Zugzwang in the Gulf: when all options lead to loss

8 avril 2026Libnanews Translation Bot

There are moments in history when geopolitics cease to be a game of influence to become an implacable mechanics. The open — or cowardly — confrontation between Israel, the United States and Iran today places the Gulf monarchies in a position that recalls a well-known notion of chess players: the zugzwang. A situation where every shot available worsens the position.

For two decades, the Gulf powers believed they could play on several tables at once. They invested massively in Africa, took foot in the strategic ports of the Red Sea, influenced the fragile balances of Sudan, while clinging to the American security umbrella. This strategy was based on an implicit assumption that Iran-American rivalry would remain contained, manageable, almost abstract.

This assumption is collapsing.

Today, two scenarios are emerging. None is in favour.

In the first, Iran resists, cashes, survives — and turns this survival into a strategic victory. It would not be a classic military victory, but a victory of endurance, saturation, wear and tear. A victory at Karpov, where the adversary is not destroyed, but neutralized.

In such a case, the Gulf monarchies become immediately vulnerable. Not by direct invasion — unlikely — but by constant political, economic and security pressure. Iran could demand what it never got: the questioning of the US military presence in the region. The closure, or at least the neutralisation, of the bases which today constitute the keystone of the Gulf security.

This shift would have profound consequences. The credibility of the regimes would be undermined. International investors, whose confidence is largely based on the security stability guaranteed by Washington, would begin to reconsider their exposure. Major projects — megacities, sovereign funds, technological ambitions — would suddenly appear as fragile or even speculative.

In other words, Iran’s survival would bring the Gulf countries into an era of reversed strategic dependence. They would move from actors to regional power objects.

In the second scenario, the United States clearly prevails. Iran is weakened, contained, or even permanently neutralized. On paper, this should reassure the Gulf allies.

But this victory has a price. And this price will not be paid in Washington.

Recent history is unambiguous: American wars in the Middle East have always been, directly or indirectly, financed by petromonarchies. Whether through massive arms purchases, security agreements, direct contributions or more discreet financial mechanisms, the bill is systematically outsourced.

In this scenario, the Gulf countries find themselves forced to finance their own protection — at an unprecedented level. Sovereign budgets, already engaged in ambitious economic transformations, would be under pressure. Priorities should be redefined. External investment — particularly in Africa and the Sudan — would become secondary or even unsustainable.

It must be made clear that the ambitions of economic expansion and Gulf influence are based on an essential condition — available liquidity. But this liquidity is not infinite. It depends on energy prices, regional stability and the cost of security.

If security becomes structurally expensive, expansion becomes a luxury.

In both cases, the result is the same: a withdrawal.

Strategic replica, first. Less indirect interventions, less risky geopolitical bets, less projection in unstable areas like Sudan.

Economic fold, then. Priority given to internal consolidation rather than external expansion. Stricter arbitrations, increased selectivity, abandonment of peripheral projects.

I mean, psychological restraint. The end of an illusion: that of a Gulf capable of playing the rank of the great powers without assuming the fundamental constraints.

The most striking thing in this configuration is that the Gulf dilemma does not depend on its own decisions. It is caught in a dynamic that exceeds it. Whatever the outcome of the conflict, room for manoeuvre is reduced.

That’s precisely that, a geopolitical zugzwang.

Moving is losing.

Don’t move, it’s losing too.

In this context, the only rational strategy is no longer expansion, but preservation. Reduce exposure, secure gains, avoid irreversible commitments. In other words, moving from empire logic to survival logic.

History shows that the powers that refuse this changeover on time pay the high price.

The Gulf today faces this choice — discreet, but decisive.