The ceasefire between Washington and Tehran produced a paradoxical effect in Lebanon. In theory, it should have opened a window of de-escalation for a country devastated since the war resumed on 2 March. In practice, it has mainly exposed the weakening of the Lebanese state. The terms of the truce were discussed without Beirut at the centre of the table. Iran defended the inclusion of Lebanon in the agreement, Pakistan relayed, Israel denied, the United States structured the sequence, and France then had to intervene to demand that Lebanon be fully included. In this crisis, the Lebanese authorities appear to be the great losers: diplomatically marginalized, militarily challenged, politically weakened and deprived of the ability to impose their own reading of war and peace on their territory.
A cease-fire negotiated elsewhere on ravaged Lebanese territory
The first observation is brutal: Lebanon paid the price of war without weighing up to that price in the negotiation of the ceasefire. In early April, several news agencies reported more than 1,300 deaths in Lebanon and more than 1,500 days later, as well as more than 1 million internally displaced persons. Yet, in the architecture of the truce, Beirut does not appear either as a pivotal actor or as a central decision maker. The agreement was reached by Pakistani mediation, and was followed by an exchange between Washington and Tehran on Ormuz, the strikes and the opening of talks in Islamabad. Lebanon, for its part, remains an object of compromise more than a sovereign subject of negotiation.
This departure is all the more striking because the Lebanese question was not secondary. It became one of the main friction points around the truce. Pakistan and Iran argued that Lebanon was included in the agreement. Benyamin Netanyahu immediately claimed the opposite. Israel then maintained evacuation orders and announced further strikes, including around Tyre. Clearly, the ceasefire was not tested in Tehran or Washington, but first in Lebanon. And yet, the Lebanese state was not the one that set the terms of the debate. This reality alone is sufficient to measure the decline in its effective sovereignty.
The sequence therefore reveals a fundamental imbalance. Lebanon remains one of the most bruised theatres of the war, but it is not recognized as one of the political centers of its resolution. Its leaders administer consequences, manage displacement, denounce strikes, seek ad hoc guarantees, but they do not define the general framework, the red lines, or the vocabulary of de-escalation. This dispossession is at the heart of the political defeat of the Lebanese authorities. She explains why the night of the ceasefire was less like a relief to Beirut than a demonstration of weakness.
Breaking the official channel with Iran cost a lot to Beirut
The second element of this defeat is diplomatic. In late March, the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the Iranian ambassador persona non grata and asked him to leave the country. Tehran replied that he would remain in office, and several media sources stressed that this Lebanese decision was being challenged within the political system itself. The result was doubly bad for Beirut: neither net breakup nor functional relationship. The Lebanese State displayed a gesture of firmness without being able to transform this gesture into an effective diplomatic lever.
We have to stay rigorous. There is no evidence that Lebanon has completely broken diplomatic relations with Iran. On the other hand, they clearly show that the Lebanese authorities have degraded their official channel with one of the central actors of the crisis, at a time when this actor was becoming indispensable again in the discussion of the war, the ceasefire and the status of Lebanon in the regional sequence. In an area where both formal and informal channels count as much, this degradation has weighed heavily. It reduced Beirut’s ability to discuss directly with Tehran at a time when this discussion became politically decisive.
This error had a very concrete effect: when Iran, Pakistan and Israel began to dispute whether or not Lebanon was part of the truce, the Lebanese State did not impose itself as the indispensable interlocutor on this point. He was, at best, a third party concerned; at worst, one territory discussed by others. Weakness is therefore not only military. It is institutional. When your country becomes a negotiating theme between foreign capitals without your diplomacy being able to impose its reading, you are no longer in control of the political pace of the crisis.
Iran defended Lebanon more visibly than the Lebanese state
This is where the paradox becomes the most difficult to absorb for Beirut. The actor who most clearly supported the idea that Lebanon should be included in the ceasefire was not the Lebanese state, but Iran. Sources close to Hezbollah claimed that Tehran had insisted that Lebanon be included in the agreement with the United States, while Pakistan publicly supported that reading. Opposite, Israel opposed a clear refusal. This simple face-to-face is already a major symbolic setback for the Lebanese authorities: the defence of the Lebanese front was played first between Tehran, Islamabad, Washington and Jerusalem.
For Hezbollah’s opponents, the political effect is formidable. For it allows the pro-Iranian camp to support a simple thesis: when the Lebanese state does not get anything, Iran imposes at least the Lebanese question in the negotiations. In essence, it does not matter whether Lebanon’s inclusion in the truce remains contested or incomplete. The main gain is narrative. It is to make Tehran more useful for the protection of Lebanon than the Lebanese institutions themselves. In a fractured country, where legitimacy is also measured by perceived efficiency, this reversal of political prestige is extremely heavy.
This mechanically weakens the camp that defends the restoration of a state monopoly on the decision of war and peace. In principle, this camp retains the argument of law, legality and sovereignty. But on the ground of the visible result, it comes up against a more cruel observation: when the country burns, it is not the official institutions that seem to obtain the most sensitive concessions. The ceasefire thus revived an old Lebanese contradiction: the State retains formal legitimacy, but the Iran-Hezbollah axis claims operational utility. And in times of crisis, this utility often weighs more than abstract principles.
The precedent of 2024 had already weakened Beirut’s credibility
The current failure is not born of nothing. It is part of the continuation of the 2024 cease-fire, which was already to restore a more State logic south of the Litani. At the time, dispatches recalled that the truce prohibited Israel from conducting offensive operations in Lebanon and required that only official forces carry arms in the south, while Israel maintained that it could continue to strike Hezbollah in case of violations. From the outset, therefore, there was a gap between the text accepted by Beirut and the Israeli security reading of its application.
This discrepancy quickly undermined the credibility of the scheme. As early as the first few days, news agencies had already reported strikes, exchanges of fire and cross accusations of violations. In other words, the previous ceasefire did not consolidate Lebanese sovereignty on the ground. He left behind a situation in which Israel believed that it had a right to military action, while Beirut denounced a permanent violation of the framework intended to protect it. The crisis of 2026 is therefore only aggravating an older flaw: the Lebanese State had already signed an agreement which it never managed to enforce according to its own reading.
This makes the current comparison particularly destructive. The new ceasefire does not appear to be a reparation for the failure of 2024. On the contrary, it appears as yet another demonstration that the political guarantees granted to Lebanon remain fragile, reversible and dependent on external actors. Even without taking into account figures not fully confirmed over the interim period, one point is clear: between the 2024 ceasefire and the open war re-launched on 2 March 2026, the promised stabilization did not take place. And since 2 March, the country has returned to a deadly cycle of destruction and mass displacement.
The other major mistake: the army did not give the state back its credibility
The question of the Lebanese army has become one of the most sensitive angles of this sequence. The authorities described the military deployment to the south as a step towards restoring sovereignty. In January, the military institution even claimed to have effectively and tangiblely established the state monopoly on arms south of the Litani, while recognizing that certain positions remained occupied by Israeli forces. President Joseph Aoun then defended the idea that this deployment enshrined the principle that war and peace are the responsibility of the State alone. At the institutional level, the message was clear: official Lebanon was taking over.
But this story broke down on military facts. For in the perception of a growing part of opinion, the army did not incarnate a takeover. On the contrary, it embodied a de facto form of withdrawal in front of the Israeli army, or at least a visible inability to impose the presence of the State as an effective protection force. One month after the beginning of the open war, there was no end in sight, Israel was considering a prolonged presence in the south, and evacuation orders continued despite the announced truce. In this context, the sovereignty promised by the deployment seemed theoretical.
The shade is important. It is not a question of saying that the Lebanese army has formally fled the ground. The facts available do not permit such a general statement. On the other hand, it is true that, in political and popular perceptions, it often seemed unable to prevent Israeli progress, repeated strikes or the logic of partial occupation. In a war, this perception counts enormously. An army can be present administratively, coordinate, secure certain areas, demine, manage emergency; If it fails to prevent the adversary from continuing to dictate the military rhythm, it quickly loses symbolic credibility.
Christian areas struck, a south unprotected: the army challenged everywhere
The loss of credibility is not just to the south. It also reads in the geographical extension of fear. On 6 April, an Israeli strike at Ain Saadé, near Beirut, killed Pierre Moawad, the Lebanese Forces local leader, and his wife. Israel claimed to target a terrorist-related site and said that Moawad was not an intentional target, but the political impact was immediate: the strike revived internal tensions and fueled the idea that even Christian areas, perceived as less directly related to Hezbollah, could no longer consider themselves protected.
This sequence further weakens the army and the state. In the Christian regions, it fosters the feeling that institutions have not been able to create truly sanctified spaces. In the south, the blame is different but equally severe: the army did not prevent Israeli advances, repeated strikes, or mass displacement. In both cases, the social verdict is close: the State promises protection that it fails to guarantee. This convergence is politically destructive because it affects very different segments of opinion and broadens the crisis of confidence far beyond the debate on Hezbollah alone.
The army is thus locked in an almost insoluble contradiction. His anti-Hezbollah critics accuse him of having neither disarmed the movement nor restored a real monopoly of force. The pro-Hezbollah circles accuse them of not defending the country against Israel and of being only an instrument of internal management, unable to fulfil a national defence mission. For a camp, it is too weak against Hezbollah; For the other, it is too passive to Israel. Between these two contradictory trials, its margin of legitimacy was considerably reduced.
The Lebanese government faces a politically toxic alternative
It is one of the most delicate nodes in the sequence. The Lebanese government is facing an almost untenable alternative. Either he claims that the ceasefire concerns Lebanon. In this case, it actually validates the Iranian and Pakistani reading of the agreement, therefore a reading in which the inclusion of Lebanon was defended by Tehran against the Israeli objection. Politically, this amounts to appearing, at least on this point, in a circumstance alignment with the Iranian axis. For a minister such as Youssef Raggi, who has precisely tightened the tone vis-à-vis the Iranian ambassador, the contradiction would be spectacular.
On the other hand, the Lebanese government, like Israel, claims that the ceasefire does not concern Lebanon. In this case, it implicitly acknowledges that its own territory remains outside the scope of a regional de-escalation, though presented as a major. This position would be politically explosive internally. In essence, it would mean that Beirut would agree to end the Israeli reading of a separate Lebanon, even as the country continues to be hit, evacuated and destroyed. To public opinion, such a position would be difficult to maintain, since it would not make the government an inadequate protector, but almost an assumed viewer of Lebanon’s exclusion from the truce.
This is probably the best measure of the impasse of the Lebanese authorities. If they adopt Iranian reading, they blur their internal diplomatic line and offer Hezbollah an additional legitimization argument. If they adopt Israeli reading, they expose themselves to a crisis of major national credibility. In both cases, they lose. This political trap summarizes the weakness of their position: they do not define the framework, they choose only between two readings produced elsewhere, each costly for them.
Hezbollah comes out less isolated than its opponents
The third great loser of the sequence is not only the abstract state. It was also the political forces that had relied on the weakening of Hezbollah. Before the cease-fire, there appeared to be signs of this. The death of Pierre Moawad in Ain Saadé fueled anti-Hezbollah anger in some circles, recalling the cost paid by all Lebanon for a war waged by the movement in solidarity with Iran. On paper, Hezbollah’s opponents could hope to turn this resentment into a political advantage.
But the ceasefire has at least partially altered this narrative power ratio. Three sources close to Hezbollah claimed that the movement had respected the truce in its early hours despite continued Israeli strikes. At the same time, Iran appears as the actor who most clearly insisted on including Lebanon in the agreement. Hezbollah can therefore support two politically useful ideas: first that it has not sabotaged de-escalation; Then his regional camp defended Lebanon more effectively than the official state. This is not enough to erase internal criticism, but it makes it capable of political counter-attack.
Hezbollah’s opponents thus find themselves in a trap. They continue to denounce the Iranian grip, which remains consistent with their line. But this denunciation loses part of its immediate performance if, at the same time, Tehran appears as the actor who pushes to stop Israeli operations in Lebanon, while the State and the army remain powerless. This is a formidable reversal: the state monopoly camp retains the language of legitimacy, but the Hezbollah camp recovers, at least in part, the language of efficiency.
The American umbrella appears limited, and it rejalls on Beirut
The other factor that weakens the Lebanese authorities is the US leverage limit. The United States had a break with Iran and the reopening of the Strait of Ormuz, but had not imposed a consistent reading of the ceasefire on Lebanon. Israel publicly maintained that Lebanon was not included, and then continued its operations and evacuation orders. For Beirut, the signal is bad: even backed by American guarantees, Lebanese sovereignty does not manage to discipline Israeli action in a lasting manner.
This point goes beyond the Lebanese case alone. The regional sequence also showed that Iran remained a central player in the strategic balances of the Gulf and the Levant. Without saying that he got everything he wanted, the available information shows at least that he got a military respite, the centrality of Ormuz in negotiating and opening talks in Islamabad. The United States has achieved a useful de-escalation without resolving all substantive issues. For Washington’s local allies, including institutional Lebanon, this asymmetry is politically costly: it gives Iran the image of a power that is once again inescapable, while the camp backed by Western guarantees seems less decisive on the ground.
Even France must correct the vacuum around Lebanon
Emmanuel Macron’s statement on 8 April sums up in his own way the extent of the problem. The French President welcomed the ceasefire while calling for full respect for it throughout the region and full inclusion of Lebanon. This formula is in itself a diagnosis. If Paris feels the need to insist publicly on the inclusion of Lebanon, it is true that there is a vacuum, ambiguity or risk of circumvention of the Lebanese element in the agreement. In other words, France did not only take a stand; It reported that Lebanon had failed to impose this requirement alone in the truce.
This French intervention underlines Beirut’s erasure more than it compensates for. When an external power comes to remind us that a regional ceasefire must also cover Lebanon, it is that the Lebanese authorities have failed to have this priority recognized as non-negotiable. Again, sovereignty is not completely absent; It is relayed, replaced, defended by others. A sovereignty under assistance has never the same political force as directly exercised sovereignty.
Reading table: Why Lebanese authorities lose
| Axis | What the authorities wanted to embody | What the sequence showed |
|---|---|---|
| Diplomacy | A State able to speak for Lebanon | Iran, Pakistan, Israel, the United States and France weighed more on the truce framework |
| Army | The return of the state monopoly to the south | The army did not prevent continued strikes, evacuations or the impression of a de facto withdrawal from Israel |
| Internal security | Protection of the territory and civilians | The strikes hit the south but also Ain Saadé near Beirut, nourishing the idea that no area is really sanctified |
| Internal policy | The weakening of Hezbollah | Hezbollah can say that it has respected the truce, while Iran appears as a more visible defender of Lebanon in the negotiations |
| External alliances | The value of US guarantees | Washington got a break with Iran, but did not impose a consistent treatment of Lebanon on Israel |
This table summarizes the core of the problem: on each of the pillars of its legitimacy — diplomacy, army, protection, alliances, ability to compete with Hezbollah — the Lebanese state comes out more fragile than before. And this fragility is not just a perception. It relies on a chain of visible, documented and politically devastating facts.
A defeat of sovereignty as much as a defeat of narrative
The Lebanese authorities are losing at three levels at the same time. They lose diplomatically, because they were not at the centre of negotiations. They lose militarily, because the army has not restored the credibility of the state and appears contested on all sides. They lose politically, because Hezbollah and Iran can claim, at least in the narrative, greater efficiency in placing Lebanon in the regional equation.
Perhaps the most just formula is this: Lebanese sovereignty is no longer produced by the State alone. It is now negotiated, challenged, corrected or claimed by external or armed actors. As long as this reality continues, every cease-fire concluded elsewhere will risk turning Beirut into a new indictment against its own institutions. And as long as the State cannot impose its diplomatic voice, guarantee credible protection of the territory, or resolve the Hezbollah issue, it will continue to appear as the great loser of the arrangements supposed to save Lebanon.
