REASON FOR LIBAN

What is Lebanon for?

Raison d’être, mission of the State and vision of a country that must finally decide what it wants to be

Bernard Raymond Jabre

Lebanon has been in political, financial, institutional and identity crises for decades. Yet, behind each of them is a more fundamental question, rarely raised in a frontal way: why do we still want to live together in the same State, and what common project justifies the existence of Lebanon? As long as this question remains unanswered, the reforms remain technical, the interim compromises and the State itself challenged.

A country cannot reform for a long time if it does not know why it exists, what it must protect and what it wants to become.

The Lebanese crisis is first and foremost a crisis of purpose

Lebanon is constantly talking about administrative reform, judicial independence, banking restructuring, decentralization, anti-corruption, sovereignty and economic recovery. All these issues are essential. But they come after a deeper question: what is the purpose of the whole? What idea of Lebanese society are these reforms supposed to serve?

A State is not just a territory, a Constitution, an administration and borders. It is also an agreement, either explicit or implicit, between citizens on a few higher purposes. Citizens agree to pay taxes, to respect laws, to entrust the monopoly of force to common institutions and to renounce certain forms of private justice because they believe that the State protects something that deserves to be protected: their freedom, their security, their dignity, their rights, their property, their future and that of their children.

The Lebanese problem is that this substantive agreement has remained incomplete. Lebanon has built power-sharing mechanisms without ever building with the same force a shared definition of its purpose. The system has therefore often answered the question « how to allocate the state? » before answering the question « what should the state serve? ». This inversion explains much of our impasses.

When the common goal disappears, institutions become territories to conquer. The ministry becomes a community resource, public employment is an instrument of loyalty, the public market is a means of redistribution, the bank is a proximity, the judge is a contact, the MP is an intermediary and the political leader is an insurer of last resort. The state then ceases to be the arbiter of the common good and becomes the very object of competition.

Several Lebanon coexist in the same Lebanon

For more than a century, several visions of the country have overlapped. Some are noble, others much less. They explain why Lebanese people can use the same words while speaking of deeply different countries.

There is first a Lebanon of networks. In this vision, rarely claimed but very present in practice, the role of power is to protect relatives, families, clientele, economic partners or communities. Access to the state becomes a form of insurance. Those who control an institution can reward their own, slow down an investigation, facilitate an authorization, guide a contract or protect an interest. This is obviously not a national reason. On the contrary, it is the privatisation of the State reason.

There is then a Lebanon of communities, conceived as an association of groups that have agreed not to dominate themselves completely. This logic has played a historical role in preserving an exceptional religious plurality in the region. But it poses a danger: if the citizen exists politically only through his community, the state becomes the addition of veto rights and areas of influence. Coexistence then ceases to be a promise to become a mechanics of paralysis.

There is also a Lebanon of external powers. Some political forces have sought security, legitimacy or power from foreign sponsors over time. Lebanon then becomes less a subject of international politics than a space for the strategies of others. It can be a relay, a front, a strategic depth, a market of influence or a trading platform. But a country that accepts to be the scene of rivalries of others will eventually lose the ability to define its own interests.

In addition to these visions, Lebanon is a « message country ». The expression is powerful because it suggests that the coexistence of different religious and cultural communities has a scope beyond Lebanese territory. But the message cannot simply be to juxtapose communities. A real political message would be to demonstrate that they can live together without any one having the state, without any need for militia, outside protector or judicial privilege to feel safe.

Finally, Lebanon is a platform: commercial, financial, academic, medical, tourist, cultural, media or technological platform. This vocation corresponds to a real part of the country’s history and comparative advantages. But it describes an economic model and a regional function, not a raison d’être. A platform can enrich a country; It does not say why its citizens want to form a political community.

Differentiating raison d’être, mission, vision and economic model

Much of the confusion disappears as soon as four concepts are separated.

The raison d’être answers the most fundamental question: why should Lebanon exist as an independent political community? It must be deep enough to survive a change of government, majority, economic model or regional environment.

The State’s mission answers another question: what must the public authorities actually guarantee to achieve this raison d’être? Security, justice, equality, sovereignty, monetary stability, freedoms, institutional integrity and property protection are not slogans; These are obligations of the State.

The vision indicates what Lebanon wants to become in the long term. It turns principles into a destination. A country can have a stable reason for being and adapt its vision to technological, economic, demographic or geopolitical developments.

Finally, the economic model determines how it produces wealth. Lebanon can be an economy of services, knowledge, finance, tourism, health, education, technology and creation. This model can evolve without questioning why the country exists.

Consolidating these four levels produces sterile debates. To say that Lebanon should be a platform does not answer the question of citizenship. To say that it must be a rule of law is not enough to define its historical ambition. Saying that it is a message country does not indicate how it should govern its finances. We need to articulate the four.

A proposal of raison d’être: organizing freedom in diversity

If we look for what Lebanon really possesses, we always return to the same reality: a very strong diversity concentrated on a small territory, combined with a tradition of opening up several spaces at once. Lebanon belongs to the Arab world, the Mediterranean and an immense network of diasporas. It has several languages, several memories, several political cultures and several religious affiliations.

This diversity has often been treated as a problem to administer. It could become the heart of the national project.

I would propose to define Lebanon’s raison d’être as follows: to guarantee to citizens of different origins, religions, cultures and sensitivities the possibility of living free, equal and secure in the same sovereign State, governed by law, and to transform this diversity, openness and diaspora into a force of creation, prosperity and influence.

This definition is based on a simple idea: Lebanon does not exist to erase identities, but to avoid their need to fight each other. It does not exist to suppress communities, but to make their transformation into political protection devices unnecessary. It does not exist to impose a single identity, but to create a common space that is sufficiently solid so that several identities can deploy freely.

In other words, diversity must no longer be the state-sharing architecture. It must become a wealth protected by the State.

The rule of law is not Lebanon’s raison d’être; it is the condition

A rule of law is not a Lebanese peculiarity. Any democracy worthy of that name should be. Yet, in the case of Lebanon, the rule of law has an even more fundamental function: it is the mechanism that allows diversity not to become a permanent war of competing protections.

When a citizen believes that his or her right depends on his or her community, party, bank, family or relationship, he or she will naturally seek the protection of the strongest. This behavior is not only cultural; it is rational in a system where the common rule is unreliable. Political clientele thrives precisely where universal law fails.

The real transition to the rule of law comes when the question « who do you know? « What is your right? » From then on, the function of the political leader changes, that of the magistrate changes, that of the administration changes and that of the community changes.

An independent justice system then becomes much more than sectoral reform. It becomes the main instrument of real deconfessionization of daily life. As long as a Lebanese needs his community leader to obtain justice, citizenship will remain unfinished. When the judge is sufficient, the citizen starts replacing the client.

Sovereignty: To belong to the world without belonging to a power

Lebanon cannot fulfil its raison d’être if the ultimate political decision is elsewhere. A sovereign State does not mean an isolated State, neutral to any influence or closed to alliances. It means that alliances are chosen by legitimate institutions, that foreign policy is a national policy and that the decision on war and peace belongs to the state.

Lebanese history has shown the cost of a country that has periodically become a space for confrontation with foreign strategies. The problem is not that Lebanon has relations with France, the United States, Arab countries, Iran, Europe or other actors. A small open country needs multiple relationships. The problem begins when an external power acquires, through an internal force, a higher right of decision than that of national institutions.

Lebanon should therefore seek an open doctrine of sovereignty: friendship with all those who respect its independence, hostility towards person by principle, automatic alignment with person, and refusal that its territory be used to resolve the conflicts of others.

A formula could summarize this doctrine: open to all, subordinate to no one. This orientation is not a leak out of the world. On the contrary, it is the condition for Lebanon to become an actor rather than an issue.

Country-message must become an institutional reality

Lebanon is often presented as an experience of coexistence. This idea has real value, but it must be rid of its romanticism. The mere presence of several communities on the same territory is not in itself a message. Groups can coexist while living in distrust, social separation and the constant search for power relations.

The real message would begin when identities were protected without institutions being owned by them. It would appear when a citizen could change his or her political opinion without changing his or her protection, when a magistrate could judge a powerful person without looking at his or her confession, when a public servant would be recruited for his or her competence, when an entrepreneur would not need a political intermediary, when a minority community could feel secure simply because the Constitution and justice function.

The country-message would therefore no longer be the country of interreligious dialogue. It would become the country where several identities demonstrate that they can share the same right.

This nuance is crucial. Lebanon would not be valuable because it would be a collection of communities. It would be because it would show that no community needed to dominate the other in order to survive.

Lebanon platform: an economic strategy, not an identity

Lebanon has advantages that make a platform economy natural. Its geography is important, but it is no longer sufficient in the digital age. Its real advantage is human: plurilingualism, diaspora, entrepreneurial culture, business networks, universities, liberal professions, ability to circulate between several cultural worlds.

The platform of the twenty-first century should therefore not be the reproduction of the pre-crisis model, based on capital flows, real estate, interest rates and largely artificial financial stability. It must be a platform of skills and trust.

A reformed Lebanon could specialize in regional higher education, medicine, professional services, arbitration, technology, artificial intelligence, creative industries, cultural production, regulated finance, heritage management, quality tourism, high value-added agri-food and diaspora services.

But a platform only works on one condition: trust. It requires reliable courts, executable contracts, credible currency, predictable administration, understandable taxation, correct infrastructure and stable rules. So even the economic strategy ends up bringing us back to the institutional question.

Lebanon does not need to be the least regulated. He needs to be the most reliable. In a global economy where capital and talent can move very quickly, trust becomes as important an infrastructure as port, airport, electricity or fibre optics.

Diaspora must become a power network, not a deficit financing mechanism

For decades, the Lebanese diaspora has often been considered through its financial transfers. It supported families, fueled consumption, financed real estate and participated in bank deposits. This contribution was immense, but the relationship between the state and its diaspora remained largely passive.

Lebanon should now view its diaspora as a global extension of its human capital. Lebanese and Lebanese descendants present in Europe, America, Africa, the Gulf, Australia and elsewhere form an exceptional network of skills, companies, researchers, doctors, financiers, engineers, artists and entrepreneurs.

The aim should no longer be simply to bring back their money, but to reconnect their knowledge, networks, credibility and investment to a country that has become trustworthy.

This transformation is essential because it alters the moral relationship between Lebanon and its expatriates. The diaspora should no longer be asked to finance system failures. It should be invited to invest in its institutional and productive reconstruction.

The Lebanese State Mission

From this reason, the State mission becomes much clearer. Its first obligation is to protect the freedom and security of every citizen without asking him to what community he belongs to. This means that national security, police, justice and fundamental rights must be universal.

Its second obligation is to ensure equality before the law. The State cannot ask citizens to recognize itself if it accepts areas of immunity, selective justice, pass-rights or political protection.

Its third obligation is to exercise sovereignty. No group may have a military, security or diplomatic power superior to that of common institutions. This rule does not apply to a particular community; It simply stems from the very definition of a State.

Its fourth obligation is to protect property, savings and contracts. After the financial crisis, this dimension can no longer be considered secondary. A State that leaves the savings of several generations to disappear without a clear mechanism of responsibility destroys the confidence pact on which every modern economy rests.

His fifth obligation is to manage public money as a entrusted asset, not as a loot. The budget, debt, public enterprises, public procurement and the central bank must comply with rules of transparency, control and accountability that apply to both the powerful and the others.

Its sixth obligation is to create conditions for social mobility. Education, health, infrastructure, access to digital technology and economic competition must enable a young Lebanese to progress through his work rather than by belonging.

Finally, the State must preserve the common space. The country cannot be reduced to an informal federation of Community territories. The school, army, justice, administration, public space, heritage, environment and some national institutions must produce a common experience of Lebanon.

What Lebanon must cease to be

Defining a raison d’être also means recognizing what the country can no longer accept.

It can no longer be a dispensing State for annuities whose implicit objective is to maintain customers. It can no longer be a confederation of protections where every citizen must negotiate his relationship to the law. It can no longer be a financial system that continuously uses future resources to maintain the balance of the present. It can no longer be a territory made available to the military or political strategies of others. It can no longer be a country in which emigration is the only mechanism for the social mobility of young people.

Nor should he seek his salvation in the inverse illusion of forced uniformity. The problem of Lebanon is not the existence of its communities. The problem arises when community membership becomes the key to access rights, resources and security.

The national project is therefore not to abolish diversity, but to gradually disconnect social diversity from political dependence.

A vision for Lebanon of 2040

If the raison d’être responds to the « why », a national vision must respond to the « what ». We must be able to describe in a few sentences the country we would like to pass on to the next generation.

Lebanon of 2040 should be a small, sovereign, politically pluralistic, legally sound and administratively effective State in which no community, party, family, bank, enterprise or foreign power is above the law.

Its religious and cultural diversity should no longer be primarily a mechanism for allocating public employment and resources, but a freely lived social wealth. Citizens should be able to retain their belongings without determining their right to security, justice, employment or investment.

Its economy should be open, productive and connected to the region and the world, based on skills rather than rents. Beirut could become a regional service centre again, but a centre built on the reputation of its institutions and not on opacity.

Its diaspora should be integrated into this vision as a strategic partner. Its educational system should transmit several languages, a lucid national memory and a culture of law. Its administration should be sufficiently digitized to reduce opportunities for corruption and sufficiently professional to withstand political alternation.

Lebanon should finally be a country capable of living in its Arab environment without losing its Mediterranean openness, capable of dialogue with the West without becoming its outpost, capable of having relations with Iran without being drawn into its confrontations, and capable of maintaining international friendships without transferring its sovereignty.

The new Lebanese pact should no longer be just a power-sharing

The National Pact of 1943, then the Taif Agreements, sought to organize the balance between communities and institutions. Their historical logic is understandable. But the 21st century requires an additional floor: a pact of purpose.

This pact would not require the Lebanese to deny their differences. He would ask them to agree on what should be excluded from competition between communities: justice, money, security, financial control, professional administration, fundamental rights, strategic infrastructure and accountability before the law.

The national compromise should no longer focus solely on the question of who gets what function. It should address the question of which institutions no one has the right to own.

Perhaps that is where the deepest reform is. As long as all institutions can be distributed, shared or captured, no sector will be truly independent. Conversely, if certain functions become sacred because they belong to all, then a common State begins to exist.

A simple formula for a national project

At the end, a reason must be understood by a student, contractor, official, member, judge, expatriate or political official. It must not look like a government program. It must be a guiding principle.

It could be summarized as follows: Lebanon exists to enable different citizens to live free and equal in a single sovereign State, to protect their rights rather than their belongings, and to transform their diversity and openness to the world into prosperity and outreach.

Its mission can be summed up in the same way: to protect, to arbitrate, to do justice, to guarantee freedoms, to ensure sovereignty, to honestly manage collective resources and to create the conditions for everyone to progress by their merit.

His vision, finally, could be that of a country where no one needs to know someone to get what they are entitled to; where one no longer needs a community to feel protected; where there was no need to leave the country to imagine a future; and where no external power can speak in place of Lebanese institutions.

Conclusion: moving from state division to common building

Lebanon has long sought peace in the balance of fears. Each group wanted to be strong enough not to be dominated by others. This logic has allowed some compromises, but it cannot be a lasting vision.

The next step must be different: to build a state that is fair enough for everyone to agree not to own it.

It’s a huge transformation. It involves moving from Community protection to legal protection, from rent to production, from intermediation to law, from foreign influence to sovereignty, from passive coexistence to common citizenship.

Lebanon is therefore not intended to be the place where communities share the State. It is intended to become the state that allows communities to no longer have to fight for survival.

This sentence may contain the essence of the national project. She does not ask the Lebanese to forget what they are. She asks them to decide what they want to build together.

Before reforming the central bank, the banks, the judiciary, the administration or the Constitution, it is necessary to know what project these reforms should be used for. For no reason, they will remain a succession of technical measures. With a shared raison d’être, they become the instruments of a refoundation.

Thus, the problem of Lebanon may not only have failed to implement its laws or modernize its institutions. It is that he never completed the definition of his political contract. The question is no longer simply: how to save the system? What Lebanon deserves to be saved?

My answer would be this: a sovereign Lebanon because it belongs to all, free because no identity is threatened there, just because no one is above the law, open because it is not afraid of the world, and prosperous because it transforms its diversity into collective intelligence rather than into competition of clienteles.

Bernard Raymond Jabre •