The departure of JD Vance from Islamabad without agreement closed the sequence of de-escalation that seemed to open between Washington and Tehran. On the ground, fighting continues in southern Lebanon, ambiguities remain on the real scope of the partial truce around Beirut, and strikes against Nabatiyah have further aggravated the political signal. In this context, Pakistan’s failure does not relieve Lebanon: on the contrary, it shifts pressure to Washington, where Beirut may be called upon to negotiate without any real leverage, against an Israel that retains the military and political initiative.
The departure of JD Vance from Islamabad without a clear result is not just a diplomatic setback. It marks the failure, at least provisional, of a sequence which was to produce a minimum of regional stabilisation. This failure cannot be read in isolation. It intervenes even as contradictory military signals have accumulated: passage of American buildings through the Strait of Ormuz, continuation of fighting in southern Lebanon, maintenance of strong Israeli pressure on the ground, despite the idea of a form of partial truce around Beirut. Is Beirut concerned as a whole, or only certain sectors? And does the southern suburbs really fit into this logic of restraint? Nothing at this stage makes it possible to consider that the de-escalation has been clear, coherent and fully assumed.
It is even the reverse that dominates. Everything gives the feeling of a sabotaged sequence, or at least made politically untenable. For while the Pakistani Canal was supposed to work on a calming, military events continued to produce a contrary message. So the question is not just why Islamabad failed. It is to understand to whom this failure benefits, and in what configuration it now returns Lebanon.
The central point is there: Lebanon will find itself more exposed after the failure of Islamabad than it was before. As long as the Iran-United States Canal remained open, even fragile, there was at least one possibility to argue that the Lebanese component could not be separated from regional de-escalation. This line, Teheran had it. It consisted of saying that a ceasefire that ignores Lebanon is a lame, politically unsustainable and strategically biased ceasefire. But if Islamabad fails, the discussion is moving to Washington, but under much more unfavourable conditions for Beirut.
Why? Because pressure, in this case, will not apply to Israel. It will exercise over Lebanon. It is now a classic mechanism: when a regional diplomatic process closes, the weakest link is required to produce concessions to save what can still be. And in the current configuration, the weak link is Beirut.
It must be made clear that Lebanon has virtually no autonomous map to negotiate. Several actions have already been implemented to reassure or satisfy some of the external requirements. The issue of the disarmament of Hezbollah has already been a matter of principle in the Council of Ministers. Diplomatic signals were also sent to Tehran. But none of these actions really transform the balance of power. Above all, they show a Lebanese will to avoid complete isolation, without creating a real lever against Israel.
That’s the whole problem. The Lebanese State can multiply the markers of good will, it has neither the military capacity to compel Israel, nor the political and operational means to impose, alone, quickly, a disarmament of Hezbollah. It can set principles, but not immediately convert them into credible strategic architecture. In other words, it can enter into negotiations, but without being able to negotiate equally.
Faced with this, Israel arrives with an infinitely stronger position. Not only because it keeps the military initiative, but also because some of its objectives go far beyond the mere security of the northern border. In the most disturbing reading of the sequence, it is no longer only a matter of getting a retreat of Hezbollah or a reduction of the threat. It is also a matter of establishing a lasting transformation of the land in southern Lebanon: buffer zone, prolonged destruction, preventing the normal return of people, or even, in the most radical versions of the Israeli debate, projection to the Litani. In addition to this, there are other ambitions raised more widely but equally worryingly: questioning acquired parameters, pressure on maritime demarcation, inclusion of Lebanese energy resources in a redefined balance of power logic.
That’s why the current configuration is so bad. Lebanon arrives in Washington without substantial maps, while Israel retains both the strength, the time, and the political advantage of the one imposing the agenda. Even the continuation of the strikes in the last few days gives an overview. The case of Nabatiyah is particularly significant. When a strike hits the large serail and affects personnel related to general safety, state security or other local public bodies, it is no longer possible to speak of a war against an armed organisation. Lebanese State structures are also affected, directly or indirectly. The message is clear: Israel speaks of negotiations, but at the same time continues to degrade the institutions of the country with which it is supposed to speak.
It is this contradiction that feeds the suspicion of Israeli bad faith. On the one hand, there is a talk about talks and a possible truce. On the other hand, operations are being maintained that empty this truce of its real scope and remind Beirut that the discussion will be under duress. In practice, this amounts to transforming the negotiation into an extension of the military power ratio.
The failure of Islamabad further exacerbates this imbalance. For as long as the Pakistani channel existed, Israel had to deal with an indirect constraint: the risk that the continuation of the war in Lebanon would appear as the element that derailed a wider de-escalation sequence. This risk partially limited its narrative margin. If Islamabad collapses, this constraint weakens. And Washington can then become the place of another logic: no longer a global discussion on appeasement, but a targeted pressure on Lebanon to deliver guarantees that it does not really have the means to produce. The hardest part of it is here. Lebanon does not go to Washington to negotiate from a position of strength. He goes there to try to avoid worse. It’s not the same thing. It is not a process where two parties meet with already identified reciprocal concessions and balanced guarantees. It is a scene where Beirut is likely to be called upon to ratify a defined framework elsewhere, with immediate demands on one side and vague promises on the other.
In these circumstances, the question is not only whether the talks will take place, nor whether they can produce a relative decrease in violence. The real question is what Lebanon can still save in a negotiation where it does not enter with a military lever, with an autonomous diplomatic lever, or with a real blocking power. And the answer at this stage is brutal: very little.
The failure of Islamabad therefore does not open a better sequence for Lebanon. It opens a harder sequence. A sequence where Lebanese weakness is likely to be less corrected than exploited. A sequence where diplomacy does not really suspend the war, but reorganize it. A sequence, finally, where Beirut may be pushed to discuss not to restore a balance, but to endorse its absence.
