extend the scheme.

This method would test the capacity of actors to cooperate without waiting for full agreement on all issues. It could also limit the consequences of a local incident, since the entire system would not be engaged at once.

But the choice of the first areas will be decisive.

If they correspond to real Israeli positions, their evacuation can be presented as an advance. If they are chosen in areas where the Israeli army is not really established, the mechanism may be seen in Lebanon as a staging intended to delay the withdrawal.

The definition of pilot areas also raises a question of timing. Should the Israeli withdrawal precede the full Lebanese deployment? Should both movements be simultaneous? Is an intermediate phase of international supervision necessary?

A poorly coordinated operation could create a security vacuum, even temporary. An operation too closely controlled by Israel could, on the other hand, give the impression that the Lebanese army is entering villages under Israeli authorization.

The mechanism must therefore preserve two principles: Israel cannot retain permanent control over the territories evacuated, and the Lebanese State must guarantee that these territories will not be reinvested by a parallel armed force.

What the agreement requires of Lebanon

The obligations in Lebanon far exceed the mere deployment of troops. The army should establish a sustainable presence, control roads, secure villages, identify possible military infrastructure and prevent any reconstitution of an armed presence beyond the authority of the State.

At the institutional level, these objectives correspond to the principle of sovereignty. The problem lies in their practical application.

The Lebanese army is operating in a region deeply affected by bombing, destruction, displacement and mistrust of Israel. It cannot ignore the political and social context of the villages in which it must intervene.

A deployment after an Israeli withdrawal can be understood as the return of the State. On the contrary, a search or confiscation carried out prior to such withdrawal may be perceived as fulfilling Israeli requirements.

The military institution is therefore seeking to avoid a mission likely to oppose the inhabitants of the South. A confrontation with the population or members of Hezbollah would cause a much wider national crisis than the only issue of border control.

The success of the mechanism implies that the army has clear legitimacy, sufficient material resources and national political support. It cannot be entrusted alone with resolving an issue that is a matter of both defence, domestic policy and regional relations.

Home searches at the heart of disagreements

The issue of private property is one of the most sensitive points of the agreement.

Israel wishes to be able to transmit information concerning houses, land or buildings in which weapons, tunnels or military equipment are alleged to be present. The Lebanese army would then be called upon to verify this information.

However, Lebanon cannot accept that every Israeli report automatically leads to a search.

Private property is protected by Lebanese law. Intervention must be based on a legal basis, sufficiently accurate information and a decision taken exclusively by the Lebanese authorities. The army cannot become the instrument of a system in which Israel designates the places to be inspected while retaining the possibility of hitting them if its demands are not carried out.

Such a mechanism would create an indirect right of intervention for Israel. It would also expose the Lebanese army to serious incidents in the event of misinformation, old or deliberately exaggerated.

Every unsuccessful search would reinforce the distrust of the inhabitants. Any misprepared intrusion could cause confrontation. Any disputed information would fuel the idea that the state is acting under foreign pressure.

To avoid this drift, information should be examined by a coordination structure comprising the Lebanese authorities and international mediators. The final decision to intervene should remain Lebanese. The mechanism should also include verification of the information provided and a clear procedure in case of disagreement.

Without these guarantees, the issue of excavations could be sufficient to make the entire system fail.

Hezbollah binds weapons at the end of the occupation

Hezbollah’s position remains unchanged on one essential point: the movement refuses to allow disarmament to precede Israeli withdrawal.

For the party, the Israeli military presence on Lebanese territory and the maintenance of a permanent threat justify the retention of its armed capabilities. To agree to abandon them before withdrawal would, according to this logic, eliminate a deterrent without obtaining in return the end of occupation.

Israel adopts the opposite reasoning. He claims that an unsecured withdrawal would allow Hezbollah to redeploy as close to the border as possible.

The framework agreement seeks to circumvent this contradiction by distinguishing Hezbollah’s general disarmament from the immediate control of evacuated areas. The movement may not appear militarily in certain sectors without all its arsenal being dealt with from the first phase.

This ambiguity may facilitate a temporary arrangement. However, it does not resolve the substantive issue.

As withdrawals progress, discussions will necessarily focus on the extent of the state monopoly, Hezbollah’s military capabilities and security assurances in Lebanon. The problem, postponed in the first stage, will return to the centre of the process.

The risk would then be that Israel would suspend the withdrawals by demanding wider disarmament, while Hizbullah would refuse any new concessions before the complete evacuation of the territory.

The United States as an indispensable arbitrator

Washington’s role is decisive. The United States is not just the mediator of the process. They are also the only actor with sufficient influence on Israel to achieve concrete withdrawals.

Lebanon expects Washington to have a clear position on the timetable and on the areas concerned. It also seeks guarantees against the continuation of Israeli strikes during the implementation of the agreement.

Israel also expects the United States to monitor compliance with Lebanese commitments and to support monitoring mechanisms.

This dual function places Washington in a delicate position. If the United States demands rapid arms measures from Lebanon while at the same time tolerating the indefinite maintenance of Israeli positions, the agreement will lose its credibility. If they get a first withdrawal but do not track the Lebanese deployment, Israel can invoke a security risk to interrupt the process.

European countries could provide financial, logistical and technical support to the Lebanese army. They could contribute to surveillance equipment, reconstruction of infrastructure and the return of residents.

International bodies could also participate in the verification of withdrawals and the registration of violations. Their role would, however, remain limited without American political will to impose a balanced application.

The agreement will therefore not work if the mediators simply bring the parties together. They will have to arbitrate disagreements, set deadlines and determine responsibilities for violations.

The Lebanese Armed Forces face the risk of internal confrontation

The military is the main instrument for applying the mechanism, but it is also the most exposed actor.

It should replace Israeli forces in the evacuated areas, control the ground, respond to the information transmitted and prevent any unauthorized armed presence. It should carry out these missions without causing confrontation with the inhabitants and without entering into direct conflict with Hezbollah.

This equation is particularly difficult.

The people of the South have suffered loss of life, destruction of their homes and interruption of their economic activities. They are waiting for the end of the strikes, the Israeli withdrawal and the reconstruction of their villages.

If the state manifests itself mainly through searches and restrictions, it may appear as absent during the destruction but present when imposing constraints.

Military deployment must therefore be accompanied by a civilian effort. Reconstruction, compensation, restoration of public services and access to agricultural land are essential to make the state presence credible.

An army deployed in villages that are still threatened and partially destroyed will not, on its own, be able to sustainably restore public authority.

The scenario of gradual withdrawal and stabilisation

The most favourable scenario is a sequenced application.

Israel would evacuate a truly occupied first position. The Lebanese army would deploy immediately. The mediators would verify the withdrawal and absence of a return of a Hezbollah military presence. The strikes would be suspended in the area concerned.

A first success would build limited confidence without requiring an immediate resolution of all issues.

The process could then be extended to other sectors. The Lebanese army would gradually strengthen its presence. The partner countries would finance its equipment and reconstruction. The reduction in incidents would reduce the risk of a general resumption of fighting.

This scenario would not mean the end of the conflict. However, it would create a political space for Lebanon to gradually address the issue of arms in a context less directly subject to Israeli military pressure.

The scenario of a lasting blockage

The second scenario is negotiation without real application.

The parties could continue to discuss pilot areas, maps, excavations and verification mechanisms without reaching agreement on a first step.

Israel would retain its positions. Hezbollah would continue its refusal to disarm. The Lebanese army would remain deployed in some areas without being able to fully restore State sovereignty.

This could last several months. It is said to be accompanied by spot Israeli strikes, border incidents and mutual accusations.

Such a situation would not be an open war, but would not be a stabilization either. It would maintain Lebanon in a state of permanent insecurity, prevent reconstruction and prolong the displacement of some of the inhabitants.

The longer this block would last, the greater the risk of an uncontrolled incident.

The Collapse Scenario

The third scenario would be a sudden rupture.

A major Israeli strike, a Hezbollah operation, a confrontation during a search or incident involving the Lebanese army could interrupt the process.

Israel could then accuse Lebanon of failing to fulfil its security commitments. Hezbollah may consider that the agreement does not protect the territory or the population. The Lebanese authorities could suspend their participation if the promised withdrawal was not carried out.

In this case, the mechanism designed to prevent war could become a new argument used by each camp to justify escalation.

The danger lies in the absence of an indisputable system of accountability. If each violation is the subject of contradictory accounts, mediators may quickly lose their ability to arbitrate.

A possibility of de-escalation, not a guarantee of peace

The framework agreement can prevent a new war in Lebanon, but only if it produces concrete changes on the ground.

Israel must engage in a real withdrawal. Lebanon must deploy its army and exercise its authority in the evacuated areas. Hezbollah must avoid any action that might provoke a new offensive. The United States must ensure that obligations are not imposed on a single party.

The main danger would be to transform the mechanism into a lengthy negotiation on the demands addressed to Lebanon, without equivalent progress on the Israeli withdrawal.

On the contrary, the main hope lies in a limited but balanced progression: withdrawal, deployment, verification and reconstruction.

The text does not remove the conflict over arms, Israel’s security ambitions, or the fragility of the Lebanese state. It offers only a method to gradually reduce the risk of war.

Its future will therefore depend on a simple question: will the different actors agree to fulfil their own commitments before demanding the political surrender of the other?