The vote on the media bill by joint parliamentary committees should not be presented as mere technical modernization. In Lebanon, an information law directly affects the press, but also ordinary citizens who publish on Facebook, X, Instagram, TikTok or WhatsApp. The dispatch of the National Information Agency indicates that the committees approved the text and that Nabih Berry convened the parliamentary bureau to prepare a plenary session next week. This sequence places Members of Parliament on a heavy responsibility. They can strengthen freedom of expression. They can also create a new monitoring tool in a country where public criticism is often treated as a threat.
The stakes go beyond editorials. Lebanon lives in a hybrid media space. A citizen is filming an altercation with a police officer. A depositor accuses his bank on Facebook. An activist publishes a list of officials involved in a public matter. A doctor criticises a ministry. A mother denounces the cost of a private school. These actions are not part of classical journalism. Yet they participate in the public debate. If the law misguides digital media, these citizens can become the first targets. The announced reform must therefore be judged not only on the rights of journalists, but also on the risks it creates for ordinary users of social networks.
A reform expected, but in a climate of distrust
Lebanon needs a new media law. The current framework remains fragmented, old and often unsuitable for digital use. The texts inherited from the printed press, the rules specific to audiovisual media, the penal code, military justice and the practices of security services overlap. This confusion allows multiple prosecutions for the same expression. It also nourishes permanent uncertainty. A journalist, a humorist or a simple internet user does not always know what authority he will be summoned to, or on what legal basis.
Retrouvez les dernieres depeches et mises a jour en direct sur Libnanews Live.
This reform could therefore have been a historic opportunity. It could abolish prison sentences for offences related to expression, protect the confidentiality of sources, limit abusive summonses and place defamation disputes in a proportionate civil setting. It could also recognize digital media without imposing excessive administrative barriers. Such a text would have strengthened the public’s right to information and reduced pressure on journalists. It also reportedly protected citizens who participated in the public debate without belonging to an editorial board.
But the way the case progresses feeds mistrust. Freedom organisations have already alerted attempts to reintroduce more repressive provisions. They mentioned the risk of vague formulations, pre-trial detention, criminal sanctions or a regulatory authority exposed to political balances. The problem is not so much the idea of a law as the final version. A reform can be progressive in its title and liberticide in its details. In Lebanon, this danger is real, because ambiguous texts are often interpreted against the least protected voices.
Media Act: the risk of too wide a net
The main danger lies in the scope of the media law. If the text is limited to media companies, channels, radios and recorded news sites, its effects will first affect professionals. If, on the other hand, it defines digital media too broadly, it may include personal Facebook pages, X accounts, YouTube channels, TikTok pages or citizen-run groups. This difference is fundamental. It determines whether the law governs a professional sector or whether it monitors social expression.
Lebanon cannot ignore the importance of social networks. They have become information, alert, denunciation and sometimes manipulation spaces. They can spread rumors, insults and hate campaigns. But they also document abuses, challenge official stories and give a voice to people excluded from the mainstream media. Treating them as conventional media would be a mistake. A citizen who posts a video from his neighbourhood has no legal service, no editor, no compliance budget.
The law should therefore clearly distinguish three categories. The first includes professional media, which regularly publish information and may be subject to transparency requirements. The second concerns content creators who monetize their activity and influence the public. The third brings together ordinary citizens, who express themselves in an ad hoc or personal way. Confounding them would put the same constraints on a Facebook user as on a TV channel. That would be disproportionate and dangerous.
Facebook, X, TikTok: When an opinion becomes a judicial file
The consequences for social networks can be immediate. If the law maintains or introduces vague concepts such as the violation of dignity, reputation, national security, institutions or civil peace, ordinary publications may become judicial records. A harsh comment against a minister could be presented as an infringement of an institution. A judge’s criticism could be interpreted as an attack on justice. A video showing police abuse could be accused of damaging the state image. Risk is not theoretical. Lebanon is already familiar with calls for messages, jokes, publications and online speeches.
Non-journalists will be the most vulnerable. A journalist may sometimes rely on editorial staff, a trade union, lawyers or defence organizations. An isolated citizen does not have these protections. He may delete his message from the first summons. He can accept a humiliating compromise. It can be self-censored for long. Fear of questioning is often enough to reduce public debate. A poorly drafted law will not only create convictions. It will create silence.
Platforms themselves can also become indirect control auxiliaries. If the authorities demand the speedy removal of content on pain of sanctions, Facebook, X, TikTok or Instagram will tend to withdraw from it by caution. Platforms do not judge the Lebanese political context with finesse. They often apply standardized rules, sometimes poorly adapted to dialectic Arabic, satire or local conflicts. A formal request, even if questionable, can therefore produce a rapid withdrawal. The citizen would lose its content before an independent judge examines the case.
Fighting false news can become a pretext
Advocates of stronger management often invoke false news. The argument is admissible. Lebanon suffers financial rumours, security intoxications, accusations without proof, video montages, sectarian campaigns and political manipulation. Social networks have sometimes exacerbated banking panic, community tensions or attacks on vulnerable groups. The State has the right to protect the public from coordinated disinformation campaigns.
But the notion of false news is one of the most dangerous when used by a fragile or partisan power. Information may be incomplete without being false. An investigation may reveal facts still in dispute. An alert may be issued prior to official confirmation. An opinion can be exaggerated without constituting manipulation. If the law does not establish a strict border, the authorities can punish political embarrassment under cover of truth. In a country where the institutions themselves often communicate late, ill or contradictoryly, entrusting the state with the monopoly of truth would be a fault.
The right answer is not through prison, nor through security summonses. It requires the right of reply, correction, access to public data, transparency of institutions and media education. It also involves speedy, civil and proportionate judicial proceedings. A false publication that causes real harm must be able to be corrected and punished. But the sanction must be for damage, not for intimidating the debate. Law must not become a weapon of revenge for powerful politicians, banks, administrations or groups.
Non-journalists, blind spot of protection
Most debates on the law speak of journalists. This is necessary, but insufficient. The Lebanese information landscape is increasingly based on non-professional actors. Residents report water cuts. Groups of parents report school fees. Collective depositors document banking restrictions. Families of victims are calling for justice. Environmental activists publish photos of landfills or pollution. Citizens run queues, abuses, destroyed roads or security incidents.
These people do not always ask to be recognized as journalists. They ask not to be treated as offenders when they document a public problem. A modern law should therefore provide for protection of citizen participation. It should distinguish bad faith, incitement to violence and organized defamation from ordinary criticism. In particular, it should protect expression in public interest cases. The more a target person exercises a public service or an important economic power, the more critical it is.
Without this distinction, the text may favour the powerful. A minister, director of administration, banker, party leader or state-related contractor may sue a citizen for a Facebook post. Even if the citizen wins later, the procedure will have already punished him. It will have wasted time, money and energy. He’ll understand the message. Next time, he’ll shut up. This is how the deterrent effect works. He doesn’t need massive convictions. A few visible cases are enough to discipline thousands of users.
Self-censorship, most likely consequence
The first consequence of an ambiguous law will not be the closure of the media. It’ll be self-censorship. Journalists will avoid some names. Citizens will delete publications. Group administrators will refuse sensitive messages. The humorists will remove sketches. The influencers will avoid political issues. Alert launchers will keep documents in their phones. Families of victims will seek advice before publishing a sentence. This invisible slowdown in public speech can be more serious than official censorship.
Self-censorship affects people without social protection. A citizen without a lawyer, a precarious official, a student, a nurse, a teacher or a bank employee will not take the same risk as a Member of Parliament or a media owner. The law can therefore produce new inequality. The most powerful will continue to speak. The most fragile will withdraw. In a country already marked by clientelism, this would be a major development. It would further reduce the capacity of citizens to hold accountable.
The Lebanese public debate is often brutal. It contains insults, rumors and excesses. But the answer cannot be legislation that puts everyone under threat. Appeals for violence, threats, coordinated campaigns and serious defamation must be punished. It is also necessary to preserve acerbic criticism, satire, social anger and denunciation of public interest. A democracy accepts that citizens sometimes speak harshly. It does not turn every clumsy phrase into a state case.
A regulatory authority can become a ministry of truth
The bill also raises the question of the authority to regulate the media. In theory, such a structure can be useful. It can organise the sector, protect pluralism, deal with complaints and ensure transparency rules. In Lebanese practice, the risk of politicization is major. If members are chosen according to parliamentary, religious or partisan balances, the authority will become a control point. It can punish weak media and save protected media.
This risk also concerns social networks. An authority with the power to request the removal of content, transmit files or impose administrative sanctions could affect online publications. The question is not just who regulates it. It is to know on what guarantees. Any withdrawal decision should be reasoned, limited, proportionate and subject to prompt appeal. Citizens should be informed. Platforms should publish data on applications received. Without transparency, regulation will become opaque and therefore suspicious.
The temptation to control is strong in states in crisis. Policy makers often accuse the media and social networks of aggravating panic, damaging institutions or threatening stability. These accusations may sometimes be aimed at real abuses. They are also used to avoid responsibilities. In Lebanon, social anger was not born from Facebook. It comes from banking collapse, corruption, shortages, explosions, wars and impunity. A media law should not allow officials to confuse criticism with destabilization.
Content influencers and creators in a grey area
The law will also have to deal with influencers and content creators. Some accounts now have a higher audience than traditional media. They publish information, direct campaigns, advertise politically or commercially and can reach hundreds of thousands of subscribers. It would be naive to consider them mere citizens. When an account monetizes its influence and regularly broadcasts news content, transparency obligations can be justified.
But these obligations must remain proportionate. Declare a commercial partnership, identify political publicity, correct false information and respect the right of reply are legitimate requirements. Imposing a pre-licensing, professional card or political authorization would be dangerous. Content creators should not become dependent on administrative approval to speak. The law should aim at abusive practices, not even the existence of independent speech.
The border will be difficult to trace. A personal account can become influential within a few weeks. A local page can play an information role during a crisis. An activist can publish investigations without being a journalist. Therefore, the law must avoid rigid definitions. It must protect the public interest, punish proven abuses and allow the digital space to breathe. The law must accompany the media change, not try to put it back under old control.
The real criterion: who will be afraid after the vote?
Parliament can evaluate the law with a simple question: who will be afraid after its adoption? If the corrupt, the traffickers, the propagandists of threats and the spreaders of false campaigns are more afraid, the law will have fulfilled a useful function. If journalists, humorists, critical citizens, victims’ families, depositors and activists are more afraid, the law will have missed its goal. This criterion is better than official discourses on modernization.
The final text must therefore guarantee several points. No prison for expression offences. No pre-trial detention in media and publications cases. No jurisdiction of military courts for public statements. No prior license for citizens and small digital media. Strict definitions of defamation, incitement and misinformation. Enhanced protection for matters of public interest. An independent regulatory authority, transparent and controlled by the judge. A right of prompt appeal against the withdrawal of content.
These guarantees are not technical details. They determine the daily lives of thousands of people who publish online. They will say whether a citizen can still write that an administration is working badly, that an injured bank, that an official has lied or that a public service has failed. They will also say whether independent media can investigate without fear of judicial ruin. Lebanon does not need a law that gives a modern varnish to old methods of pressure.
Plenary as a moment of truth
The adoption of joint committees opens a decisive phase. The announced plenary session can turn reform into progress or backwards. The consolidated text should be published before the vote. Members should explain the sensitive articles. Professional organizations should be able to comment. Citizens should know whether their publications on Facebook, X, Instagram or TikTok will be protected or exposed. A law concerning public speaking cannot move forward in the opacity.
Lebanon already has enough laws applied selectively. He has enough summonses to intimidate. It has enough institutions that protect the powerful faster than the citizens. The media law can break with this logic. It can also fit into a cleaner, more digital and more efficient environment. It will depend on the amendments adopted and on Parliament’s ability to resist the temptation of control.
The reform will be judged to its practical effects. The day after the vote, can a journalist investigate a minister without fear of arrest? Can a depositor denounce his bank on Facebook without receiving a summons? Can a comedian mock a religious or political authority without risking prison? Will a citizen be able to film an abuse on the street without being accused of violating the image of the state? These questions, more than official press releases, will say whether Lebanon has passed a law to protect information or discipline those who speak.
